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Synopsis: The Impact of the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy on 
the Development of National Policies.
This thesis looks at the impact of the Global AIDS Strategy, an ambitious attempt to 
combat HIV/AIDS with a concerted, liberal campaign co-ordinated by the World 
Health Organisation (WHO).
The thesis adopts a policy analysis approach to examine the Strategy's effects on the 
development and implementation of national AIDS policies in two case countries, 
Britain and Zambia. Policy network theory is used as a meso-level, explanatory 
theory to examine the ways in which different groups were able to exert pressure to 
resist or apply the over-arching principles of the Strategy.
Policy development in both countries was affected both by the WHO as an operational 
organisation and the Global AIDS Strategy as an institution -  “persistent and 
connected sets or rules ... that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and 
shape expectations” (Keohane, 1990; 732). In the early years of the epidemic, WHO 
collected and disseminated evidence in a way that helped to develop an international 
consensus about the nature and significance of the HIV/AIDS problem. In Britain, the 
WHO’s perceived authority was used to reinforce calls from the health policy 
community and from pressure groups for a liberal response to HIV/AIDS.
In Zambia's politically and economically unstable policy arena, however, WHO's 
interventions created a 'donor-dependent' network, a relatively large, interdependent 
network of weakly accountable state, non-government and donor agencies that acted 
effectively to exclude non-members. This effect of this network was to generate 
relatively bureaucratic and inappropriate responses to HIV/AIDS.
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Chapter one: The Global AIDS Strategy
Introduction
One o f the glories o f our era is that we have witnessed the birth o f 
global solidarity — imperfect, struggling, yet nonetheless real — in 
the creation o f the United Nations, in the concern about nuclear 
war, in the growing world-wide resolve to protect the environment, 
and in AIDS.
WHO/GPA, 1989a: 7
In 1985 the World Health Organisation (WHO), a specialised agency of the United 
Nations with responsibility for directing and co-ordinating international health 
work, began developing a trans-national strategy for dealing with the emerging 
problem of HIV/AIDS. The plan, which became known as the ‘Global AIDS 
Strategy’, was designed to “unite countries all over the world in a rational, co­
ordinated and effective way to prevent the spread of AIDS and to reduce its impact 
on individuals and societies” (WHO, 1989b: 5). Its rationale was unambiguous: 
HIV/AIDS presented a serious threat to world health and organised international 
co-ordination was the only effective way to control the problem.
In 1987 the Strategy was unanimously endorsed by the UN General Assembly, the 
World Health Assembly and the Venice Summit of Heads of State. Over the next 
seven years it was to become the largest ever peace-time operation by a UN 
agency, galvanising an unparalleled flow of donor resources to developing 
countries. A sense of the political significance of this global strategy permeates all 
WHO’s early literature on HTV/AIDS and gained particular resonance by 1989, 
when the collapse of the Berlin Wall offered the possibility of fully-integrated 
global co-operation unhindered by Cold War politics. The international response 
to HTV and AIDS was seen as evidence of a new era of international co-operation, 
in which scientists, government and non-government organisations could unite 
against a common threat. For the WHO AIDS programme’s first director, the late 
Dr. Jonathan Mann, “AIDS science was more international than the science of any
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other disease and perhaps any other scientific endeavour” (WHO, 1989a: 2).
The idea that the political primacy of the nation-state is being superceded by trans­
national economic and political forces has become a key theme in sociological 
debate. For many, ‘globalisation’ is seen as a threat to national economies and 
cultures (Gelinas, 1999; Neufeld, 1999; Mishra, 1998). For others -  including the 
architects of the Global AIDS Strategy -  recent political, economic and 
technological developments offer the possibility of greater international co­
operation in tackling key issues such as poverty, environmental regulation, world 
health and conflict management (Sachs, 1999; Short, 1998; WHO, 1989a).
This thesis examines the impact of an explicit and ambitious attempt to co-ordinate 
a global policy on the development of national AIDS policies in two case countries: 
Britain and Zambia. In so doing, it sheds light on the extent of, limits to and 
potential dangers of trans-national policy co-ordination. In its various guises as 
international expert, advocate and fimding-agent, the WHO played a significant 
role in structuring national-level responses to HIV/AIDS. Yet though nominally a 
global strategy, it is scarcely surprising that very different relationships evolved 
between the WHO and national organisations in the developed and developing 
world. In Britain, one of the industrialised countries that were effectively 
underwriting the costs of implementing the Strategy, the WHO’s not insignificant 
impact remained largely confined to advocacy and consensus-building. It 
supported national organisations that were lobbying for a liberal and concerted 
approach to HIV/AIDS. In Zambia, however, the WHO’s more direct role as 
funding body led to the establishment of an ambitious programme of HIV/AIDS 
interventions which the WHO had neither the financial nor political resources to 
implement effectively. The result was an expensive, bureaucratic and inappropriate 
response to HTV/AIDS.
1. The Global AIDS Strategy
The basic premises of the global strategy were first outlined by staff at the WHO in
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1985, but it was in 1987 that the strategy really began to come into effect. In 
February of that year, WHO inaugurated the Global Programme on AIDS (GPA) 
as an operational programme to implement the AIDS strategy. In May, the 40th 
World Health Assembly adopted resolution WHA40.26, calling for every country 
in the world to recognise the epidemic’s threat and to develop their own national 
AIDS programme. This was followed by an apparently overwhelming international 
endorsement of the WHO’s initiative. Within months, the UN General Assembly, 
the Venice Summit of Heads of States and a specially convened World Summit of 
Ministers of Health had ratified WHO’s Strategy.
At the 41st World Health Assembly in 1989, this resolution was augmented by 
resolution WHA42.34, which recognised the special contribution that was being 
made by non-government organisations. Governments, inter-governmental 
organisations and non-government organisations (NGOs) had complementary roles 
and should be able to contribute to the world wide initiative in ways which were 
“commensurate with their respective qualities and potentials” WHO, 1989c: 1). It 
also included an undertaking by signatory states to avoid discrimination against 
people with HTV/AIDS (WHO, 1989). The Global AIDS Strategy was finally in 
place.
The figure below shows the key premises of the Global AIDS Strategy. On an 
organisational level, the WHO was to take the lead in co-ordinating an organised 
international response to HTV/AIDS. There can be some confusion over the terms 
co-operation, co-ordination and collaboration. Co-ordination and collaboration 
can be seen as alternative ways of achieving co-operation, parties acting together 
to achieve a mutually acceptable strategy. Collaboration requires parties not to 
defect from a mutually desirable strategy in favour of an individually preferable 
one. International regimes controlling fishing levels, for example, require states to 
forgo short-term income maximisation in favour of the longer-term, collective 
benefit of ecological (and ultimately commercial) sustainability. Co-ordination, 
however, requires parties "to pursue a common strategy in order to avoid the 
mutually undesirable outcome arising from the pursuit of divergent strategies"
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(Little, 1997: 245). The Strategy explicitly sought trans-national co-ordination.
The Global AIDS Strategy then identified three objectives: to prevent HIV 
infection, to reduce the personal and social impact of HIV infection and to unify 
national and international efforts against AIDS. In the absence of an AIDS 
vaccine, the prevention element of the strategy was to be two-fold. Firstly, the 
spread of the disease was to be contained by information and education campaigns 
designed to modify individual behaviour. Secondly, a strategy of non­
discrimination against people with HTV and AIDS was to be adopted. 
Discrimination, it was argued, would cause “unnecessary additional suffering” as 
well as threatening public health more generally (WHO/GPA, 1989a: 5). The 
stigmatisation of those with HTV/AIDS, they argued, would serve only to 
discourage people from seeking advice and information on reducing their risk of 
infection. It would also dissuade people who may have been exposed to the virus 
from coming forward for testing, thereby driving the problem ‘underground’.
Figure Is The Global AIDS Strategy
Signatories WHO
Member states
Commitments Political, technical and financial resources
Cooperating partners WHO/GPA
Government (National AIDS Programmes) 
NGOs
Objectives The prevention of HIV infection (information and education)
Reduction of personal and social impact of AIDS (liberal, non-punitive 
approach)
Unifying national and international efforts
The Global AIDS Strategy embodied a fusion of late 20th Century liberal ideals. 
Firstly, it represented Bretton Woods principles — in that it envisaged a UN 
organisation leading a co-ordinated international response to a world-wide 
problem. Its design also reflected an increasing emphasis on liberal pluralism and
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the significance of non-government groups in a democratic, effective polity. Non­
government groups (NGOs) became increasingly important development players 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the perception being that they could provide 
more effective services than corrupt and inefficient state agencies. By the late 
1980s, this emphasis was strengthened by an emerging liberal consensus that the 
non-state sector played a vital role in generating wealth and ideas in parallel with 
the state, thereby acting as a check to inefficiency and authoritarianism (Robinson,
1996). Finally, and perhaps least obviously, the Strategy reflected an individualist, 
medico-liberal view of transmittable disease, predicated on individual rights and 
responsibilities. The state has a responsibility to educate people of the risks 
involved in particular activities and to protect the rights of those infected, but 
ultimate responsibility for the spread of the disease lay with individuals. An 
alternative, collectivist approach to controlling transmittable disease, is for the state 
to protect the general population by measures such as isolating infectious carriers, 
criminalising knowing transmission and/or refusing entry to — or deporting — 
infected aliens (Gordenker, Coate, Jonsson, and Soderholm, 1995). These types of 
population-based responses have been pursued in several states, including Cuba, 
China and Hungary (Berridge, 1996: 55; WHO, 1994b).
As the first international programme actively to address the problem of HTV/AIDS, 
the GPA had a critical role in formulating early AIDS policies. In the first place, it 
provided a central repository of information and ideas about the emerging 
epidemic. The global strategy was based on the WHO/GPA’s appraisal of the 
nature of the problem and on its understanding of the best way to deal with it. In 
the second place, donor funding on AIDS was largely channelled through its 
programmes. The programme attracted significant support from donors with 
contributions rising from only US$0.1 lm in 1986 to US$58.77m the following year 
and US$129.63m in 1988 (Laws, 1996: 380). The GPA soon became the largest 
single division of the WHO and was unusual within the organisation in that it 
supplied not only technical guidance to over 160 countries, but also field staff and 
financial support (WHO/GPA, 1996: 3).
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Gradually, however, the GPA’s influence on international AIDS interventions 
declined. In part, this was the natural result of an increasing number of 
organisations implementing their own programmes. New organisations brought 
with them new perspectives and new funds. The World Bank and UN 
Development Programme (UNDP), for example, viewed the problem in terms of its 
economic impact, and designed programmes accordingly. At the same time, 
evolving knowledge of the disease brought with it a recognition that AIDS 
presented a more complex range of policy problems than had been envisaged. The 
GPA’s original programme had been based on the vertically-structured health 
education programmes of the sort that had been successful in controlling epidemics 
such as typhoid and cholera. WHO-backed National AIDS Control Programmes 
(NACPs) were predicated on the importance of centralisation, of having a 
designated office with responsibility for national education campaigns. AIDS 
education, however, involved the culturally sensitive issue of sexuality. Many of 
the people most at risk were already socially and politically marginalised. Many 
were illiterate and/or had little access to the traditional channels of health education 
such as schools, health centres or community groups. Successful education 
programmes involved more diverse approaches and experiments were made with 
more community-based education, finding ways of communicating information in 
relevant and accessible ways. More significantly, it became increasingly apparent 
that many individual’s ability to control the extent to which they were exposed to 
risk was constrained by their economic, political and social resources. 
Increasingly, HTV/AIDS began to be seen as a human rights issue, rather than as a 
technical and informational problem.
In the process, the homogeneity of AIDS policies began to fragment. In March 
1990, its Director Jonathan Mann resigned citing important differences between his 
own and WHO Director General Hiroshi Nakajima’s positions on various areas of 
policy (Lancet, 1990: 8691). Unusually for a senior international bureaucrat, Mann 
went public with his dissatisfaction, directly criticising Nakajima’s lack of 
commitment to HTV/AIDS generally and to the GPA’s emphasis on human rights, 
support for grass-roots organisations and the global availability for drugs.
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Nakajima, he argued, had consistently tried to “inhibit and diminish GPA’s 
activities” (Lancet, 1990: 8691). At the same time, WHO as an organisation was 
becoming concerned about funding shortages. In 1992 it adopted a new ‘Paradigm 
for Health Action’ to accelerate the achievement of health for all member states, 
which included the need to mobilise a wider pool of resources for health (WHO, 
1992: 1).
The following year the World Health Assembly adopted the idea of replacing the 
GPA with a broader-based programme that would pool UN AIDS efforts. In 
January 1994 the WHO’s executive board passed a resolution to establish a co­
sponsored UN programme to “achieve global co-ordination of policies, approaches 
and funding in the urgent struggle to slow the spread of [AIDS]” (WHO, 1994a; 
1). On December 31, 1995, the GPA was formally dis-established and replaced 
with UNAIDS. This organisation was to be administered by WHO in collaboration 
with the UNDP, the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), the UN Population Fund 
(UNFPA), the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) 
and the World Bank. An official statement argued that “faced with a truly global 
emergency and its multi-sectoral needs, it is imperative that the UN response is 
comprehensive and effective. HIV/AIDS will not be controlled unless all of us, 
acting as a global community, unite our efforts, co-ordinate our actions and reduce 
duplication” {Global AIDS News, 1995: 1).
2. Research questions.
The Global AIDS Strategy is intriguing both for the ambitiousness of its remit and 
for the rapidity with which it established a formal international consensus on 
HIV/AIDS. HIV and AIDS provided policy-makers with a new problem, which 
impacted upon communities in diverse ways. Yet out of all the potential policy 
responses to it, a world-wide initiative was launched relatively early in the epidemic 
which had the specific aim of homogenising and co-ordinating national policies.
In many respects, the Global AIDS Strategy appeared to offer a prime opportunity
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for international co-ordination. The collapse of the Berlin wall had brought to an 
end some of the most immediate political obstacles to trans-national, UN-driven 
policy co-ordination. The health sector is generally considered to be an area of 
low politics', in which non-state and non-economic groups have a potentially 
greater role in policy development than the high politics' of economics and national 
security (Walt, 1994: 42). Thus, attempts at trans-national policy co-ordination in 
the health initiatives have a greater chance of survival than those that present a 
more direct threat to national economic or strategic interests. HIV and AIDS 
presented problems which were genuinely international (Christakis, 1989). The 
HTV virus was relatively easy to transmit and, given the extent of international 
travel, one state’s problem with HTV and AIDS could certainly affect others. 
Unlike most chronic diseases, its heaviest impact was on the young and 
economically active, which had grave implications for world labour markets. It 
was a new and poorly-understood problem, so that states could benefit from help 
and support from each other in combating it.
However, similar features are shared by a number of policy problems like 
environmental damage and global warming, and states have at no point reached 
anything like the same consensus about how to deal with them (Majone, 1989). 
How then, was such a consensus achieved? Some commentators argue that the 
particular characteristics of the HTV/AIDS issue made a strong, centralised 
response particularly appropriate (Christakis, 1989; Day and Kline, 1989). The 
majority of state policies are a response to relatively predictable events. Policy­
makers have a set of precedents to inform their policy choices and an established 
language with which to explain them as they adapt to evolving circumstances. HTV 
and AIDS, however, seemed to come out of the blue. No one had predicted the 
epidemic, science had no solutions for it and no one was sure how the problem 
would evolve. Importantly, it also contained the potential for social disturbance, in 
a public backlash against people with, or suspected of having AIDS.
In a case study of the UK, Day and Klein (1989) argue that, given the complex 
nature of the emerging HTV/AIDS problem, the state's role in moulding and
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informing public opinion was at least as important as its technical responses. 
Policy-making can be seen as a political process as much as an analytical one, a 
process of adjusting perceived reality to social values and vice versa (Gregory, 
1993). In the absence of a technical solution, policy makers chose to adopt a 
programme of action based on the values of the medical profession and public 
health experts. Massive information campaigns deliberately promoted the message 
that AIDS was a widespread problem that could involve the whole population. In 
so doing, AIDS’s potential for political disruption was minimised by rendering it an 
apolitical, ‘clinical’ problem, “so insulating the policy process from possible 
disruptive populist pressures” (Day and Klein, 1989:337). This, they argue, is a 
predictable response by policy-maker's to complex problems that threaten social 
cohesion.
On one level, the WHO/GPA’s approach conforms to Day and Klein’s model of 
AIDS policy-making in the UK. Its global strategy emphasised the potential threat 
to all, despite the fact that different continents had very different rates of infection. 
Yet it is not entirely clear why policy-maker's internationally should be so 
concerned about HTV/AIDS or why they chose to endorse the particular principles 
enshrined in the strategy. Examination of the evidence available to policy-makers 
at the time reveals it was not necessarily obvious that HIV/AIDS was a serious 
threat to world health, that it should be tackled within a liberal paradigm or that the 
WHO had the organisational capacity to spearhead such an ambitious global 
strategy. In other words, the three most basic tenets of the Global AIDS Strategy 
were contestable.
Firstly, in the mid-1980s, it need not have been obvious that AIDS was such an 
immediate and present danger that it required sweeping interventions worldwide. 
The reported incidence of AIDS was low at the time the Global ADDS Strategy 
was endorsed. As of May 1988, only 88,000 AIDS cases had been reported to the 
WHO — a drop in the ocean in terms of world health (WHO, 1988b). WHO 
argued that unreliable reporting and the long incubation period between infection 
with the HTV virus and the onset of AIDS meant that this figure was deceptive. It
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estimated that 5 to 10 million were infected with HIV and that between 15 and 20 
million would have become so by the year 2000 — all of whom would eventually 
go on to develop AIDS (WHO, 1989a). Yet even these estimates were low 
compared with other fatal diseases such as malaria, typhoid and even simple 
malnutrition (WHO, 1987). Not only was reported incidence low, but the disease 
had yet to be identified in large parts of the world. It was not thought that HTV or 
AIDS were present in Eastern and Central Asia, the Pacific region or Eastern 
Europe. In signing WHA40.26, state officials in these regions appeared to accept 
projections of the problem in the absence of a priori evidence of its significance as 
a national policy issue. Reliable evidence about HIV prevalence would only 
emerge when policy measures such as surveillance and testing were undertaken.
Secondly, it is intriguing that governments universally endorsed a Strategy that was 
liberal both in its size and underlying philosophy. In 1987, HIV and AIDS was still 
strongly associated with what were then referred to as ‘risk groups’ — sex- 
workers, homosexuals and intravenous drug-users (Watney, 1996). One potential 
response to this situation would be simply to clamp down on the behaviours then 
associated with HIV transmission — prostitution, drug-use and sex with multiple 
partners — or to introduce immigration restrictions (Gordenker et al, 1995; 
Berridge, 1996). In 1987, the US and the UK — two of the loudest voices in the 
UN system — were led by radical right-wing governments. Indeed, with the fell of 
the Berlin wall occurring as the Strategy was still being endorsed, the political 
climate more generally could be characterised as shifting to the right. Many 
governments were attempting to pare down the scale of state interventions in 
World Bank-backed structural adjustment programmes. Despite this, here were 
governments agreeing to commit substantial public resources towards a 
fundamentally liberal set of policies.
Finally, it was not clear that the WHO/GPA had the authority to command a 
global, homogenous initiative against HTV/AIDS. Constitutionally, it had no 
authority to coerce or even hold governments accountable for implementing the 
terms of the strategy. Even in terms of guidance and advice, the GPA was a
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significant new departure for the WHO. Although WHO had a respected track 
record in combating diseases such as smallpox, its role had hitherto been confined 
to technical advice and support. Its greatest successes had been in identifying and 
controlling relatively small outbreaks of easily diagnosed and treatable diseases 
(Henderson, 1992). HIV and AIDS was untreatable, the HTV virus had only 
recently been identified and there was still controversy over its link to AIDS 
(Hodgkinson, 1996; Patton, 1990). Strictly speaking, this put the problem outside 
the WHO’s legitimate area of technical competence.
The premises of the Global AIDS Strategy were, therefore, contestable and 
politically charged. The Strategy was endorsed before it had become immediately 
apparent that HIV/AIDS was a significant health or political risk in many of the 
signatory states. Rather than policy-makers coming to public health experts for a 
solution, policy-makers seem to have been persuaded that HIV/AIDS was, in fact, 
an issue they should be addressing in an organised, liberal way. The WHO itself 
would seem to have played a role in catalysing and organising the international 
consensus on HTV/AIDS.
Resolutions WHA40.26 and WHA42.34 were, however, just resolutions. They 
had no binding power and governments could not be held accountable for their 
effective implementation. To many writers, international resolutions are essentially 
empty gestures of international goodwill. In the final analysis, “delegates know 
they can ignore resolutions once they go home” (Walt, 1994: 142). This thesis 
seeks to establish whether the Strategy had any actual effect on the development of 
national policies and, if so, how that effect was achieved. The research was 
designed to try to answer three questions. Together, I hope to shed light on the 
ways that international organisations and agreements impact upon the development 
of national policies.
1. To what extent were the objectives of the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy 
achieved?
2. In what ways did the Strategy impact upon national AIDS policies?
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3. What are the main factors that influenced the answers to question two?
The first question is designed to establish an effect. The Global AIDS Strategy 
was based on several core liberal principles. Were these principles actually 
embodied in national policies? The figure on page four is the first step towards 
identifying measurable ‘outputs’ of the strategy. I will establish whether 
governments committed resources to the problem and took steps towards creating 
a supportive legal environment, removed potentially discriminatory legislation and 
added non-discriminatoiy laws where necessary.
The second and third questions are designed to explore the causal links between 
the Global AIDS Strategy and any identified policy outputs. Governments may 
have made policy decisions that appear to comply with the resolution, but for quite 
different reasons. If the Strategy did influence the development of national 
policies, how was this effect achieved? If not, what were the main factors that 
curtailed its influence?
3. International relations and international agreements
AIDS emerged on to the international policy agenda as the Cold War ended, 
making it a useful place to re-examine theoretical approaches to understanding 
international co-ordination. Despite the wealth of literature on the subject, many 
researchers complain that traditional analytical frameworks for conceptualising 
contemporary international relations are poorly adjusted to understanding 
increasingly trans-national policy pressures (Anand, 1997; Mohan, 1997; Krause 
and Knight, 1995, Bennet, 1995; Chayes and Chayes, 1993).
The study of international co-ordination is a debate about state autonomy versus 
determinism and about the ways in which the international system is maintained and 
developed (Haas, 1992). It involves arguments about the extent to which national 
policies are determined or broadly conditioned by trans-national structural forces, 
or whether they are the product of highly contextual negotiations between groups.
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Historically, perhaps the most dominant school of international relations has been 
that of realism, an enlightenment approach to understanding human interaction that 
sees politics as a series of rational decisions by key actors. The approach has a 
long tradition in political science and has been subject to revision and 
reinterpretation. However, different manifestations of realism share core emphases 
on the state, security and self help (Keohane, 1986). The international system is 
seen as one of competing states, international politics as a struggle for power 
(Carr, 1946, Morgenthau, 1951). Individual states are therefore conceived as 
autonomous actors, engaged in rigorous pursuit of its own interests.
To realists, then, international agreements represent something of a paradox. 
According to a realist logic, states will only comply with international agreements 
when it is in their interests so to do. Thus, the only way a state would comply with 
an international agreement that was not clearly in its interest is through the threat 
of military or economic sanction (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). This approach, 
however, can not explain the variety of circumstances in which states do reach 
agreement, peacefully and with little obvious benefit either financially or 
economically. The Global AIDS Strategy is a case in point, pioneered as it was by 
an organisation which had no coercive force and was dependent on the financial 
resources of its wealthier signatories.
Since the 1970s, there has been a resurgence of interest in international regimes — 
delineated areas of rule-governed activity — in the international system (Little,
1997). Revisionist neo-realist approaches to understanding regimes acknowledge 
that the international system is anarchic in structure, but concede that it has never 
been without systems of norms and rules. In different sectors at different times, 
states choose to co-operate with other states, even when it is not in their short­
term interest, because to do so is in their longer-term strategic, diplomatic and/or 
economic interests. States establish regimes when unco-ordinated strategies can 
interact to produce sub-optimal outcomes. However, the norms and values upon 
which regimes are based are influenced disproportionately by the most powerful 
state or states within the international political system. Thus, regimes generate
13
differential benefits for states. Power is a central feature of regime creation and 
survival, with powerful states effectively able to instigate or, if necessary, veto 
emerging regimes (Little, 1997). The challenge to researchers then becomes an 
empirical one, identifying the way in which a particular state weighs its short-term 
national costs against the practical and diplomatic advantages conferred by 
international co-operation in a particular sector (Little, 1997; Caporaso, 1992). 
Thus, analysts apply game theory to explain why states may chose to adhere to the 
principles and norms underlying a regime to which they are opposed. For realists, 
the key impediment to regime formation is the problem of how to co-ordinate 
effectively in conditions of imperfect information and communication.
A second major approach to understanding regimes, liberal-institutionalism, shares 
many of the core assumptions of neo-realism, but has a more benign view of their 
potential for promoting the common good (Keohane, 1986). Like neo-realists, 
liberal-institutionalists use game theory to analyse how states develop policy 
preferences, but focus on the way that regimes allow states to overcome obstacles 
to collaboration in an anarchic state system (Little, 1997). In this approach, a 
regime is likely to become more sustainable, and individual states less likely to flout 
its terms, when it is supported by a benign hegemon or when member states fear 
that individualistic actions will adversely affect international relations in the future.
Such approaches, however, have weaknesses. In the first place, they tend to over­
simplify the question of ‘national interest’. Studies of national level policies show 
that the state may have conflicting goals, or be unclear about the particular 
outcomes of different policy goals (Berridge, 1996; Majone, 1989; Skocpol, 1985). 
Thus, the idea that a single decision-making body rationally weighs up its choices is 
unrealistic. Even if a state could clearly define its national interests, it is unlikely to 
be able to execute them unilaterally. Detailed studies of policy developments at the 
national level show ‘government’ to be a site of conflict between different interest 
groups, with policy-decisions made incrementally in a process of trade-offs and 
compromises (Hulme and Murphree, 1999; Lewis, 1998; Clayton, 1998).
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Pluralists argue that realism over-emphasises the autonomy of state actors, 
ignoring the various influences of trans-national actors such as multi-national 
companies, NGOs and international organisations (Willetts, 1993; Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998). Since neo-realists concede that a state may make expedient 
compromises to forestall political antagonism from other groups, the extent of their 
autonomy is open to question (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). In trying to undermine 
the realist idea that states are autonomous actors, early pluralist accounts of 
political processes tended towards over-compensation. Having established that 
political outcomes are dependent on negotiation between different groups, they 
failed to account for differences between groups in their ability to effect change 
(Skocpol, 1985). Certain groups are more organised than others and have greater 
financial and economic resources with which to influence policy. Some theorists 
have adopted a historical approach to argue that, in certain circumstances, states 
have limited autonomy to use their resources to enforce change from above or to 
change the circumstances in which other groups operate, thereby undermining 
them (Stepan, 1985; Amsden, 1985). These studies adopt an essentially relational 
approach to understanding national political developments, arguing that policy 
outcomes need to be understood within the context of the interests and capacities 
of other groups (Skocpol, 1985).
If, however, international agreements pose something of a paradox for realist 
approaches to understanding international relations, they also pose a problem for 
pluralist approaches. International agreements take place at state level. They 
represent an undertaking by states to adopt particular policies during and beyond 
the life-time of a particular government. According to a pluralist logic, however, 
state governments are unlikely to have a sufficient degree of autonomy to make 
such undertakings meaningful. Policy decisions are the product of the interplay of 
domestic forces and that process cannot be short-circuited. Thus, international 
resolutions may have little value other than general statements of goodwill or 
intent. Once again, empirical analysis of particular situations is called for.
A third, functionalist approach, takes a more optimistic approach to international
15
agreements, arguing that the increasing economic interdependency of nations 
necessarily leads to a convergence of policy decisions (Haas, 1964). In direct 
opposition to realist approaches, Henkin (1989) and Chayes and Chayes (1993) 
contend that most states comply with international agreements most of the time. 
To do so, they argue, is efficient in that it minimises the duplication of research and 
policy development and reflects the way in which organisations react to policy 
issues in an innately conservative way. Problems can be settled within international 
frameworks of norms and ‘best practice’. Increasingly, theorists are explaining 
international policy convergence in term of the spread of ideas and values. At its 
boldest, exponents argue that the end of the 20th Century has seen the final victory 
of economic and political liberalism, the “triumph of the West, of the Western 
ided' (Fukuyama, 1989: 4). While economic upheavals and the resurgence of 
nationalism over the last decade have eroded the confidence of this form of 
determinism, there remains an argument that national policy developments are 
consciously and unconsciously affected by the values and ideas disseminated at 
international policy fora. In a seminal essay first published in 1966, Inis Claude 
argued that one of the UN’s primary functions was ‘collective legitimation’. 
Politics, he argued, is not simply a struggle for power but a contest for legitimacy, 
by which means power is converted into authority and possession validated as 
ownership. Post World War n, the function of legitimation is increasingly being 
conferred upon multi-lateral organisations. State powers need multi-lateral 
endorsement of their position. Though proclamations of UN approval or 
disapproval had no legal significance, statesmen had made them important by 
attaching importance to them. The UN movement could provide politically 
significant approval and disapproval of the claims, policies and actions of states 
(Claude, 1966).
A special edition of International Organisation in 1992 adopted a similar line of 
argument by developing the notion of ‘epistemic communities’, a “network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue- 
area” (Haas, 1992: 3). These communities can, the authors argue, play a key role
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in international policy co-ordination by putting forward a plausible framework for 
understanding complex problems. By organising knowledge in particular forms 
they can influence the way states formulate policy (Haas, 1992).
This notion of epistemic communities is useful for understanding policy responses 
to HIV/AIDS. When the disease began to emerge, the relatively small number of 
medical experts and individuals directly affected by the disease committed 
significant resources towards making contacts with each other and pooling 
information about the issue (Berridge, 1996). This ’community' was not entirely 
homogenous. Like most groups, its identity was perhaps more coherent viewed 
from the outside, by people who were sceptical that AIDS was a serious problem. 
Different groups had different priorities and international AIDS conferences were 
sometimes acrimonious (Berridge, 1996). There was, however, especially in the 
early years of HIV/AIDS, a definite sense of shared purpose. HIV/AIDS must be 
brought onto the national and international political agenda. From the mid- 
Eighties, the WHO's Global Programme on AIDS became an increasingly 
important part of this 'epistemic' community. They organised international 
conferences that attracted a wide range of people. Their staff represented members 
of the community from around the world. Executive staff had all developed some 
expertise in the area and all shared the programme's basic, liberal values in relation 
to HIV/AIDS.
However, to acknowledge that an epistemic community exists, is not to explain its 
impact on policy outcomes. The notion of epistemic communities adds an 
important insight into trans-national policy influences, but still raises the problem of 
the relative influence of different groups in the policy process. Implicit throughout 
the literature on epistemic communities, is the notion that their influence is greatest 
at times of uncertainty. State actors’ temporaiy indecision within a knowledge 
area can provide an opportunity for other groups to affect the way problems are 
perceived. That influence, however, is likely to be temporary and is certainly 
constrained both by the domestic political environment and the distribution of 
power internationally (Hall and Ikenberry, 1989).
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Another critique of functionalism can be generated from the policy analysis 
literature, rather than international relations theory. In Evidence, Argument and 
Persusion, Majone (1989) argues that policies are not simply the result of rational 
evaluation of objective criterion. 'Scientific' evidence in a policy area is often 
ambiguous and contestable. Different groups may frame problems very differently, 
prioritising different aspects of a problem and asserting different causal 
relationships. It follows that the choice of which group or groups of experts to 
believe has huge impacts upon subsequent policy development and is inherently 
political. Policy makers rarely have reliable and objective systems for gauging the 
quality of scientific explanations of particular problems. Instead, the relative 
weight accorded to different conceptions is dependent on a variety of factors. 
Some groups are viewed as more authoritative and unbiased than others, but this is 
at least in part a value judgement based on preference, history or ideological 
predisposition. Expert groups having to play by the 'rules of the game' if they are 
to be taken seriously. Historical and ideological factors affect which groups are 
recognised as expert, competent and authoritative.
The weakness of the functionalist approach is that it tends towards determinism 
(Skocpol, 1985). By de-politicising the concept of 'recognised expertise' and 
assuming that international policy convergence is inevitable, functionalist 
approaches risk underplaying the significance of cultural, socio-economic, 
administrative and political factors in determining the outcome of attempts at 
international co-ordination (Kenny, 1999; Knill, 1998; Mohan, 1997; Krause and 
Knight, 1995; Cliff, 1993). A related criticism is that it tends to underplay the 
structural differences between states in terms of power (Strange, 1988). Relatively 
little systematic research has been done on the extent to which socio-economic 
differences between states affect the rate and manner of policy convergence. 
Functionalist theory has been largely derived from regional convergence in 
industrialised countries, particularly Europe. Developing countries are mentioned 
in asides, but there is little agreement as to whether relative poverty actually 
increases the likelihood of states conforming to international standards. For some
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writers, low-income countries must necessarily find it harder to implement 
international standards (Chayes and Chayes, 1993). There is another school of 
thought, however that argues precisely the opposite. Wealthy countries, 
particularly the USA, enjoy considerable autonomy from and control over the trend 
of international agreements while lower-income countries are frequently obliged to 
comply with international agreements because they can neither afford to develop 
their own policy strategies nor antagonise other states (Strange, 1988).
4. The policy analysis approach
I have argued that the international relations literature is relatively weak at 
explaining international agreements and that the subject raises several analytical 
problems. First, there is the question of the relative influence of different groups 
— national and international — in the actual development of policies (as opposed 
to the mere declaration of intent). Secondly there is a question about the different 
form s of influence. In certain conditions, international epistemic communities may 
be able to influence the way policy-makers perceive and respond to policy 
problems. How is that influence achieved and what are the major opportunities 
and constraints of that influence? Finally, it is unclear how differences in economic 
development affect the extent to which countries comply with international 
agreements and their relationships with international organisations generally.
In a study of the impact of forty years of international initiatives on population 
control through family planning, Lee and Walt (1995: 257) argue that the influence 
of “well-intended declarations and financial pledges” can only be understood by 
adopting a policy analysis approach. Only by carefully examining policy evolution 
in a particular context over a particular period can you begin to gauge how far 
international agreements actually impact upon the national policy process. The 
authors argue that in four pairs of (low-income) case countries, national family 
planning policies and programmes have been shaped to varying degrees by 
international organisations' attempts at promoting family planning as a significant 
health and population issue. The extent of this influence, they argue, was 
ultimately dependent on the 'compatibility' between national and global policy
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contexts. Firstly, it is argued that the degree of support by governments for family 
planning corresponds with that of the country’s relations with Western countries 
over time. The better the relations, the more receptive national elites were to the 
global population agenda. Secondly, it is held that support for family planning is 
influenced by the changing economic circumstances of each country. When 
economic problems have been perceived as urgent by policy elites, family planning 
moved up the agenda. In post-independence Zambia, for example, nationalist 
leader Kenneth Kaunda was ‘likely” to have been resistant to Western-led family 
planning agenda on the grounds of its being seen as part of a colonial past. The 
politics of non-alignment were made possible by the country’s relative economic 
prosperity through its copper exports. Years later, structural shifts in the global 
political economy inter alia weakened the bargaining power of developing 
countries and increased their reliance on donor aid. This in turn led to a “policy 
context which was more conducive to [family planning]” (Lee and Walt, 1995: 
264).
Though a timely illustration of the political tensions inherent in international policy 
interventions, Lee and Walt’s study still raises some serious questions. If countries 
remain relatively immune from international interventions so long as they remain 
solvent, do individual international organisations per se have any effective influence 
over policy development or was the apparent adoption of international values only 
a fleeting symptom of economic crisis? In the study, case countries’ compliance 
with the family planning agenda is measured only by its state officials’ 
pronouncements at international conferences. It is therefore difficult to judge 
whether these statements represent a politically expedient but insincere concession 
to economic necessity, or a harmonious new phase of international partnership.
The study is also weakened by an unacknowledged ambivalence about the policy 
effects of donor-dependence. On page 264, donor dependency is seen as creating a 
decline in the relative autonomy of states by reducing their bargaining power 
forcing them to adopt an international policy agenda they would reject when they 
enjoyed financial independence. By page 265, high levels of donor aid are seen as
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a symptom of ‘Vanning relations” between low-income countries and Western 
countries. In this, friendly policy environment, elites become more receptive to 
family planning arguments. The authors’ two pre-conditions of compliance -  
economic crisis and ‘good relations’ with Western countries -  could in feet be 
alternative explanations for elites apparent endorsement of population control as a 
central policy objective. Dolowitz and Marsh (1996: 40) have developed a more 
nuanced analysis of the process by which ideas, policies and programmes are fed 
into the policy-making arena in another time or place. The authors regard 
‘coercive’ and ‘voluntary’ policy transfer as opposite ends of a spectrum. For the 
majority of bureaucrats in developing countries, policies are adopted after a 
mixture of coercion and ‘lesson drawing’ from the policies of other states. 
Economic or political crisis challenges existing policies and forces bureaucrats to 
review and adopt policies from abroad.
Whatever the motivation for espousing the language of international norms, it 
remains unclear how apparent shifts in elite discourse actually impact upon 
subsequent policy developments. A recent study has shown that elite attitudes are 
a relatively poor indicator of subsequent policy development and performance 
(Kenny, 1999). Elites in low-income countries do not necessarily have the capacity 
to implement policy reforms (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). Serious local resistance 
can stop policy reforms even when they are supported by members of policy elites 
and have been made a condition of further aid (Killick, 1997). Once again, it 
becomes clear that it is impossible to understand the nature and extent of external 
influences on policy without understanding the specific context in which policies 
are negotiated and to trace through the policy development beyond declarations at 
international conferences.
Summary and conclusion
In this chapter, I have discussed the Global AIDS Strategy and argued that it offers 
a useful place to look at the influence of international organisations post Cold War.
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Conventional international relations macro-theories are ill-equipped to 
conceptualise the influence of international resolutions and international 
organisations on the development of national policies. Realist approaches over­
estimate the extent to which state actors have clearly defined goals and agreed 
strategies to achieve them. In practice, the state is a site of conflict, allowing room 
for both non-state and trans-national organisations to influence the way problems 
are perceived and tackled. Pluralist accounts of policy-making, however, tend to 
over-estimate the extent to which national policy decisions are the result of 
interplay between interested organisations while underestimating the extent to 
which differences in power affect different organisations’ bargaining power. They 
have also tended to focus on the national level, at the expense of investigating 
international pressures on policy. Functionalist approaches tend towards 
determinism and underplay the extent to which groups are able to frustrate 
attempts at international policy co-ordination. They also reveal a degree of 
confusion about how low-income countries fit into the functionalist framework. 
Does low income make countries more or less likely to comply with international 
agreements?
Policy analysis approaches have greater potential to analyse how different groups 
may be able to influence policy development at national and international level. 
Lee and Walt's (1995) study of the effects of international agreements on 
population control shows how their impact is dependent on the policy environment 
at national level, and that the relationship between national and international actors 
varies over time. Though undoubtedly a step forward in understanding the impact 
of international agreements, their analysis leaves two key issues unresolved. The 
first issue is the extent to which impact can be gauged by what officials say at 
international conferences. Governments that are dependent on aid are clearly 
motivated to appear to toe the international line. Whether these pronouncements 
have any impact upon policy is a different matter. Governments may not have the 
capacity or even desire to implement them. We cannot gauge the actual impact of 
international agreements without a more thorough analysis of policy development 
over time. The second issue raised is the ambiguity around international 'pushes'
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and 'pulls'. Does increasing economic hardship and dependence on aid force 
national decision-makers to adopt international policy agendas, or is it more a case 
that the donor/donee relationship helps to generate a greater understanding of and 
sympathy with said agendas? These questions cannot be answered without a more 
detailed understanding of how policy development in low-income states is 
influenced by international organisations. To what extent do 'epistemic' values at 
the international level influence the way problems are perceived and how far are the 
effects of this influence mitigated by the interests and capacities of groups at 
national level?
In this study I will use a detailed empirical investigation of two case sites to 
explore the ways in which the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy influenced the 
development of national policies. Traditional approaches to international 
agreements have often focused on narrow analyses of goverament-to-govemment 
relationships between states. In so doing they have tended to underplay the role of 
non-state actors in forming state government attitudes to multi-lateralism as well as 
the impact of multi-lateral diplomacy on state policies. By adopting an explicitly 
relational perspective it follows that this study requires a rather broader unit of 
analysis than simply the WHO/GPA as an operational organisation. I will therefore 
look also at the Global AIDS Strategy as a multilateral institution, where institution 
is defined as “persistent and connected sets or rules, formal and informal, that 
prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane, 
1990; 732). The WHO/GPA is an important and integral part o f this multilateral 
institution, but it is not the whole part.
This thesis examines the extent to which international ‘epistemic’ values influenced 
the development of AIDS policies in one high- and one low-income state. It will 
look at how the WHO sought to influence national policy actors and the main 
factors that limited or increased its influence. In the following chapter, I will 
outline a conceptual framework for understanding the impact o f international 
agreements in the development of national policies. The approach assumes that 
different groups can impact on the way policies are developed and implemented,
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but that their relative influence is path dependent and varies according to the 
particular context in which they operate. In the third chapter, I will discuss the 
methodological issues raised by these research goals and the methods used in this 
study. The fourth chapter analyses the policy environment in the two case 
countries at the time the strategy was being implemented. In the fifth and sixth 
chapters, I will discuss the ways in which the WHO/GPA and the Global AIDS 
Strategy impacted upon the development of national policies. The final chapter 
will discuss the theoretical implications of these findings for understanding trans­
national policy co-ordination.
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Chapter two: Policy and power
Introduction
In the previous chapter I defined three research questions and argued that the main 
approaches to International Relations provide a relatively poor framework for 
analysing the influence of international agreements. In this chapter, I will develop a 
framework for understanding the Global AIDS Strategy’s impact on policy 
development. The discussion of the previous chapter raised three key issues that 
need to be addressed if we are to understand the Global AIDS Strategy’s impact. 
The first issue raised is the empirical question of how far pronouncements at the 
international level actually go on to influence policy development. In the first 
section of this chapter I will set out the key tools of the policy analysis literature 
that will be used to examine HIV/AIDS policy development in Britain. Policy 
analysis will provide a framework for empirical analysis of the different stages in 
the policy process and how different groups may have opportunities to influence 
policy development at each stage.
The second issue raised is more abstract, and concerns the relative influence of 
different groups. Though various groups may influence policy in particular 
circumstances, not all groups have equal ability to effect change. The policy 
environment is not a neutral arena for negotiation (Ham, 1999: Chapter seven). 
For a number of reasons, some group interests can be represented more 
consistently than others. The level of influence on policy of different groups is to 
some extent path dependent, with some groups having institutionalised advantages 
over others. These other groups may have a limited ability to influence policy, but 
not in the conditions they would choose (Ham, 1999: Chapter seven). In the 
second section, policy network theory is used as a means of explaining how some 
groups are able to act together to increase their relative influence over policy 
development, effectively excluding other groups from key stages of the policy 
process. This section will discuss the question of power in the international 
system. Policy network theory has been used at a number of different theoretical
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levels, but in this thesis it is used as a meso-level theory to explain structural 
differences between groups in terms of the ability to influence policy.
The third issue raised is the question of drawing international comparisons between 
rich and poor countries. International relations literature is, in the main, based on 
studies of industrialised countries. The literature remains divided about how low- 
income countries ‘fit’ into theoretical frameworks that have been developed to 
explain political phenomena in the North. In the third section of this chapter, I will 
set out a framework for identifying the key groups involved in the development of 
health policies at a national level. The discussions of the previous two sections will 
demonstrate that the relative influence of these groups in particular circumstances 
will be path dependent. The organisations involved are, however, similar enough 
to make international comparisons of the relative influence of one of the groups — 
the WHO/GPA — on policy development.
1. Understanding the policy process
Following Lee and Walt (1995), this study adopts a policy analysis framework to 
understand the influence of international agreements on national policy. Policy 
analysis comprises a complex blend of insights from organisational analysis, 
sociology, and political theory. In colloquial usage, the term ‘policy’ is most often 
viewed as a (written) set of objectives; a statement of an overall organisation’s 
direction. In policy analysis, this type of written document is just one, concrete 
manifestation of a complex set of decisions, political interactions and expected — 
and unexpected — consequences. Policy is not just what it says, but what it does. 
In this section, I will discuss three key approaches to analysing policy, state- 
centred approaches, society-centred approaches and the ‘garbage can’ model.
A. State-centred approaches
Perhaps the most enduring accounts of the process by which policies are designed 
and implemented assume that policies are (or can be) the result of informed 
decisions by rational actors. Within this state-centred or ‘top down’ approach, the 
role of policy analysis is to understand and thereby improve the way that policy-
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makers design and manage policy innovations. State-centred or top-down 
approaches take different forms. At one, rationalist extreme it provides an innately 
prescriptive model for bureaucratic policy-making. Centralised economic planning 
in developing countries during the 1970s, for example, was driven by the 
assumption that centralised policy-making by skilled technocrats was an achievable 
and desirable means to economic and social ‘development7.
Increasingly, authors such as Wihtol (1988), whose work is discussed in greater 
detail below, use elements of the ‘top-down’ policy literature in a rather different 
way. Policy analysis is used as a means of analysing the different stages of policy, 
showing how central policy directives can be frustrated by organisational and 
political stresses at the periphery. However, despite these differences in tone, 
Sabatier (1986) argues that top-down approaches share essential features. They 
each take a policy decision by governmental officials as their starting point and 
then ask a series of questions. To what extent were the objectives achieved; what 
factors affected this; to what extent were the actions of implementing officials 
consistent with the objectives and procedures outlined in that policy decision and 
how was the policy reformulated over time? State-centred approaches accept that 
other actors can radically affect the way in which policies are implemented, but use 
policy analysis as a means of minimising the potential threat of these ‘external’ 
factors. As such, they contain a prescriptive element, in that they assume that it 
should be both possible and desirable for well-informed state policy-makers to 
design and implement ‘rational’, effective policies.
For some, like Lindblom (1979), policy-makers can actually take advantage o f the 
unpredictability of policy implementation. Policy-making is not a clinical science. 
Unforeseen factors cause policies to impact in unforeseen ways. Shrewd policy 
makers may, however, develop ways of adapting policies to these influences. In so 
doing they can make the policy-process more responsive to local conditions and 
ultimately more effective: the ‘science of muddling through’. This approach is 
echoed in the work of Rondinelli (1993), who argues that in the complex and 
uncertain policy environment o f developing countries, projects should best be 
viewed as experiments, reducing uncertainties incrementally. Viewed cumulatively,
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projects could gradually develop planning and administrative capacities. In a rather 
different approach, Grindle and Thomas (1991) argue that policy-makers should 
make more active attempts to understand the politics of implementation. In so 
doing, skilled policy-makers will be better able to predict and avoid political 
obstacles to implementation. In this formulation, the ‘politics’ of policy-making 
are seen as an integral part o f successful policy management, rather than as an 
impediment to it.
i. The policy cycle
The advantage of the state-centred approach to policy analysis is its conceptual 
clarity. Policy analysts offer a way of schematising the complex evolution of policy 
decisions into identifiable stages, the model of the policy cycle. Though different 
analysts configure the phases o f the cycle slightly differently, they contain the same 
basic elements. Policies go through common, identifiable stages of formulation, 
organisation, evaluation and finally termination, or more often reformulation as the 
‘policy cycle’ begins again. The limitation of Lee and Walt’s (1995) study of the 
effect of international agreements is that it uses policy analysis to explore only the 
very earliest, agenda-setting stage of the policy cycle. The study ‘stops’ at the 
stage at which officials make a formal pronouncement on population control. The 
policy process model highlights how different groups can impact upon the way 
initial policy goals are operationalised and implemented.
□ Agenda-setting
In most cases, policy agendas are adapted incrementally, in response to evolving 
circumstances or different understandings of the impacts of existing policies — so 
called ‘politics-as-usual’ (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). A relatively stable group of 
actors are involved in policy development, following well-established, 
institutionalised procedures. In a minority of instances, however, economic, 
political or social crises call for more radical policy shifts. External events make it 
glaringly apparent that existing policy measures are inadequate and/or 
unsustainable. As discussed in the previous chapter, HIV/AIDS can be viewed as 
an example of a policy crisis (Day and Klein, 1989). Yet the fact that it was in 
many ways out of the ordinary, did not mean that every sort of policy option would
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be given equal consideration. The nature and scale of a country’s government 
organisations have a significant impact on the way in which policy agendas are set. 
The organisations and systems in place to monitor a particular issue area will tend 
to ‘look for’ answers to problems that reflect a particular view of the issue. In 
Britain, for example, the government response to HIV/AIDS was heavily 
influenced by the fact that it had an established public health system and an 
extensive infrastructure of anonymous Genito-Urinary Medicine (GUM) clinics 
(Berridge, 1996: 25). These organisations dealt with the emerging problem of 
HIV/AIDS within a long-established set of values and a belief in the utilitarian 
benefits of offering anonymous testing and treatment.
□ Formulation
This is the stage at which policy-makers define their objective and make decisions 
about the instruments they will use to achieve it. In many cases, this will involve 
decisions about which government bodies will be responsible for its 
implementation. In other cases, there may be a decision to delegate responsibility 
to non-government bodies, with the government retaining only responsibility for 
support and review.
Some rationalist approaches assume that the agenda-setting and formulation phases 
of the policy cycle are essentially technical. Particular problems are identified by 
empirical observation and their solutions identified by scientific analysis. This 
conception under-estimates the political complexity of the way in which ‘problems’ 
are articulated (Majone, 1989: 15). The nature and hence the potential solution to 
problems is often the subject of great debate. A key function of interest groups is 
to attempt to influence the way that state organisations view particular policy 
problems (Grant, 1995). Nor can it be assumed that, even once a particular 
problem has been put on the agenda, scientific analysis will necessarily offer a 
single, unambiguous and objective picture of the problem (Majone, 1989). 
Organisations may therefore commit substantial resources to influencing the way 
that problems are defined, using evidence and argument to ‘persuade’ decision­
makers that theirs is the most appropriate way of conceiving a particular problem.
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□ Legitimation
The process of legitimation is the stage at which the legal framework is adjusted so 
as to define who are the proper targets o f a policy, and under what legislative 
conditions. This is a critical stage of the policy process, and one that can radically 
affect subsequent policy development. This is particularly true in low-income 
countries that have relatively weak legal infrastructures. One criticism of economic 
planning in developing countries during the 1960s and 1970s, for example, is that 
governments failed to enact legislation that would have made it possible to 
implement policies effectively. Thus, elaborate national plans remained largely 
symbolic, little more than a general ‘wish list’ (Agarwala, 1985).
□ Organisation
At the organisation phase of the policy cycle, policy-makers make decisions about 
how policies are to be administered and who is to implement them. In many cases, 
a particular government department may be held responsible for implementing the 
policy. In others, policies may be contracted out to independent, non-government 
organisations, with government retaining only a supervisory role. Decisions made 
at the organisation phase of the policy cycle will have significant implications for 
the way in which policies are subsequently implemented.
□ Implementation
In the classic state-centred approach, the implementation stage is viewed as being 
overtly political. The various organisations involved in implementation have 
capacities to affect the way in which policies are interpreted and enacted (Pressman 
and Wildavsky, 1979). At every stage of the policy cycles, organisations and 
individuals have different capacities to ‘veto’ policy development (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991).
□ Evaluation
In a rationalist ideal-type, mechanisms for evaluation should be firmly built into 
policy design. The criterion by which a policy can be judged to have succeeded or 
failed should be agreed and an evaluation process pre-scheduled. Evaluation can 
take different forms, from internal organisational reviews, to scrutiny by
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independent bodies or interest groups. Evaluation may also take unplanned and 
unofficial forms in public discontent or media interest.
Being poorly understood and incurable, HTV/AIDS presented an evaluation 
problem for policy makers. An inoculation programme, for example, can be easily 
evaluated based on the numbers of the target population who have been inoculated. 
A programme’s ultimate success would occur when the disease was eradicated. 
ADDS interventions, however, are based on rather more abstract courses of action: 
education campaigns designed to alter the way people behaved and how they 
perceived the problem. Here the goal is to try to affect the rate of transmission. 
This is a much more problematic goal as it involves complex issues such as how to 
gauge behaviour change accurately and how far any change was directly 
attributable to policy interventions.
□ Termination
Rather than being infinite and linear, policies are inevitably succeeded by fresher 
formulations, or policy ‘succession’. The notion of the policy ‘cycle’ was 
developed specifically to emphasise how policies have a certain life span before 
they are adjusted and reformulated. The duration of the policy cycle, however, will 
depend on the its nature and on the political context. Majone (1989: 150) 
describes policies as having a relatively stable ‘core’, of shared assumptions, 
methods and goals that are central and only abandoned after great stress. At the 
periphery, however, are various more transitory policy end products, which will be 
reviewed with greater frequency.
//. Top-down models and trans-national policy
Top-down models of policy-making have been used to examine attempts at trans­
national policy implementation. Wihtol (1988), for example, uses the notion of the 
policy cycle to examine and explain the sub-optimal implementation and unintended 
consequences of the Asian Development Bank’s (ADB) rural development policies. 
The ADB, a multilateral development bank funded primarily by the developed 
market economies, was faced with the challenge of implementing an effective
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lending programme in developing countries aimed not only at promoting economic 
growth, but also at alleviating poverty in rural areas. Wihtol breaks down its 
policy evolution into five core stages, revealing a series of conflicts between the 
policies and priorities of the three key groups involved in the policy: the ADB, 
donors and borrowing governments. Donor preferences played a dominant role in 
shaping the Bank’s overall development policies, which were regularly reviewed 
and changed considerably over the period studied. Over time, donors began to 
place more emphasis on poverty alleviation and rural development, rather than 
simply increasing the country’s GDP. On a more day-to-day level, however, 
operational policies and organisational constraints made it difficult for bank 
personnel to implement these policies. As an organisation, the ADB was 
structured around the importance of achieving annual lending/disbursement targets 
and administrative efficiency. This meant that bank executives favoured projects 
which were large, temporally defined and easily-managed at the expense of longer- 
term programmes which may have tackled poverty more successfully and which 
were more in accord with the ADB’s overall objectives.
The advantage of state centred or ‘top-down’ approaches to understanding the 
policy process is their conceptual clarity. The life span of a particular project or 
policy provides an organising logic around which to explore how organisational or 
political factors may facilitate or impede policy implementation. Such approaches 
do, however, have associated weaknesses. In the first place, they tend to focus on 
central decision-makers, thereby neglecting strategic initiatives from other 
agencies, the private sector or implementing officials (Barrett and Fudge, 1981: 
Introduction). One of the criticisms of ‘top-down’ approaches is that they are 
difficult to use in situations where there is no one dominant policy (statute) or 
agency in place, but rather a variety of government directives, agencies and actors, 
none of which are pre-eminent (Barrett and Fudge, 1981). The Global AIDS 
Strategy falls into this category. Though it is a single resolution, its very design 
incorporates a variety of different government and non-government agencies with 
no clear hierarchy between them. Though the WHO/GPA was nominally in 
charge, it had no effective power to enforce implementation — one of the basic 
tenets o f the UN system is that individual states are sovereign and that UN
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agencies can not launch interventions without the express permission of the 
government in power. Yet within this inter-organisational web, there are 
asymmetries of resources and power. The Strategy was signed by a range of 
individual states, many of which were small, impoverished and dependent on 
international agencies for funding. Other signatories were well-resourced and had 
elaborate AIDS programmes in place prior to signing the agreement. This type of 
asymmetry will influence the relationship between different organisations and must 
be addressed explicitly if we are to understand the WHO/GPA’s influence in 
particular circumstances. The second weakness of state-centred approaches is that 
they tend to over-emphasise the ‘rationality’ of decision-makers. In a sense, these 
are similar arguments to those levelled against realists. In practice, individual 
organisations can be riven by disagreement; actors may have no clear conception of 
the problem or how to tackle it.
R  The ‘garbage-can ’ model
The foremost account of the international response to HIV/AIDS rejects top-down 
approaches and instead adopts a ‘garbage can’ model to explain the complex 
interactions of national and international organisations as they responded to the 
growing AIDS problem (Gordenker, Coate, Jonsson, and Soderholm, 1994). The 
garbage can model counters the perceived tendency amongst policy theorists to 
over-emphasise policy-makers’ ability to design and implement rational policies. 
The main focus of the garbage-can approach is on organisations, rather than 
individuals, and it is based upon three fundamental observations. The first is that 
decision-makers often operate without any clearly defined objectives. 
Organisations can be seen as loose collection of ideas, establishing preferences 
through experience rather than working on the basis o f a unitary set of principles 
(Cohen, Mar and Olsen, 1972). Secondly, it is argued that the workings of an 
organisation are often unclear. Few people have a sound grasp of the way in which 
their organisation works as a whole; their understanding is patchy and localised. 
The final observation is that decisions are rarely made by a consistent set of actors. 
Different people and interests become involved at different stages of the decision­
making process.
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From this original set of observation, Cohen et al (1972) argue that problems, 
solutions, participants and decision-making opportunities are semi-independent 
factors, all of which impact upon the policy process in different ways. Policy 
decisions can be seen as the outcome of the particular collision of these factors. In 
other words, policy development is irrational and unpredictable. Gordenker et a l 
(1994) use this ‘garbage-can’ model to emphasise the often random process of 
international collaboration on AIDS issues. The authors contend that HTV/AIDS 
provided policy-makers with a complex and technically insoluble problem. Far 
from being a ‘rational’ process of optimal decision taking, policies evolved 
sporadically, the result o f competition between organisations to claim authority in a 
conceptually troublesome field. The authors argue that the probable survival of 
proposed policy solutions depend on at least three criteria. The first is technical 
feasibility — only ideas capable of effective application can survive. The second 
test is that of value acceptability — successful solutions have to accord with the 
values held by policy-makers. The third criterion of survivability is the 
‘anticipation of future constraints’. Policy-makers take into account the obstacles 
that alternative proposals are likely to face and make policy choices accordingly. 
With AIDS, the absence of a cure or vaccine made other, educational and social 
solutions more prominent. Yet, in the absence of purely technical solutions, 
alternatives such as sex-education, needle exchanges and condom distribution 
challenged deeply held values of policy-makers and public alike.
Given this complex policy environment, the authors argue that one key factor 
could have enabled one particular conceptualisation of a problem to win out over 
others: the development of a vivid metaphorical formulation o f the problem. The 
UN General Assembly’s formulation of the seabed as ‘the common heritage of 
mankind’ for example, is said to have framed negotiations on the law of the sea for 
years. In contrast, it is argued, no clear, consensual formulation of HTV/AIDS 
emerged and as a result, policies developed in sporadic and often contradictory 
directions.
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Gordenker et aVs approach provides a detailed review of international attempts at 
co-operation, yet it has certain weaknesses. In the first place, it is only an 
overview and its focus is on the dominant inter-govemmental and non­
governmental international organisations. This at times leads to some confusion 
about the level of analysis at which the study is operating. In many respects, the 
analysis operates at the extreme macro-level in its discussion of large-scale 
international movements. In their chapter on Third World bargaining, for example, 
the authors do not analyse negotiations between groups in individual countries. 
Instead, they focus on general trends in donor policies and organisational 
adaptation within donor and international organisations. In the process of 
examining these interactions, however, the authors inevitably get drawn into 
detailed analysis of inter-personal and inter-organisational relationships. Changes 
in policies or organisational reshuffles are explained by reference to individual 
perceptions and/or competition between organisations. The result is that the 
analysis swings uncomfortably from global movements to personal disagreements, 
with no explanatory analysis of policy developments at a country level.
A related weakness o f the book is its failure to show how historical and structural 
factors may impact upon the extent to which particular ideas hold sway. In many 
ways, this appears to be a limitation of the somewhat mechanistic and ahistorical 
‘garbage-can’ model. In this construction of the policy process, policy agendas are 
likened to bins into which participants dump problems and solutions in various 
forms and at different speeds of collection and removal. This model was developed 
to counter undoubtedly simplistic notions that policy choices are the result of 
informed and rational deliberation, yet in eliminating one simplification, the model 
introduces others. Though the authors state that problems, solutions, participants 
and choice opportunities are only ‘relatively’ independent, in practice they are 
implicitly presented as existing in isolation from each other and from a wider 
historical and ideological context. There is little discussion of how differences in 
participants’ resources impacted upon policy negotiations, for example, and little 
attention is given to how wider historical processes influenced the various contents 
of the policy ‘bins’. The model implies that policy outcomes are the product of a 
type of political free market, in which ideas, participants, solutions and problems all
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vie for ascendancy. In practice, all these factors are constrained by a prior history 
of previous choices and power relations.
Gordenker et cd’s approach is a useful antidote to overly rationalist policy analyses. 
However, the fact that it only discusses the relationship between major 
international organisations makes it difficult to draw any wider conclusions about 
policy development as a whole. It can not explain how individual state and sub­
state organisations interact with this web of international organisations. More 
importantly, it tells us nothing about power in the international system. 
International organisations are seen as competing against each other in a political 
vacuum. It cannot explain how differences in relative power affect the relationship 
between international and national organisations.
C  Society-centred approaches
Society-centred, or ‘bottom-up’ approaches to understanding the policy process 
reject the assumption that policy is decided by the higher echelons and then simply 
put into practice by those lower down the hierarchy. The assumption that there is 
a clear distinction between policy-making and policy implementation is regarded as 
being naive (Majone and Wildavsky, 1978). In practice, lower-level workers have 
the ability to exercise discretion in the application of policy. They can resist or 
alter policy decided by those at a higher level and act in ways which conflict with 
higher level policy declarations. Policy-making is seen as an iterative, political 
process, between those who seek to put a policy into effect and those who must 
implement it.
This approach to understanding the policy process has significant methodological 
implications. Where top-downers focus initially on a (central) government 
decision, ‘bottom-uppers’ look first to the local implementation structure involved 
in a particular issue. They then identify the network of actors involved in service 
delivery in a particular area, and ask them about their goals, strategies, activities 
and contacts (Hjem et al, 1978). Such an approach offers some advantages over 
top-down methods, especially in a trans-national, multi-agency policy arena such as
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that within which the Global AIDS Strategy was operating. Instead of focusing on 
the attainment of formal policy objectives, the approach can reveal the 
(unintended) consequences o f policy programmes. It is also better equipped to 
deal with policy areas involving a variety of public (and private) programmes than 
state-centre approaches. Methodologically, it provides a more exhaustive, 
systematic framework of analysis than the garbage-can approach.
The bottom-up approach does, of course, have disadvantages. In the first place it 
focuses on peripheral actors’ goals and strategies. In doing so, the approach can 
underestimate the centre’s ability to frustrate the periphery and its indirect 
influence on peripheral actor’s goals and strategies (Sabatier, 1986). The second 
criticism is that its heavily contextual approach makes theoretical generalisation 
and policy evaluation very difficult If policy is constantly adapting, policy 
evaluation, rather than simple description, becomes impossible (Sabatier, 1986).
This criticism is particularly relevant to the study in hand. The purpose of this 
study is to look at the broad impact of an international resolution and the 
organisations it generated over an eight-year period. While it might, theoretically 
be possible to do an exhaustive review of the inter-personal and inter- 
organisational dynamics involved at every stage of implementation in individual 
cases, such a study would not say very much about international collaboration in 
general. Neither would it acknowledge sufficiently the dramatic imbalances of 
power between the range of organisations affected by the strategy. Only from one 
step removed is it possible to see how the overall organisational and political 
landscape affects the range o f options available to policy-makers and the 
development of policy.
2. Policy network theory
In the previous section, I reviewed the main ways of approaching policy analysis. 
State-centred approaches provide a framework for conceptualising the policy 
process, including the ways in which external factors may influence policy 
development. They are, however, weaker at understanding situations — like the
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Global AIDS Strategy — in which responsibility for policy development fells 
across a variety of different organisations. They also tend to over-emphasise the 
rationality of policy-making., failing to acknowledge the way that different values 
and sets of assumptions are built into the organisations responsible for developing 
policy. ‘Garbage-can’ models of policy-making emphasise this unpredictability of 
policy development yet are weakened by a compensatory over-emphasis on its 
randomness. The relative influence of organisations is dependent on broader 
historical factors, which give some groups greater access to central decision­
making bodies and makes some policy approaches more ‘acceptable’ than others. 
Society-centred approaches provide a methodological framework for analysing the 
influence of a broad range of groups and (unexpected) impacts of policy, but are 
weak at analysing structural inequalities between groups.
The Global AIDS Strategy was a trans-national policy initiative, involving a variety 
of organisations with no clear hierarchy between them. Policy analysis can provide 
a framework for describing in detail the way in which policies evolved and their 
various effects. However, in order to begin to explain the relative influence of 
different groups involved in developing HTV/AIDS policies, it is necessary to 
develop a meso-level conceptual framework that takes into account the various 
actors involved in the policy process, but which acknowledges differences in their 
relative influence. It is also necessary to look at how historical and economic 
precedent impact upon the way groups are organised and their relative influence.
In this section, I will argue that policy network theory provides such an approach, 
offering a means of describing the relationships between groups in particular policy 
arenas and explaining how these affect policy outcomes. The underlying argument 
behind policy network theory is that in order to understand policy outcomes, it is 
first necessary to understand the relationship that exists between groups and the 
interests and activities of state actors (Smith, 1993). The theory first emerged as a 
critique of pluralist accounts of the policy process, in which policy outcomes are 
seen as the result of group pressures. In the American pluralist literature, groups 
are seen as the means of articulating the interests of various sectors of society and 
representing those interests to a relatively neutral state. The state’s role is to
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balance the competing pressures o f these different groups. Critics, however, 
observed that is certain circumstances, small groups of members of Congress 
and/or Senate, legislative agencies and pressure groups were developing a 
symbiotic relationship, forming a sub-government which effectively excluded other 
participants from the decision-making process (Lowi, 1979). These ‘iron triangles9 
are presented as being an obstacle to full and proper political participation, an 
imperfection in the pluralist free market.
Since then, the term ‘network theory’ has been used in a number of different ways, 
from describing close interpersonal relationships within an organisation, to political 
manoeuvring on the national stage. The result has been a proliferation of 
terminology, with the same terms being used by different writers to describe rather 
different concepts (Rhodes, 1990). Policy network has, for example, been used to 
describe relations between individuals within organisations (see Wilks and Wright, 
1988). It has also been used very loosely to describe “actors and potential actors 
who share a common identity or interest” (Wright, 1988: 606). Such definitions 
offer little explanatory insight into how actors relate to each other, and what effects 
these relationships have on policy.
For Smith, policy network theory is an intermediate or meso-level theory that is 
potentially compatible with Marxist, Pluralist or Elitist understandings of political 
power (Smith, 1993: 233). Its usefulness lies in its ability to describe and explain 
underlying inequalities in group dynamics. A policy network can be defined as a 
“cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by resource 
dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by breaks in the 
structure of resources dependencies” (Rhodes, from Smith, 1993; 58). Thus, 
policy networks can be distinguished from an ‘issue network’, which encompass all 
the groups that may potentially be involved in the policy process and which have 
limited or no interdependency and varied resources and capabilities.
Table 2.1 The Characteristics of Policy Networks
1. Membership Policy Network Issue Network
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Number of participants Very limited, some conscious exclusion Large
Type of interest Economic/professional Wide range
of groups
2. Integration 
Frequency of interaction 
Continuity Membership, values, outcomes persistent Fluctuating
access
All participants share basic values A degree of






Distr of resources within network All participants have resources










There is a balance among members. Unequal power.
One group may be dominant but power Power zero-sum
is positive-sum
Adapted from Rhodes and Marsh, 1992:1S7.
Rhodes and Marsh (1992) argue that networks vary according to four main 
dimensions {see table above). The first dimension is that of membership. Policy 
networks may be made up o f state and/or private organisations. Professionals may 
be included, whether as individual experts or as organised groups. Policy networks 
may deliberately exclude other groups. In order to participate in day-to-day policy 
making, members must abide by the ‘rules of the game’ and must be perceived as 
being ‘sound9 and qualified. If an organisation seeks to engage in illegal 
demonstrations to make a political point then it could be excluded from official 
policy discussions (Grant, 1995: 19). The second dimension is the extent to which 
networks are integrated. In a policy network, members meet frequently and 
engage in detailed discussion. Members share values and policy outcomes are 
relatively persistent. All the participants share the same basic values. The third 
dimension is the way in which resources are distributed. In a policy network, all 
participants have resources and their relationship is one of exchange. In an issue 
network, resources are unevenly distributed.
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The final dimension to influence the relationship between groups is that of power. 
In a policy network, all members have power and power is positive sum: their 
relationship actually increases their collective influence. By joining forces, they can 
act to exclude other groups from the policy process or to achieve particular ends. 
In an issue network, power is distributed unevenly and is zero-sum. If one group 
gains more power, it will be at the expense of other groups in the issue network. 
The relative influence of a network will depend on its power relative to other state 
networks and to state organisations immediately above it. In some circumstances, 
the government or head of state can over-ride the wishes of a policy network.
Policy network theory can be used to show how groups operate on a national and 
international level. It recognises that different groups may influence policy, but 
that the extent of their influence is largely, though not entirely, path-dependent. In 
certain circumstances, such as the policy crisis presented by AIDS, it may be 
possible for normally relatively peripheral groups to influence the course of policy. 
This approach to policy network theory assumes that the state has an interest in 
developing integrated relationships with other groups as a means of increasing its 
influence and that these relationships affect policy outcomes. Thus, it has 
explanatory as well as descriptive value. Essentially, the approach is based on 
three key premises. Firstly, that some groups have structural advantages over 
others. Secondly that the state is an influential, and often under-estimated actor. 
Thirdly that, rather than acting in anarchic opposition, groups can actually increase 
their influence through forming networks.
A. Structural advantage
It is widely accepted that in any inter-group dynamic, certain organisations yield 
more influence than others and, other things being equal, their interests will be 
most consistently represented in policy outcomes. Pluralists have long conceded 
that well-resourced groups can have a disproportionate influence over government. 
In the US, there is considerable anxiety about the relative power of lobbyists. 
Thus, pluralist studies of group interactions focus heavily on differences in financial 
and administrative resources, the argument being that prosperous, well-organised
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interest groups are in a stronger position to lobby government effectively and 
thereby influence policy outcomes. According to policy network theory, which has 
been more influenced by European sociological traditions, it is not enough to look 
just at the resources of different groups. The financial and organisational resources 
of a group are not the sole determinants of its influence. As Smith (1988: 4) 
memorably observed, the British labour movement had as many resources on May 
2, 1979 as they had on May 1. But the Conservatives party’s electoral victory 
radically reduced its influence over-night. According to network theorists, it is 
important to look at the context within which groups operate.
It is therefore necessary to consider the vexed question of power. In this thesis I 
will use it in an inclusive sense, as “the ability of a person or group to affect 
outcomes [so] that their preferences take preference over others” (Strange, 1996: 
17). This definition avoids the problems created by attaching power to the pursuit 
of individual, state or class ‘interest’. The term ‘interest’ is inherently problematic, 
it being contestable that a collective entity such as the state, could identify, 
prioritise and pursue an objective ‘interest’. State agencies may be in disagreement 
about their interests, or be mistaken about how to achieve ones they have identified 
(Skocpol, 1985). A second problem with the term ‘interest’, more specific to the 
study in hand, is that it implies that decisions are necessarily taken with an 
explicitly self-interested motive. This study analyses an ambitious attempt at 
international co-ordination in the face of a serious health problem. In some cases, 
the impact of WHO/GPA’s interventions was limited and even negative. Though 
some authors have suggested that ‘development’ agencies have an interest in 
reproducing poverty (Rajab, 2000) this study reveals no evidence that sub-optimal 
policy outcomes were the result of systematic or malicious self-interest. On the 
contrary, many individuals in the WHO/GPA, governments, civil service and NGOs 
were personally and professionally committed to addressing a serious and 
intractable problem. However, structural constraints affect the context within 
which policies are formulated and implemented. Equally, decisions about how to 
prioritise objectives and how to organise and implement projects reflect most 
closely the values and priorities of influential groups. This can in turn affect policy 
outcomes, to the detriment of poorer project ‘stakeholders’ (McGregor* and
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Laurence, 2000). Strange’s definition simply asserts that in any particular 
situation, groups may have particular preferences as to how to achieve particular 
goals and that those who have power will be able to assert that preference over 
others.
Jessop identifies two forms of power (1980). The first is direct or agency power, 
the ability of A to get B to do something he would not otherwise do. This may 
take the form of coercive violence or force. As I have already argued, this aspect 
of power is o f limited relevance to the Global ADDS Strategy, which was voluntary 
and ultimately based on the UN’s principle of the sovereignty of states. Agency 
power may also, however, take more subtle forms, in strategic skills. Those 
groups who are able to develop and deploy ultimately persuasive arguments have 
access to a form of power. In certain circumstances, individuals or organisations 
can use superior analytical, economic or political resources to assert their 
preferences over others.
The second form of power, is structural power, the power to “shape and determine 
the structures ... within which other states, their political institutions, their 
economic enterprises and (not least) their scientists and other professional people 
have to operate” (Strange, 1988: 24). While direct power may be the ultimate 
sanction, day-to-day dealings between separate parties are more constrained by the 
rules, norms and expectations of the most powerful. In any group dynamic, 
therefore, certain groups may have structural advantages over others. These 
advantages are not created by the deliberate acts of individuals or groups, but 
develop over time as the result of a whole range of acts, intended and unintended 
consequences and the repetition of routines (Giddens, 1986). Being deeply 
embedded, these advantages can not be changed by the decisions of individual 
actors.
Smith (1993) argues that in order to understand the relative influence of groups, 
you have to understand the context within which they operate. A group’s relative 
influence is determined by three factors: history, ideology and organisation. 
Historical factors influence the esteem with which groups are held, their resources
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and their institutionalised access to the policy process. Ideology plays an important 
role in the way that groups are perceived and what policy options are conceivable. 
In any given policy sector, core values will affect policy-makers’ perceptions of 
problems and hence limit the number of ‘solutions’ that are considered appropriate. 
The increasing acceptance of the free-market ideology since the 1970s, for 
example, has radically affected policy development in many state and international 
organisations (Strange, 1988: 185). Finally, the way policy-making bodies are 
organised also impact on the relative influence of groups. Some procedures favour 
certain interests over others because they provide access to only a limited number 
of groups, or favour a limited set of solutions. The organisation of the policy 
network creates institutions that include or exclude groups (Grant, 1995).
Structural power confers the ability to decide how things are done and to shape the 
way individuals and groups relate to each other. Strange (1988: Chapter Two) 
argues that all contemporary human relations, whether at an individual, national or 
inter-state level, can be viewed in terms of differences in structural power. 
Structural power, she argues, resides in four separate, distinguishable but related 
structures: security; production; finance and knowledge. Thus, power lies with 
those in a position to exercise control over people’s security and with those who 
can decide and control the manner or mode of production of goods and services. 
In the international arena, an increasingly important source of power stems from 
the ability to control the supply and distribution of credit. This facet of power, she 
argues, tends to be over-looked by traditional Marxists, who emphasise the 
significance of the production function. Modem capitalism, she argues, is 
developing too quickly to be financed solely by the accumulation o f profit. Credit 
is a vital component for economic growth and those who decide how it is to be 
allocated have a significant influence on the parameters within which businesses 
and governments must operate. This facet of power is of particular relevance to 
contemporary international relations, when a majority of states are heavily indebted 
to individual governments, commercial banks and multi-lateral institutions, such as 
the World Bank.
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Finally, access to the control and production of knowledge is a form of structural 
power. Those who can control the way it is acquired, disseminated or withheld -  
whether through education, the media or government -  wield power. Strange’s 
conception of the ‘knowledge structure’ includes what is believed, what is known 
and what is perceived as understood. It also includes the channels by which beliefs, 
ideas and knowledge are communicated (Strange, 1988). The knowledge structure 
determines what knowledge is discovered, how it is stored, who communicates it 
by what means and on what terms. It is also the aspect of structural power that is 
undergoing the most change. Innovations in communication systems have a 
substantial influence over the distribution of knowledge. Over the last century, 
improved communications have allowed for a far greater centralisation of power. 
In the past fieldworkers, especially in geographically remote areas, had a significant 
degree of autonomy. Central government could not find out about local conditions 
quickly enough to make day-to-day decisions, which were thus the responsibility of 
local staff (Strange, 1988). Developments in information technology have allowed 
central government more direct control of a greater number of issues.
One important way in which structural power in the knowledge structure is 
preserved is through the existence of a supportive underlying belief system. For 
centuries, the Catholic church’s authority was underpinned by the belief that it 
alone could provide salvation (Strange, 1988). Equally, the influence of 
contemporary organisations such as GATT and the World Bank are supported by 
the underlying belief that free trade and non-interventionist government is the most 
effective way to long-term economic development.
R  The significance of the state
Policy network theory sees the state as having a significant role in policy-making in 
its own right. For traditional Marxists, the capitalist state’s role is essentially to 
ensure the long-term interests of capital in the face of opposition by organised 
labour. Essentially the state is subordinate to the interests of the representatives of 
capital, and is only able to act independently in times of real crisis, when war or
45
economic depression divides political opposition and creates opportunities for 
policy changes (Block, 1980).
To some critics, the idea that the state has autonomy is incompatible with policy 
network theory which, they argue, is a development of pluralism (Jordan, 1990). 
To pluralists, the state is simply the mechanism by which societal wishes are 
mediated and enacted. More recently, however, there has been re-emphasis on the 
state, with theorists arguing that as a powerful and well-resourced body of 
organisations, the state has the means to influence the context within which other 
groups operate. The state and state actors have interests and capacities o f their 
own and, in certain circumstances, the ability to translate those interests into 
policy. For Cemy (1990) the state has a significant influence over the structure of 
society, and therefore it cannot be accurate to say that society determines the 
interests of the state. Similarly, Nordlinger (1981) argues that the preferences of 
the state are at least as important as those of civil society and that the state can act 
according to its own preferences even when they diverge from those of the most 
powerful in society. Nordlinger identifies three types of state autonomy. Type I 
autonomy occurs when state and societal preferences diverge, and state officials 
act according to their own preferences ignoring societal wishes. Type II occurs 
when societal preferences differ from those of the state, but public officials use 
argument and persuasion to bring about a shift in societal perceptions. Finally, 
type HI autonomy occurs when a state agency pursues a course of action that is in 
accordance with public opinion, but does not do so because it is popular. In other 
words, it would have pursued that course of action irrespective of public opinion. 
Analysts, he argues, tend to confuse a correlation between state and societal 
wishes with a causal relationship.
Unlike realism, ‘the state’ is not seen as a unified actor but rather a loose 
association of relatively distinct organisations including government, the civil 
society, the judiciary, parliament and local government (Hall and Ikenberry, 1990). 
The state is seen as a site of conflict, in which various sub-sections of the state 
compete for resources (Skockpol, 1985). Together, this set of organisations and 
rules provides the broad parameters of conflicts over the use of resources and the
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direction of policy. State actors are also seen as having distinct interests of their 
own (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). State interests are not reducible to class interests 
and the state may take actions against the preferences of capitalist classes, as 
Skocpol (1980) demonstrated in his discussion of the United State’s New Deal. 
State agencies are interested in their own survival and preserving their influence 
relative to other organisations. They will also develop their own procedures and 
organisational values, which will influence their perception of policies. Different 
role-holders may have different interests. Elected state actors have an interest in 
re-election, while bureaucrats may have a greater interest in minimising the 
problems and unpredictability of policy implementation (Smith, 1993: 50). 
However, they also have some shared goals, such as internal order, state 
legitimacy, external security and economic growth.
Thus, state policies are oflen the result of conflicts between state organisations, 
rather than collective action by ‘the state’. The expression ‘state actions’ is 
therefore just shorthand for individuals within particular organisations acting, and 
not an assertion of collective action on the part of an abstract body. The activities 
of these agencies are, however, constrained by their particular roles, defined as 
clearly articulated bundles of rights, duties, obligations and expectations (Knoke, 
1990: 7). Ultimately, therefore, decisions are made and actions taken by 
individuals acting within organisational roles. The role of groups, therefore, is 
often to support the most sympathetic state agencies, rather than acting in direct 
conflict with ‘the state’.
The ability of state actors to put their preferences into action depends on their 
capabilities. A state may chose to use force to overcome political opposition, as 
the Chinese government did in Tiannamen Square in 1989. The problem with 
using despotic power, however, is that it is almost certain to prove expensive in the 
long run, tying up resources in military and para-military organisations. It also 
creates conflicts internally and with the international community. A more effective 
use of power is to use the state’s ability to penetrate civil society in order to 
implement political decisions. The state has resources, administrative machinery 
and controls most essential services. It therefore has the ability to intervene in
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society, creating expectations, influencing opinions and affecting the environment 
in which other groups operate. The state is fully centralised over a clearly defined 
territory. It therefore has a strategic advantage over other groups, who will be 
dependent on it to provide an infrastructure (Smith, 1993: 53).
C  Consolidation of power through reciprocal exchange 
In pluralist theory, power is seen as being zero-sum. Groups compete for power, 
and one group’s gain must necessarily be at the expense of another’s. Similarly, in 
Marxian analyses, the state is only able to achieve limited autonomy where 
opposition groups are divided. In network theory, however, the state actually 
gains power from building relationships with other groups. By working together, 
the state and civil society organisations can achieve greater autonomy from other 
parts o f the state and gain greater control over the policy process. Relationships 
between members of a policy network are therefore seen as being one of exchange, 
with different groups trading financial, technical or political support in a reciprocal 
exchange. Policy making, therefore can be seen as a game in which both “central 
and local participants manoeuvre for advantage, deploying their constitutional- 
legal, organisational, financial, political and informational resources to maximise 
their influence over outcomes” (Rhodes, 1990: 10).
Most models of inter-organisational politics view relationships as being one of 
conflict. Policies are negotiated through the opposition of different groups. In 
fact, the lines between state and society are blurred and it is sometimes difficult to 
make a meaningful distinction between the two sectors. Many non-government 
groups have state sponsorship, or are given regularised access to policy 
negotiations. Similarly, state actors are members of a wider society; subject to 
many of the same social, economic and cultural influences. It is therefore all the 
more useful to see power as being positive sum, sometimes growing through 
collaboration between groups, not necessarily being diminished by opposition from 
others (Smith, 1993: 73).
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3. Health policy in an international context
The aim of the Global AIDS Strategy was for international, state and non­
government organisations to collaborate in the implementation of a globally 
homogenous response to HTV/AIDS. Policy network theory has not been used to 
examine the process of international policy co-ordination and this section I will 
provide an overview of the different organisations that are potentially involved in 
the implementation of international policy agreements in the health arena. If the 
Global AIDS Strategy was to be implemented successfully, its policy 
recommendations would have be negotiated at a national level, then implemented 
by national organisations. As I have argued, policy-making can be seen as a 
political process, involving negotiation and bargaining between conflicting 
interests. Policy development will reflect those interests, but will also be influenced 
by prior policies, the resources available, expected resistance to particular policies 
and the historical relationship between key organisations.
The figure below maps out the organisations that would have been involved if the 
aims of the strategy were to be achieved in the way undertaken by signatory 
governments. Though the relationships between these organisations would vary 
from country to country according to its political and socio-economic history, the 
basic organisational landscape is likely to have been broadly similar. The diagram 
is intended as a basis for drawing comparisons between the way the WHO/GPA 
impacted upon national organisations in different contexts. The case studies in the 
following chapters will go on to explore differences in the relationships between 
these organisations and how this impacted upon HIV/AIDS policy development.
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A. Macro level: the international community
National governments do not act in a vacuum and are affected by international 
agreements and international organisations. International organisations, which may 
be regional or global in remit, are defined as one whose membership, finance and 
field of operation involves two or more member states. The current UN system — 
of which the WHO is one part — was established by charter in October 1947 and 
bore the strong imprimatur of the US and the Western industrialised states that 
funded it. It was based on the principle of state sovereignty. Individual member 
states retained sovereignty within their own borders. Since the mid-1960s, the 
newly independent states have greatly increased the UN’s membership at the same
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time as expanding the remit of its specialised agencies. These agencies — which 
include the WHO — were originally established to provide a clearinghouse of 
information in their areas of expertise and to advance international standardisation. 
After 1950, they gained a more direct role providing technical assistance and 
funding to low-income countries (Williams, 1987: 14). These organisations are 
purposive bodies that have resources, interests and capacities in their own right 
(Gordenker et al, 1994). Increasingly, they also have a direct impact on the way 
policies are developed, particularly in low-income countries (Walt, 1994: 122).
International organisations operate within a wider framework of international 
agreements and understandings. These I will term international institutions, where 
institution is defined as “persistent and connected sets of rules, formal and 
informal, that prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity, and shape 
expectations” (Keohane, 1990: 732). In other words, actors’ behaviour in the 
international context is to some extent circumscribed by the expectations of the 
existing international regime. Aberrant behaviour is likely to be met with 
repercussions in the form of deteriorating relations with other states, or political or 
economic sanction.
The WHO is a specialised agency of the UN, with responsibility for health. The 
organisation is made up of 178 member states, an executive board and a 
secretariat. Member states meet at the World Health Assembly for two weeks 
every year. The executive board, consisting of about thirty elected representatives, 
meets before and after the assembly to discuss policy directions in more detail. 
Thus, state representatives have some opportunity to influence its overall policy. 
The WHO secretariat is composed of the Director General and permanent paid 
staff and is responsible for its day-to-day operations. Staff are meant to be 
politically neutral but are often national political appointees and keep in close 
contact with their country’s embassy (Walt, 1994: 132). The Director General has 
significant influence within the WHO, formally appoints all other staff and has 
authority to move them from department to department.
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The WHO was originally funded by a regular budget donated by its members. 
Increasingly, however, it has become reliant on extra-budgetary or voluntary 
funding. This has grown from 25% of total funding in 1971 to approximately 54% 
in the early 90s (Walt, 1994: 135). The GPA, which was created to implement the 
Global AIDS Strategy, was one such extraordinary programme. According to 
some, this change in funding patterns has altered the balance of power within the 
organisation, giving relatively more power to a handful of donor governments 
making ad hoc decisions about who to support rather than developing strategic 
policies (Walt, 1994: 136).
The WHO/GPA were just one among many international organisations who had a 
potential interest in HIV/AIDS policies. In addition to the other specialist agencies 
of the UN, there are regional organisations, such as the European Commission, the 
executive body of the European Union. Many of these organisations were 
developing policies in the area whilst the strategy was in operation. Gordenker et 
al (1994) give a detailed description of the various approaches to HTV/AIDS that 
were being pursued in the late eighties and early nineties and the organisational 
competitiveness this sometimes provoked.
In addition to formal international organisations, many national organisations have 
bilateral links with organisations in other countries. National research institutes 
often work collaboratively with other organisations, for example. State actors 
draw from the experiences of other countries when they develop their own national 
policies. These bilateral links are particularly important in developing countries. 
Much aid is given by bilateral agreement and donor countries maintain close links 
with the governments to which they give money, overseeing the way it is 
disbursed. In many low-income countries, ministry business is strongly influenced 
by the donors who support policy changes and provide expert consultants (Cliff, 
1993).
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B. Meso-level: national organisations
/. 'TheState’
Though the international relations literature often refers to ‘the state’ as a 
homogenous entity, empirical observation reveals it to be a heterogeneous 
ensemble of separate agencies, each with its own resources, strategies, procedures 
and priorities. Most contemporary states comprise of a legislature, an executive 
and an administration. The legislature is the supreme policy-making body, and is 
usually deemed to have three functions, to represent the people, to enact legislation 
and to oversee the executive. Elected representatives have constitutionally 
established responsibilities, and they are often the most immediate focus of public 
dissatisfaction, should policies ‘go wrong’. Increasingly, however, they are seen as 
being relatively ineffective, ‘rubber-stamping’ decisions that are made by the 
executive. Healey and Robinson (1992) argue that the legislature’s role is 
marginal. The executive keeps a strict control of their activities through the use of 
patronage and party discipline. Supra-national bodies like the EU also limit 
legislature autonomy. Most, however, retain the ability to debate, adapt and even 
block proposals. Members of the legislature may also derive some power from 
their ability to attract publicity and embarrass government.
In most states, considerable policy-making power resides with the executive, a 
senior-level sub-section of the legislature normally including the premier and 
ministers (deputies or senators), who have responsibility for particular policy 
sectors. The power of the chief executive, relative to other members of the 
executive and other parts of the state varies over time and between states. In many 
parts of the world, particularly Africa, the rule of the chief executive is often 
personal and unaccountable (de Sardan, 1993; Bayart, 1993).
The ‘administration’, or civil service, can be extremely influential. Without the 
administration, the executive could not function. Its influence will depend on the 
organisational and political context. In some countries, like the UK, the 
administration is stable and expected to be neutral. Much of its influence is derived 
from its representative’s expertise and experience. When ministers arrive in office 
they frequently know little about their new portfolio and have to be guided by the
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administration. Headey (1974) argues that the minister’s role is often minimal, 
confined to making marginal choices, improving efficiency and acting as an 
ambassador for policy developments. British politician Michael Meacher has 
argued that civil servants’ knowledge and experience gave them considerable 
opportunities to minimise minister’s influence (1980). In the other regimes such as 
the US and most of South America, senior administrators are political appointees, 
replaced when the executive changes. The administration is not then seen as 
‘neutral’ and does not necessarily have greater expertise than the executive.
Health departments usually have relatively low status within this ensemble of state 
agencies. Many politicians regard the health sector as peripheral and the sector 
often fails to attract political high-fliers unless there is a particular crisis. In the 
event of a clash of preferences with more prestigious or economically productive 
sections of the state, health department’s preferences are likely to be over-ridden 
(Walt, 1994: 86). This low status has implications for its dealing with other 
departments whose policies affect health, yet who are reluctant to change them 
when to do so would compromise priority goals such as economic growth. Health 
departments are rarely entirely unified bodies. Often tensions exist between 
different sections of the health service, especially in low-income countries in which 
powerful, externally funded vertical programmes are seen as acting beyond the 
control of central health boards (Walt, 1994: 86).
Finally, the implementation of health policy is frequently the responsibility of 
district and provincial health boards. Decisions made at sub-national level about 
how to operationalise policies and how resources should be allocated will have a 
significant impact on policy development and overall resource distribution. Since 
the 1980s, many low-income countries have been attempting to decentralise their 
health services amidst strong pressure from the international community. Though 
the process of decentralisation takes different forms, central bodies usually retain 
control over planning and policy formulation, limiting local autonomy through 
mandatory demands, targets and budgetary allocations (Atkinson, 1999).
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ii. Civil society organisations
Historically, International Relations theorists have paid relatively little attention to 
non-state actors in policy development. In a discipline that has been dominated by 
realists, it was assumed that they were relatively unimportant. They did not, 
ultimately, affect power relationships between countries and the state could close 
them down if they became incompatible with the ‘national interest’. In the last 
twenty years, however, they have become an increasing focus of attention in 
national and international studies (see: Willetts, 1993). The end of the Cold War 
served to reinforce this trend, with ‘civil society’ being seen increasingly as an 
essential part of a stable, democratic system. In donor discourse, the term ‘civil 
society’ is used to describe relationships, social groupings and values that are not 
solely determined by family and kin ties, yet are not of the state (Gellner, 1994). It 
is seen as generating wealth and ideas in competition with the state and moderating 
the more pernicious aspects of authoritarian state control (Harbeson et al, 1994). 
To this end, donors are channelling increasing amounts of aid towards ‘civil 
society’, usually in the form of non-government organisations (Van Rooy, 1998).
How, though, are societal preferences organised and articulated in a political 
system? Broadly speaking, this influence can be analysed on two levels. The first 
way is to look at civil society organisations (CSOs) whose aims are specifically to 
influence policy. If the expression ‘civil society’ is viewed as a general 
‘associational realm’ of heterogeneous interests and relationships, the term CSOs 
refers to organised, purposive non-state groups. Not all CSOs are interested in 
influencing policy, however, so I shall focus my discussion on pressure groups -  
those groups that have an explicitly political dimension to their activities, even if 
that is not the sole or even main reason for their existence. The second way of 
looking at the way societal preferences might influence policy is broader, and looks 
at dominant values within society and how the political system is maintained and 
reproduced. This is discussed in more detail in the section ii. below.
Pressure groups are those that explicitly seek to influence political decisions. The 
expression usually refers to non-state organisations, though Lindblom expands the 
definition to include factions within the state that seek to influence policy (cited in
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Jordan and Richardson, 1987: 187). Pressure groups may be divided into two
main groups: sectional groups and promotional groups (Willetts, 1982).
Promotional groups seek to promote causes arising from a particular set of values,
and fall into five main categories.
□ Welfare agencies (NGOs). This expression refers to groups that run 
operational welfare programmes and/or raise funds to provide education, health 
or social services. Though welfare organisations do not necessarily have a 
lobbying role, advocacy is becoming an increasingly important part of NGO 
activities (Van Rooy, 1998: 36).
□ Religious organisations are concerned with the general promotion of (religious) 
values. The extent to which religious organisations become formally involved 
with politics varies. They can, however be significant advocates on behalf of 
sections of the population or around certain core values. Most major religions 
have a formal trans-national structure and are involved in lobbying and 
advocacy in the international arena.
□ Community groups. These arise when distinct segments of society such as 
people of a particular geographic area or ethnic origin organise to promote 
their group identity or status. Community groups may include woman’s 
groups, who are involved in similar issues of group identity and status.
□ Political parties. Opinions are divided as to whether political parties are 
analytically distinct from pressure groups as they seek to win office rather than 
influence policy outcomes. Willetts (1982) argues that they often function as 
pressure groups. Some political parties have no realistic chance of winning 
power, but are formed to promote particular issues. Political parties can also 
act as pressure groups on government even when ‘the party’ itself is in office. 
There is often a distinct difference between the views and interests of 
government, and that of ‘the party’ it purports to represent.
□ Specific issue promotional groups. Promotional groups such as human rights 
organisations, gay groups and patient’s organisations have had a considerable 
influence in the HIV/AIDS arena, as will be discussed in more detail in 
subsequent chapters.
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The second category of pressure group is sectional groups, those that seek to 
protect the interests of particular sections of society. They fall into three main 
categories.
□ Professional associations. Organisations that represent the health professions 
play a particularly important role in health issues generally and HIV/AIDS in 
particular. The health sector is unusual in the relatively high status accorded to 
its professional advisors, many of whom have a substantial influence on policy 
development (Ham, 1999). The predominance of medical professional values 
has led to a historical tendency to equate ‘health’ with medicine, rather than 
environmental factors, which may have a far greater impact on peoples’ health 
(Ham, 1999: chapter seven). Health resources are often diverted to expensive 
drugs, hospitals and equipment, even when health plans cite primary health care 
as being the most urgent priority (Macrae et al’ 1993). In Africa, many 
advisors are expatriates funded by donor organisations. This has led to 
criticism that their advice can be inappropriate for local conditions (Cliff, 
1993). The activity of professional groups in Britain and Zambia will be 
discussed in more detail in chapters four and five.
□ Sectional economic groups. These may include individual companies, as well 
as business or sectoral associations as well as trade unions. Business interests, 
articulated via direct lobbying from individual corporations and business 
associations have had a significant influence in various specialist areas of 
AIDS-related policy such as private insurance and drug development (see 
Berridge, 1996).
□ Sectional recreational groups, for example sports associations and member- 
based leisure organisations.
The distinction between promotional groups and sectional groups is a useful first 
step towards categorising social organisations, however it says little about how 
groups influence policy. Grant (1995: 15) suggests that it is more helpful to 
categorise pressure groups according to the strategies they adopt when they seek 
to influence policy. Thus, pressure groups can be sub-divided into ‘insiders’, who 
work with policy makers and who are recognised by them as having a legitimate
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claim to policy relevant knowledge, and those that choose or are compelled to 
remain ‘outside’ government policy circles. This basic distinction can be further 
refined to take into account the different resources available to pressure groups and 
state attitudes towards them. State actors may choose deliberately to exclude 
certain pressure groups from any form of consultation. Equally, particular groups 
may not have the technical capacity to lobby government effectively. Thus, 
pressure groups can be categorised in the following way:
□ Prisoner groups. Groups that find it difficult to retain political independence 
from government because of their dependence on state funding.
□ Low profile insider groups. Pressure groups that work quietly behind the 
scenes with government agencies.
□ High profile insider groups. Groups that work closely with government but 
may sometimes choose to generate public support for their particular 
viewpoint.
□ Potential insider groups. Those groups that have the potential to become 
insiders, but have yet to develop a particular interest and expertise in so doing.
□ Outsider groups by necessity. Those groups that are deliberately excluded 
from the decision-making process, or that do not have the political, financial or 
technical resources to lobby government effectively.
□ Ideological outsiders. Those groups that reject the existing political system and 
who have no interest in attempting to collaborate with representatives of 
regime they regard as illegitimate (Grant, 1995).
Interest in pressure group activity has increased dramatically since the end of the 
Cold War. There are, however, various critiques of this growing confidence in the 
non-government sector, and in civil society as the agents of democracy. Some 
writers argue that interest groups have a negative influence on policy, forcing 
minority interests on government to the detriment of the majority (Olson, 1982). 
Pressure group activity can reinforce patterns of political inequality. Businesses, 
for example, already have a significant influence on social and political 
organisation. Organised business lobbies may simply reinforce this influence
(Grant, 1995). Another widespread criticism is that the concept has limited
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applicability to the majority of low-income countries. Many Southern states do not 
have a strong tradition of well-organised, high profile non-government pressure 
groups (Walt, 1994).
Some writers have gone so far as to argue that ‘civil society’ is incompatible with a 
society in which relations are ordered through the traditional ties of family, caste 
and kin (Gellner, 1994). Such a formulation, however, over-estimates the extent to 
which ‘modem’ societies are freed from ‘traditional’ ties, which in fact coexist in 
(relative) harmony with professional and social associations (Etzioni, 1997). It 
also under-estimates the networks of formal and informal professional, trade and 
interest groups that exist in low-income countries (Chazan et al, 1992). Though 
civil society organisations in the Western sense have traditionally been weak in 
many low-income countries, there are other channels for external pressure. While 
ethnic identity per se is often poorly articulated, some ethnic, familial and kin 
groups are formally organised and provide a significant form of external pressure 
on state organisations (Scott, 1998). Non-government organisations, which were 
originally formed to provide relief for vulnerable communities, are taking an 
increasingly high profile role in advocacy on the national and international stage 
(Richmond and McGee, 1999). Donor funding has brought them significant 
resources and greater organisational capacity. In some cases, they are being 
brought directly into the policy-process though seminars and consultative 
committees.
ii. Societal pressures
Thus far, I have discussed the role of organised pressure groups. Political 
decisions can, however, be influenced by values and attitudes within society more 
generally. As I have already argued, widely held religious or cultural values will 
have an influence on which policy options are regarded as ‘sensible’ or politically 
feasible. Issues surrounding HIV/AIDS touch upon deeply-held religious and 
moral beliefs, which has had profound implications for policy development in the 
area, as I will discuss in more detail in chapters five and six.
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How, then, can society influence policy? The answer to this question depends on 
the nature of the state and on the political system in operation. These have a 
profound impact on the way in which societal preferences are articulated. For 
Hirschman (1970), the three main channels of political expression are exit, voice 
and loyalty. Loyalty is an indicator of the extent to which citizens accord 
legitimacy to their government and even the identity of the nation-state itself. 
Voice is the process by which citizens express their dissatisfaction with government 
performance. The ways in which public ‘voice’ is articulated depends on the 
nature of the state. ‘Voice’ can range from voting or lobbying at party conferences 
to violent demonstrations and political coups. Civil disobedience, or even the 
perception of its threat, can exert influence on state policy makers (Day and Klein, 
1989).
For Hirschman, exit is primarily an economic response. Citizens may seek recourse 
to the market for goods or services when the state is not adequately providing for 
them. For example, an individual may choose to pay for private medicine when 
they lose confidence in state health provision. The significance of ‘exit’ as a form 
of political pressure is of particular relevance to businesses. Government policy 
makers are mindful of the fact that businesses may move abroad if they do not 
develop policies that are perceived as acting in the general interests of capitalist 
endeavour. Thus, businesses have an indirect influence on policy development that 
is quite separate from the organised lobbying discussed above. This form of 
indirect influence has some relevance to the formation of HTV/AIDS policies. 
Chapter five will discuss how public health officials persuaded policy-makers of 
HTV/AIDS significance as a policy issue by estimating its potential impact on 
business profitability.
Recent developments in thinking on the dynamics of poverty and social exclusion 
suggest that rather than seeing exit solely as an economic response, it is helpful to 
see citizens’ economic and social responses as interdependent (Rodgers et al, 
1995). Citizens who choose, or are indeed forced to ‘exit’ from state services, are 
often socially and politically excluded as well as economically. Equally, the ability 
to exercise ‘voice’ effectively is often intimately related to economic power and the
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availability of exit options (see Lindblom, 1979). This debate is of particular 
relevance in developing countries, where health services are often effectively 
outside the geographic or financial reach of many poor households. In Africa, 
many people use traditional healers in the first instance of ill health, using formal 
state-sponsored medical services only as a last resort. The fact that traditional 
healers are not included within national health strategies reflects the way health 
ministries were formed and the articulation of interests at state level, as will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter four.
Summary
In this chapter, I have outlined a theoretical framework within which to understand 
the Global AIDS Strategy’s impact. Rather than being a process of applying 
technical solutions to objective problems, each phase of the policy process is 
inherently political. Not all the agencies within this political process, however, 
have equal influence. For historical reasons, some agencies are in a position to 
influence the environment within which decisions are made, thereby affecting the 
capacities of other groups. I have argued that the capacities of and relationships 
between groups vary over time. In some circumstances, groups increase their 
cumulative influence over policy outcomes by working with, rather than in conflict 
with other groups. These networks, which are dependent on each other for 
resources, can act together to exclude other groups from key stages in the policy 
process. In the final section, I mapped the main types of group that are likely to be 
involved in implementing the strategy in any particular country and gave a brief 
overview of the constraints and opportunities for them to influence policy 
development.
In the following chapter, I will discuss the methodological framework that 
underpinned my research. I will then go on to discuss the policy environments in 
the two case countries, which have been chosen from the ‘developed’ and 
‘developing’ world. Network theory has not yet been extended to developing 
countries and I will therefore conduct a review of the literature on developing 
country policy environments more generally. Subsequent chapters will explore
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how far network theory can be usefully applied to these very different policy 
environments, and how it can help to conceptualise trans-national policy influences.
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Chapter three: Research methodology
Introduction
In the first chapter I outlined three major research objectives: to establish the 
extent to which the objectives of the Global AIDS Strategy were achieved, to 
identify the ways in which the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy impacted upon 
the development of national AIDS policies and to explore the main factors that 
account for any observed impact. In other words, I seek to identify an effect and 
to establish a causal link: between the Global AIDS Strategy and policy 
developments. In the second chapter, I reviewed the literature on trans-national 
policy influences and argued that the influence of one particular group can only be 
understood within the context of the resources and organisation of other groups. 
It follows, therefore, that any observed impact has to be viewed within a complex 
environment of existing policies, organisations and political and economic trends.
In this chapter, I will demonstrate that a case study approach using both 
quantitative and qualitative techniques is the most appropriate way to explore this 
complex environment and to establish how the strategy’s implementation 
influenced and was in turn influenced by the policy environment within which it 
operated. In this thesis I use case-studies in Britain and Zambia to explore the 
processes by which the Global AIDS Strategy influenced the development of AIDS 
policies, focusing on how differences in a country’s relative wealth affected the 
Strategy’s impact. I will then give a more detailed account of the research 
methods I used and the ways in which I minimised the potential pitfalls of the case 
study approach.
1. Research methodology
There are many ways of conducting social research and the choice of research 
methods is determined by the questions being posed. This thesis explores a 
complex causal process, looking at how a range of organisations negotiated and 
implemented a global undertaking. In the following section, I will argue that a 
purely quantitative approach to these questions would be an inadequate way of
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explaining the various impacts of the Global AIDS Strategy. Exploring case- 
studies in detail using a combination of quantitative and qualitative research 
methods was the most effective way of tackling these questions given the resources 
that were available.
A. The quantitative approach to measuring policy interventions
One approach to determining the effect of policies is to establish indices to measure 
the scale and distribution of a problem. The UNDP, for example, has established a 
set of indices to measure levels of ‘human development’. The level of education is 
measured by looking at school enrolments and literacy rates; health by mortality 
rates and so on. Comparisons can then be made between levels of ‘human 
development’ in different countries and development interventions' impact can be 
monitored by comparing how these indices vary over time.
One way of measuring the effect of the Global AIDS Strategy would then, be to 
look at a cross-section of the signatory states and use indices to establish how 
ADDS funding changed, whether governments set up AIDS programmes and how 
HIV transmission patterns varied over time. There are, however, various problems 
with this approach. Firstly, they could neither establish nor explain a causal 
relationship between the Strategy and policy development. Secondly, there are 
glaring inadequacies in the quantitative data available and thirdly, the approach 
would fail to compare like with like.
/. The causal relationship
This research seeks to examine a causal process, the ways in which various 
organisations impacted upon each other. Sample data might establish a correlation 
between variables, but could neither establish nor explain a causal relationship 
between them (Stake, 1994). The endorsement of the Global AIDS Strategy, for 
example, coincided with an increase in funding for HTV/AIDS interventions. It 
does not necessarily follow, however, that the signing of the strategy caused this 
increase. Indeed, the causality might be in the opposite direction: the strategy was 
endorsed because policy-makers were already concerned about AIDS, as
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evidenced by their commitment of extra funding. It is necessary to conduct further 
research to establish the relationship between the two variables. Equally, 
quantitative indices of financial and organisational resources provide only a partial 
picture of as complex and multi-faceted a process as ‘political influence’. As I 
have already argued, one group’s impact is as much defined by historical precedent 
and their relationship with other groups as on their financial resources.
ii. The nature o f the data
A study that looks at cross-sections of a given population would also be seriously 
compromised by the nature of the data that was available to me. Given the 
resources that were available to me to conduct this research, acquiring primary 
data on a statistically significant sample of the signatory states was impractical. I 
would have to rely on data that had already been produced by various government 
and international agencies. This data is, however, flawed in various significant 
ways that would limit the inferences that could be drawn from such a survey. The 
three main objectives of the Global AIDS Strategy were to reduce the spread of 
infection, to reduce the social and personal impact of HTV/AIDS infection and to 
co-ordinate national and international interventions. The three clearest indicators 
of how far these objectives were achieved are a) changes in transmission rates b) 
the presence or introduction of discriminatory or anti-discriminatory legislation and 
c) changes in funding flows for HTV/AIDS interventions.
Data on each of these have been collected by the WHO on a trans-national basis 
and used as general measures of government commitment and the efficacy of 
interventions. Used in isolation, however, these indicators give an inadequate 
picture. Firstly, estimates of the levels of infection with the HTV virus are 
unreliable. There is a time span between infection and producing HIV anti-bodies 
that are identifiable for testing purposes. There is a further, indeterminate gap 
between infection and showing the symptoms of AIDS. Testing procedures are 
often patchy and inadequate with many countries unable to afford adequate testing 
programmes. Many people are unwilling or unable to be tested and a significant 
number of AIDS deaths go undiagnosed. Political and cultural factors can have a
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significant impact on reporting rates. Without state commitment to testing 
programmes, empirical evidence about HTV prevalence will simply not be 
produced. Low-recorded rates of infection may therefore mean nothing more than 
that the government has not been looking for the problem.
Similarly, though the WHO has produced international data on HTV/AIDS 
legislation, it would be unsafe to assume that the presence of anti-discriminatory 
legislation is necessarily evidence of a committed policy of non-discrimination and 
government support to people with HIV/AIDS. Conversely, a state may have 
legislation that appears to discriminate against people with AIDS but, for a number 
of reasons, may fail to invoke it. The relationship between public policy and state 
legislation is complex and highly dependent on the legislative traditions of the 
particular state.
Thirdly, it is notoriously hard to obtain reliable information about HTV/AIDS 
funding. In part, the problem is practical, as the information to be collated involves 
so many different countries and organisations, each with its own accounting 
methods. Funding for ADDS prevention or care is often donated as part of wider- 
ranging development projects, and it is not always possible to identify AIDS 
spending as distinct and separate (Laws* 1996). These practical obstacles to 
collecting reliable data on funding and prevalency are compounded by another 
difficulty, which strikes at the heart of the problem of using data from one 
particular group or set of groups. The government and international agencies that 
provide the main sources of quantitative data on HTV/AIDS have their own 
agendas, which affect the form and extent to which they publish information. 
Official publications say as much about the organisations that produce them as the 
problems they report (May, 1993). Ultimately dependent on external goodwill and 
support, agencies use official publications to ‘sell’ their organisation and 
programmes. The amount donors claim to have given to developing countries, for 
example, is often larger than donees say they have received (Laws, 1996). 
Administrative costs, for example, may be deducted from the overall contribution. 
At the same time, the amount recipient governments acknowledge they have 
received from donors may not reflect the sum that is actually spent on aid
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programmes. The ‘Good Governance Agenda’ introduced by the World Bank and 
since taken up by most of the main donor organisations was designed specifically 
to combat what is suspected to be significant corruption within development 
projects (Mosley, Harrigan and Toye, 1995).
Hi. The diverse population
Notwithstanding the problems of data on HIV/AIDS interventions, a cross- 
sectional analysis of input/outputs in terms of HIV/AIDS policies would offer a 
weak basis for comparison. The population of signatories to the Global AIDS 
Strategy encompassed such a huge range of political, economic religious and 
cultural systems that drawing inferences from an international sample would be of 
dubious value. How much funding, for example, would represent evidence of the 
UK government’s commitment to a problem? How could you compare this 
contribution with that of a small, low-income country? Different countries also 
came from different starting points in terms of their attitudes to sexuality and 
sexually transmitted diseases. It would not be possible to draw any inferences 
about the extent of that influence from simple outputs such as changes in 
legislation or funding unless they are followed up by a more detailed examination 
of particular political and socio-economic contexts. The WHO may have exerted 
very substantial influence to achieve a relatively small concession in deeply 
embedded policies of discrimination against people with sexually transmitted 
diseases. Finally, HIV/AIDS did not affect all countries equally, so it would be 
unrealistic to expect some international ‘norm’ in terms of policy interventions. 
Only by looking at a particular case would it be possible to draw conclusions about 
the nature and extent of the WHO/GPA’s influence.
B. The case study approach
Case studies are one of several ways of conducting social research. Unlike 
experimental methods or surveys, case studies do not make claims to 
representativeness, they focus on a particular case and examine it in detail. The 
case studies in this thesis use both quantitative and qualitative techniques to
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describe how the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy impacted upon a range of 
organisations. The aim of this research is both contextual and diagnostic. Its first 
aim is to identify the form and nature of the relationships between the various 
organisations involved in AIDS policy making. Then, information from a number 
of different sources has been used to establish the main factors determining what 
exists (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994).
As a research strategy, however, case studies are often criticised for being 
unscientific. Evidence obtained from case studies, it is argued, is often subjective 
(Yin, 1994). No two researchers would approach the research site in the same way 
and could interpret information very differently, depending on their individual 
interests and experience. Equally, it is argued, the results from individual case 
studies are ungeneralisable, and thus of little value in generating theory. The 
response to these criticisms has been mixed. Some writers question the relevance 
of a ‘scientific9 approach to the social sciences, arguing that events in the social 
world are too complex for an approach which depends on examining the effects of 
single variables in a controlled environment. Stake (1994), for example, argues 
that while case studies may be subjective, that does not necessarily undermine their 
validity as long as the researcher is careful and reflective. They are simply a 
different way of constructing knowledge. Indeed, by foregrounding the 
researcher’s interpretations, they can help avoid the situation in which implicit 
biases are hidden behind the veneer of scientific objectivity. The design of any 
research project will necessarily be informed by theoretical and cultural ‘baggage’ 
on the part of the researcher.
That said, steps can be taken to make case studies as reliable as possible. Yin 
(1994) argues that case study methodologies can and should be designed in a way 
that fulfils ‘scientific’ criteria of reliability. Because a research design is supposed 
to represent a logical set of statements, it should be possible to judge the quality of 
any given design according to logical tests. Thus, the four tests common to all 
social science methods — construct validity, internal and external validity and 
reliability — are equally relevant to a case study approach. The methodology has 
been designed with these tests in mind.
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/. Construct validity
One of the most common complaints about case study research is that it fails to 
establish sound operational measures for the concepts being studied (Yin, 1994). 
In the absence of a proper definition of the phenomena that are being observed, the 
case study becomes a subjective interpretation of events. Yin argues that two 
criteria have to be met in order to satisfy the test of construct validity. Firstly, the 
specific types of changes that are to be studied must be properly identified. 
Secondly, the researcher must demonstrate that the selected measures of these 
changes reflect the specific types of change that have been identified. In my 
particular research, it is important to define what ‘compliance’ with the Global 
AIDS Strategy means in operational terms and to develop appropriate measures.
As a first stage in this process, I have summarised the Global AIDS Strategy, as 
shown on page four. Viewed schematically, it is possible to identify the composite 
elements of the strategy. The Global AIDS Strategy was based upon two major 
premises that had direct policy implications for signatory states. The first was that 
AIDS was a serious problem that should have political, technical and financial 
resources directed towards solving it. The second was that it should be done 
within a non-discriminatory legal framework. Both of these have measurable 
outputs. If the Global AIDS Strategy was implemented successfully, we could 
expect the financial and technical resources devoted to HIV/AIDS to increase after 
the strategy was signed, and the legal framework altered accordingly. On an 
organisational level, we could expect to see the establishment of a centralised 
government agency to deal with the problem of HTV and AIDS, and NGOs should 
be actively involved in implementing WHO/GPA operational policies.
The strategy also had three major objectives: to prevent HTV infection, reduce the 
personal and social impacts of HTV infection and to unify national and international 
efforts. Had the strategy been successful, we would expect to see a decline in rates 
of infection, welfare services for people with HIV/AIDS and an integrated national 
response in alignment with the WHO strategy. Though precise figures for the rate
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of infection are difficult to obtain for the reasons I discussed above, it is possible to 
discern broad trends in rates of transmission from epidemiological reports. 
Similarly, surveys provide quantitative evidence about changes in the populations’ 
knowledge and attitudes towards HIV/AIDS and changes in their sexual behaviour. 
It is possible to discern the extent of HIV/AIDS interventions by looking at 
changes in funding patterns and organisational responses. The extent to which 
countries sought complied with the strategy's undertaking to avoid discriminatory 
legal practices can be partially gauged by the presence or otherwise of legislation 
that either discriminates against people with HIV/AIDS or prohibits discrimination. 
The WHO compiled tabular information on the legal instruments dealing with HTV 
infection and AIDS in all its member states (WHO, 1994b).
While these quantitative indices create some structure to a complex and unwieldy 
subject matter, on their own they can not establish a causal relationship between 
the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy and changes in the scale or impact of 
interventions. As Walt et al (1999a) have noted, it is extremely difficult to gauge 
the effectiveness or impact of aid co-ordination. Thus, further interpretative 
research is needed to try to identify ways in which the GPA’s ‘Global Programme’ 
influenced policy development and the main constraints to its impact. I therefore 
supplemented this quantitative data with evidence from articles, reports, policy 
documents and ‘grey literature’; in-house publications from relevant organisations. 
Finally and perhaps most importantly, I undertook a series of in-depth, semi- 
structured interviews with key members of the AIDS policy network.
The interviews served to put the quantitative data into a local context that could 
then support comparison between the two countries. Differences in resource 
availability and health status in the two countries make it difficult to make direct 
comparisons between funding levels or sero-prevalency. The interviews were used 
to explore how senior, experienced AIDS personnel perceived the scale and 
efficacy of the response to AIDS given the resources that were available and the 
scale of the problem in that particular context. It was then possible to identify 
areas where the response had been relatively weak and establish why problems had 
occurred or how the WHO/GPA may have impacted upon policy development.
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The table below defines the intended ‘outputs’ of the strategy, the quantitative 
indices I have used to measure changes over time and the sources of qualitative 
data I drew upon.
Table 3.1. Global AIDS Strategy output indices and research 
resources
Overall objectives 
1. Prevention of HIV
Quantitative data 
Sero-prevalency data 


















The test of internal validity has its origins in the causation experiments of the 
natural sciences, the logic being that the most common threat to an experiment’s 
validity is that of ‘false’ results caused by unaccounted factors. One of the 
fundamental premises of my research is that policy decisions are informed by a 
range of socio-economic, cultural and political influences. It is therefore 
inappropriate and misleading to attempt to identify and measure the effects of a 
single determinant of social change mathematically. That said, it is still possible to 
explore the main ways in which a particular organisation influences others. This
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research explores the relationship between an effect — national AIDS policies that 
correspond with the WHO’s Global AIDS Strategy — and a causal process — the 
influence of the Global AIDS Strategy. For that reason, the logic of the internal 
validity test has relevance to my research design. In individual case studies, the 
challenge of checking that a particular inference is correct can only really be 
tackled by triangulation, defined as a “process of using multiple perceptions to 
clarify meaning, verifying the repeatability of an observation or interpretation” 
(Stake, 1994: 241). By using secondary sources to establish whether changes took 
place, in combination with interviews from the representatives of a broad range of 
interest groups, it should be possible to ensure that the conclusions drawn are 
appropriate and accurate.
iii. External Validity
Another criticism of case study research is that it is impossible to generalise from a 
particular case. Research findings are thus of little relevance to an implied hard 
core of social ‘science’. Many factors could influence the way in which the 
strategy was implemented in a particular state, so can a case study be anything 
more than an intrinsically interesting history?
Firstly, case studies can be a useful way of examining the process of influence in a 
way that an input/output analysis of whole populations can not. Experimentation 
approaches to understanding these relationships are acknowledged to be 
problematic as statistical correlations do not actually establish any type of causal 
association (Yee, 1996). Secondly, I follow Yin’s argument that complaints about 
generalising from case studies are based upon the unsuitable application of 
representative logic to a very different line of research enquiry (1993). Case 
studies are not ‘representative’ in the sense of carefully chosen statistical samples. 
They can, however, fulfil the criteria of being analytically generalisable. Used 
cumulatively, case studies can test and revise theoretical propositions (Eckstein, 
1966). Treated in this way, case studies can be a relevant and productive addition 
to the international policy debate.
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t v . Reliability
Case studies have also been criticised for subjectivity. Were another researcher to 
conduct the same research, they might come to different conclusions via a different 
route. In comparison with quantitative research, the actual process of qualitative 
research, particularly data analysis, is often opaque to outsiders (Ritchie and 
Spencer, 1994). To some extent this is unavoidable when analysing something as 
abstract and complex as social policy (Stake, 1994). Any analysis is bound to be 
selective in the way it is presented and argued. However, I have minimised this 
risk by making my research criteria explicit and keeping a record of all sources. 
Interviews have been conducted and analysed systematically. These procedures are 
discussed in more detail later.
C  Choosing the case sites
Having argued that the case study method is the most appropriate way of 
examining the research questions, I will now turn to the question of deciding which 
cases to investigate. The priority of this research was to compare the relationship 
between the WHO/GPA and a high- and low-income country. The most significant 
divide between the WHO's member states is the distinction between the low- 
income net recipients of WHO financial and technical support, and the 
industrialised countries upon whose contributions the organisation ultimately 
depends. The WHO is a member-based organisation and members’ contribution to 
its general funds are based on their GDP. The organisation is also becoming more 
dependent on extra-budgetary funding from industrialised countries to fund health 
interventions in low-income states (Walt, 1993).
The Global AIDS Strategy provides a means of exploring how differences in state 
income impact upon the relationship between states and international agencies and 
how this in turn impacts upon policy. There are significantly divergent opinions in 
the international relations literature about how national income affects the extent to 
which states comply with international agreements. The Global AIDS Strategy 
provides a relatively discrete case study of the effects of an international 
organisation over a defined period. It allows consideration of how international
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organisations influence the way that policies are put on to the international agenda 
and how they influence the way countries develop policies.
Explicit comparisons between policy interventions in high- and low-income 
countries are rare in the policy literature (for an exception to this general rule, see 
Collins, Green and Hunter, 1999). Though interventions in low-income countries 
are often measured against a Western template, the comparisons are implicit. 
Explicitly comparative research is usually conducted on a North-North, South- 
South basis. This is partly because of the historic disciplinary divide between the 
Social Policy literature, which has tended to focus on welfare provision in 
industrialised countries, and the Development Studies literature, which focuses on 
the analysis of interventions in low-income countries. It is, however, increasingly 
recognised that the study of social policy needs to take a more international 
perspective (Lewis, 1998; Deacon et al, 1997). Supra-national ‘public’ 
organisations such as the IMF, World Bank and WHO, and supra-national NGOs 
have key roles in policy formation and implementation and their influence needs to 
be understood. Deacon et a l (1997) argue that Social Policy analysts could 
usefully draw upon work on developing countries in order to make sense of these 
developments.
There are, however, significant methodological implications in drawing 
North/South comparisons. The Comparative Social Policy literature is largely 
based upon detailed comparisons of welfare interventions in industrialised 
countries. Predicated on a quasi-scientific experimental approach to understanding 
causation, Comparative Social Policy is based on the assumption that states and 
societies are not wholely unique, but that central elements exist that are common to 
all countries (Hauser; 1993). These common cores may be smaller or greater, but 
there always remains a domain of unique features which makes complete 
comparison impossible. It follows that the most ‘complete’ comparisons can be 
made between countries that are as similar as possible. Only then can analyses 
focus specifically on identifying the factors that cause different policy results. 
Within this logic, drawing comparisons between interventions between countries of
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very different social, political and economic backgrounds would make comparison 
difficult if not impossible.
This thesis, however, focuses on one dynamic: the relationship between the 
WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy and policy development. I am not comparing 
British and Zambian responses to HIV/AIDS per se. To do so would immediately 
raise the problems of comparability. The epidemics in Britain and Zambia took 
different routes and the organisational, economic and political environments were 
very different. In a comparison of the relationship between international and 
national policy networks, however, exploration of these contextual differences 
become an important way of explaining differences in impact.
The Global AIDS Strategy was an explicit attempt to homogenise policies across 
the range of signatory states encompassing every sort of political system and level 
of GDP. As an explicitly ‘global’ strategy it is justifiable to examine its impact 
upon very different countries. To do so is useful in that it allows examination of 
the whole system, rather than one aspect of it. Most evaluations of the GPA’s 
interventions have focused on programmes in developing countries. In so doing, 
they fail to look at donors’ expectations and how political negotiations between 
donor organisations and international agencies impact upon the development of 
policy interventions. The comparison also provides a means of exploring the 
implicit assumptions that are hidden behind ‘global’ resolutions. The strategy was 
signed by every member state, yet reason tells us that the relationship between a 
state and an international agency will differ depending on the direction of resource 
dependency.
Having decided to compare one high- and one low-income country, I then come to 
the choice of particular case sites. The two countries I have chosen to compare are 
Britain and Zambia. I chose Britain for a number of reasons. In the first place, it 
was a convenient place to start. I was familiar with the policy environment and 
assured of easy access to information and key policy-actors. There is little to be 
learned from a hostile case (Stake, 1994). Britain is also thought to have a 
historically good relationship with the UN and its agencies (Krause, 1995). Taken
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together, it seems to be a good opportunity of examining the relationship between 
a government and an international organisation in auspicious circumstances.
I chose Zambia because it is a fairly typical low-income, heavily indebted state. 
Though the two countries are very different, it has certain similarities with Britain 
that reduced the number of dependent variables and allowed me to focus on the 
donor/donee relationship between the WHO/GPA and the case countries. Its 
political and administrative systems bear a close resemblance to that of the UK, its 
former colonial government. Its state institutions and the majority of its population 
are officially Christian, which has implications for attitudes towards controlling a 
sexually transmittable disease. Both countries have a historically close relationship 
with the WHO (Walt, 1993). The following chapter discusses the policy 
environments in the two countries in more detail. On a practical level, I had 
numerous contacts in Zambia and the University of Bath has close research links 
with various agencies there. The official language is English and I was confident 
that I would have good access to a variety of contacts.
2. Research methods
Having explored the over-arching methodology of this research, I now turn to a 
more detailed discussion of the particular research methods I employed. The 
research was divided into two broad areas. The first was an analysis of secondary 
data from government, international organisations, NGOs and academic journals. 
Information about state policies from government or the WHO was interpreted in 
the light of the growing body of critical literature from NGOs and pressure groups. 
The second stage of my research was a series of in-depth interviews with senior 
members of the policy network.
A  Secondary data
In the first stage of the research I looked at published data from a variety of 
agencies that were involved with planning, implementing or monitoring HIV/AIDS 
interventions. This stage of the research had two aims. The first was to gather 
together empirical data on AIDS funding, changes in sero-prevalency and
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organisational responses to HIV/AIDS as a means of quantifying the ‘outputs’ of 
the strategy I have already identified. The second objective was to collect data that 
might repudiate or confirm observations made by the interviewees.
R  Interviews
The second stage of the research was a series of in-depth interviews with key 
members of the AIDS policy community. Interviews were semi-structured and 
lasted approximately one hour each. There were five main areas I wished to 
explore, but I allowed each respondent to develop their own ideas and asked 
subsidiary questions where clarification was needed. The interviews had two main 
purposes. The most important objective was to establish how senior role-holders 
explained the influence, or not, of the Global AIDS Strategy. The second was to 
provide confirmation of the findings of my initial documentary research. The case 
country may or may not have had non-discriminatory legislation, for example, but 
did respondents feel that it had achieved a non-discriminatory environment within 
which to work?
i. The interview schedule
When designing the interview schedule I bore in mind that I would be approaching 
people from a range of organisations who would be looking at HIV/AIDS policies 
from very different perspectives, cultures, educational backgrounds and experience. 
The questions I asked should be ‘open’ enough to be productive prompts for 
discussion, yet structured enough to allow meaningful comparison between 
interviews. I encouraged general discussion first, but then give more specific 
prompts to clarify what I meant to the respondent and to ensure that answers were 
sufficiently focused.
I was also aware that interviewees’ involvement with and commitment to the 
objectives of the Global AIDS Strategy would vary. I therefore asked questions 
which would invite discussion even if, for example, people had never heard of the
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Global AIDS Strategy, or had been quite unaffected by it. In these circumstances, 
I wanted to be able to explore the reasons why that may have been the case.
Interviewees can be confused by questions or, inadvertently and quite 
understandably, answer them selectively (Bulmer, 1993). I therefore ensured that 
questions ‘over-lapped’ and that issues that were raised by one question were also 
raised in another, albeit from a slightly different direction. In so doing, I created a 
means of cross-checking to see whether responses were consistent with each other, 
that the respondent understood what I was trying to ask and that they had 
discussed the issue as fully as possible (see appendix 1).
ii. Interview Samples
The sample of interviewees was dictated by the organisational design of the Global 
AIDS Strategy. I identified the main organisations that were identified in the 
Strategy as being necessary to its successful implementation. I then interviewed 
senior representatives of prominent NGOs. NGOs were an important source of 
information for two reasons. Firstly, resolution WHA42.34 included an 
undertaking by states to seek ways of “developing effective working relations with 
non-governmental organisations and strengthening their capacity to respond to 
AIDS within the framework of the Global AIDS Strategy” (WHO, 1989c: 1). By 
talking to NGO representatives, it would be possible to establish the ways in which 
they were involved with government and thus gauge the extent to which the 
strategy was implemented in that particular respect. In the second place, whether 
or not they were directly involved in this way, they could provide an alternative 
view of the AIDS problem and the adequacy of policy responses to it. They could 
also suggest reasons why policies may or may not have achieved the objectives of 
the Global AIDS Strategy.
I then identified experienced, executive-level staff within these organisations and 
wrote to them requesting an interview. I obtained individual names from a number 
of sources including reports and conference minutes. I wanted to speak to people 
with a wide experience of AIDS, who were working in the field at the time the
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Global AIDS Strategy was first endorsed. Having interviewed this group, the 
‘snowball sampling’ question picked up any organisations or interest groups which 
were influential in a way not foreseen within the design of the Global AIDS 
Strategy.
In Britain, I conducted 20 such interviews. As I will discuss later, the impact of 
the WHO/GPA Global AIDS Strategy was confined to a relatively small number of 
senior executives and the snow-ball sampling questions established quite a clearly 
defined group who had worked with the WHO/GPA. That and the fact that there 
exists a rich supply of data on meetings, conferences and organisational responses 
meant that it did not prove necessary to expand the original pool of interviewees 
very greatly. AIDS organisations in Zambia had far closer and more integrated 
relationships with the WHO/GPA and it proved necessary to conduct more 
interviews. I conducted 67 separate site visits and interviews over a five-month 
period. The majority of my research took place in Lusaka, where government, the 
bi- and multi-lateral agencies and most of the main NGOs are based. I also visited 
and conducted interviews in Mazabuka district in Southern Province, the 
Copperbelt and Serenje in Central Province.
iii. The fieldwork
Most of the UK interviews were undertaken during the first year of my PhD in 
early 1997. I was fortunate in that most of the key people who developed 
HIV/AIDS policy in Britain were still working in the field. Even in the three years 
since then, some have moved on or retired. More than that, they obviously 
regarded the period as important personally and historically. They were therefore 
willing to help not just with the interviews but referring me on to people they 
thought it was important to interview. It quickly became clear quite how small the 
initial issue network was. The same names appeared time and time again in the 
'snowball sampling'. Most knew each other well, having been regularly attending 
conferences and meetings together.
The closeness of the network, as well as the justifiable pride with which 
interviewees regarded their achievements in putting AIDS on the policy agenda
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sometimes raised the question whether their responses were tinged by an element 
of post hoc justification. It was, however usually possible to confirm claims 
through reference to reports and minutes. Where it was not possible for any 
reason, I have reported comments as people's individual views. As I shall go on to 
discuss in greater detail, the collection and dissemination of information was 
regarded as one of the most important aspects of tackling the emerging problem. 
Advances in research or in organisational responses to HIV/AIDS were quickly 
published. Much of this secondary data was collected at specialist libraries such as 
the Kings Fund library in London and the Terrence Higgins Trust resource centre 
— which has a comprehensive collection of HTV/AIDS related literature.
The Zambian fieldwork took place in 1998 and received funding from the 
Department for International Development. Though the actual interviews and data 
collection could have been condensed into a far shorter time, I found that it took at 
least the first three months to begin to develop a rounded picture of the political 
and social dynamics in Zambia. As it was, it took time just to acclimatise myself 
socially and culturally. In Britain, for example, one can ask a fairly direct question 
'politely1 simply by changing one's intonation. The question Have you got time?' 
can seem polite or rude depending on the way the different words are intoned. 
Zambians have more formal etiquettes surrounding good mannered conversation 
and it is easy to seem brusque.
More than I had expected, I found that an important aspect of my research was 
simply spending time with people who were involved in making and implementing 
policy in various different ways. The first three weeks were spent staying with a 
World Bank economics adviser who was part of a close-knit group of expatriates, 
who were all working for different bilateral and international agencies. Generally 
speaking, morale was low in the expatriate community. Many expatriates were on 
short contracts and were concerned about their future. Aid contracts tend to be 
well remunerated, both financially and in living conditions. Financially, few people 
could find work in their home countries that was as interesting or gave them as 
much responsibility. However, the work — and lifestyle — has significant 
drawbacks. Clearly, expatriate life can put a strain on personal relationships.
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People also felt that the brevity of their contracts under-mined their effectiveness. 
Often contracts came to an end just as people had begun to settle in and were 
making some professional headway with the project they had been employed to 
oversee. More than anything else, these expatriates felt bitter about the 'politics' of 
their work. They felt that they were constantly battling against bureaucracy and 
inter-governmental animosities, which frustrations will be discussed in greater 
detail in chapter six.
As a new arrival in a small expatriate community, I was frequently drawn aside so 
that people could explain to me how difficult things were for them, socially as well 
as professionally. There was a particular anxiety about safety, and most of the 
expatriates I met lived in secure compounds with armed security guards. Two 
people went so far as to warn me never to stop at traffic lights whilst driving a 
vehicle. To do so would only give thieves the opportunity of stealing its contents. 
Travelling alone and without a car, I was considered to be a prime target for crime, 
though in the event, I never experienced any problems. I deliberately chose not to 
rent a car. Travelling by foot, bicycle and public transport gave me more 
opportunity for observation. I was also loath to appear as though my research was 
supported by a donor agency and that co-operation with me might lead to some 
future financial reward.
The first three weeks were a useful introduction to the expatriate community, and I 
was able to learn a lot about the social and professional dynamics of expatriate life. 
After that, I thought it would be useful to move to a less exclusive area, where I 
met a broader cross section of people. I rented a flat in a block for hospital staff. I 
was therefore in fairly close and regular contact with a range of doctors. These 
forms of participant observation were extremely useful when I came to analyse 
data, enabling me to place people's responses in a broader context.
In general, the interviews went well. People were generous with their time and I 
was able to interview most of the people I wanted to. The questions generated 
useful responses and did not have to be modified. Language was not a problem, as 
all the people I needed to interview — senior representatives of AIDS-related
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organisations — spoke good English. In general, however, people in Zambia were 
more cautious in their interviews than they had been in Britain. Several people 
refused to be taped, for example. One person only agreed to give a taped interview 
only after I had given my assurance that I would delete the tape as soon as I had 
extracted the necessary information from it and that I kept their comments 
anonymous. They feared serious repercussions should the government ever found 
out what s/he had said about them. A failed coup shortly before I arrived had 
prompted the government to declare a state of emergency. Some senior politicians 
had left the country and the former President Kenneth Kaunda had been placed 
under house arrest. Though the coup was not considered very serious, the incident 
made for a somewhat tense atmosphere. Given the strength of respondent's anxiety 
about confidentiality, and the fact that the AIDS issue network is relatively small, 
identifying individuals is relatively easy. I have therefore kept all the interviewees 
from Zambian civil society organisations anonymous, even those who were happy 
to have their observations attributed to them. Though this level of anonymity is in 
a sense unfortunate, allowing greater possibility for exaggeration or inaccuracy, 
interviewing senior participants is the only effective way of gaining the information 
I wanted. I therefore minimised the risk of being misled by only used information 
that has been verified from at least one other source.
The final problem with fieldwork in Zambia is that there are fewer sources of 
independent information on HIV/AIDS interventions. Most of the literature on 
interventions is produced or funded by the agencies that conducted the 
programmes. In the case of the WHO/GPA, these reports are written with the 
implicit goal of persuading donors and state officials of the significance of the 
problem and the value of on-going interventions, a phenomenon which will be 
discussed in more detail in chapter six. I did not find any literature that was 
prepared by independent, indigenous groups such as community groups or 
Zambia's AIDS patients' organisation. This absence made the interviews a 
particularly new and useful source of research material.
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iv. Analysis
While I was analysing these interviews, I kept the criticisms of case study research 
in general and qualitative research in particular at the forefront of my mind. 
Generally, these approaches are criticised for being subjective and selective. I 
therefore made each stage of the analysis process as open as possible. I have kept 
full records of each stage of analysis in a research database. I was particularly 
concerned about the problem of subjectivity. Rather than simply reading and 
interpreting people’s interviews, I used a systematic method of analysis. 
‘Horizontal and vertical read’ is designed to ensure that every theme, explanation 
and empirical observation made by interviewers is recorded, and can be presented 
in a manageable way that allows comparisons between interviewees1. Such a 
method adopts a similar approach to Ritchie and Spencer’s (1994) ‘Framework’ 
approach to the analysis of quantitative data. Essentially, data analysis is 
conducted in five key stages; familiarization; theme identification; indexing; 
charting and mapping; and interpretation.
Whenever possible I taped interviews. In certain circumstances, however, either 
interviewees were unhappy about their interviews being taped or the location was 
inappropriate. All tapes were transcribed verbatim, a process that proved 
extremely useful. The first phase of systematic analysis of qualitative data is 
familiarization (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994). The process of transcription made me 
considerably more familiar with each respondent’s account and helped to ensure 
that I did not listen selectively, noting only those points that fitted in with some, 
perhaps unconscious, preconception. It also meant that everything the interviewer 
said became a matter of accessible and verifiable record, with the exception of 
those remarks that the interviewee had specifically requested to be kept off record.
I made an initial reading of the text, noting factual observations that confirmed or 
undermined information I had gathered from secondary sources about the extent to 
which the case country had conformed to the Global AIDS Strategy. I then turned
1 Professor Helen Haste, University of Bath Department of Psychology: personal communication.
83
to the question of how the Global AIDS Strategy had influenced the policy-process 
in the case countries.
Table 3.2: Horizontal and vertical read






1. What effect did the G.A.S have on your 
organisation?
C£We attended their meetings and conferences” 1 1 1
“They funded us for small projects abroad” 1
I created a spreadsheet in Microsoft Excel and wrote the questions down the left- 
hand column. I then took the first interview and wrote down the interviewee’s 
answers and observations below each question, with a ‘1’ beside it in a labelled 
column, to indicate which interviewee had made the observation. I then repeated 
the process for the second respondent, creating a new answer if necessary or, if 
they repeated a point made by an earlier respondent, simply marking that they had 
repeated the observation.
When I had completed this process for each of the respondents I rearranged the 
various answers into sub-headed themes, though retaining the original quotations 
beneath the sub-heads for ease of reference. This created a single spreadsheet in 
which an individual respondents answers could be analysed longitudinally -  
comparing responses to different questions, and latitudinally -  comparing answers 
from one respondent, or group of respondents with others. This provided a 
thematic framework within which data could be examined and referenced. The 
left-hand column provided an index of responses for subsequent retrieval and 
exploration. The process of identifying the themes that emerge from a particular 
body of data necessarily has an element of subjectivity. This system of annotating
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textual data made it possible to ensure that particular interpretations could be 
substantiated by empirical evidence.
Summary
In this chapter I have argued that a case-study approach that combines both 
qualitative and quantitative data is the most appropriate way of answering the 
research questions and described the research methods I applied to the case 
countries. In the following chapter, I will discuss and compare the policy 
environments in the two case countries.
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Chapter four: The policy environments in Britain and 
Zambia
Introduction
In chapter two, I argued that it is essential to understand the political and economic 
context within which the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy had to operate if we 
are to identify and explain any impact it might have had on the development of 
national policies. In this chapter, I will discuss the policy environments in Britain 
and Zambia at the time the strategy became operational. The first section reviews 
the literature on policy networks in Britain, focusing particularly on the health 
sector.
In the second section, I will discuss the policy environment in developing countries 
generally and Zambia in particular. Network theory has not yet been extended to 
the developing country policy environment and one of the intentions of this 
research is to explore the extent to which it provides a useful tool for analysing the 
asymmetrical relationships between donor organisations and lower-income states. 
There is always a danger in exporting analytical frameworks that have been 
developed in the West to analyse quite different societies. The resulting analysis 
can be inappropriate and misrepresent the complexity of particular societies 
(Chambers, 1998). Network theory, however, adopts an explicitly contextual, path 
dependent approach that makes it a suitable analytical framework to explore and 
compare different policy environments. Section two starts with a discussion of 
developing country environments generally with particular emphasis on sub- 
Saharan Africa, before focusing on Zambia in particular. I have adopted this 
approach for two reasons. In the first place, there is a relative paucity of literature 
on Zambian politics and policy compared with Britain. It is therefore useful to gain 
insights on its policy environment from analyses of similar countries. In the second 
place, it is useful to understand the wider context of Zambia’s economic and 
political development. Though this thesis is focusing on specific case studies, I will
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use this evidence to revise theoretical hypotheses about developing country policy 
environments more generally.
The table below puts a comparison of Britain and Zambia into broad perspective. 
Figures are taken as near to 1987 as possible, that being the year the Global AIDS 
Strategy was first endorsed. The two countries are at opposite ends of the 
spectrum in terms of both socio-economics and health status. Such differences 
were clearly likely to impact upon the expectations and functioning of their 
relationship with the WHO/GPA. Zambia is a large, sparsely populated country 
compared with Britain, which is about a third of the size of Zambia with seven 
times the population. Zambian per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was only 
USS250 in 1987, making it one of the poorest countries in the world (World Bank 
Report 1989). It had a negative growth rate and a high annual rate of inflation. It 
was also heavily indebted, with a total external debt of US$6,400m, three and a 
half times its GNP of US$1,800m. The disparity in income has obvious 
implications in terms of health spending. The Zambian government's health budget 
at this period was only US$5.9 per capita (UNZA, 1997). Life expectancy was 
nearly 20 years shorter, partially reflecting much higher rates of infant mortality.
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Population (millions, mid ‘87) 56.9 7.2
Population growth (‘80-87) 0.1% 3.6%
Area (,000 square km) 245 753
Economic indicators
GNP per capita (1987) $10,420 $250
Average annual growth rate (‘65-’80) 1.7% -2.1
Average annual rate of inflation (‘65-80) 11.2 6.4
Average annual rate of inflation (‘80-87) 5.7 28.7
Total external debt (‘87) n/a $6,400m
Health indicators
Live expectancy at birth (1987) 75 53
% babies with low birth weights 7 14
% of total state expenditure on health (‘87) 13.1 4.7
Total state expenditure as % of GNP (‘87) 39.9 40.3
Population per physician (‘84) 870 7,100
Estimated % of adult population H3V+ 0.087 (1994) 16/17%*
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA)
ODA (‘87) $1,865m -
ODA as % of GNP (‘87) 0.28 -
Net ODA received from all sources (‘87) $429m
ODA as % of GNP (‘87) 21.1
Source: World Bank Report, 1989
*Source: Rev. Professor Anne Bayley, personal records
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1. The policy environment in Britain
A. Policy network theory
Policy network theory has been used to describe the political context of a number 
of industrialised countries and has been thoroughly developed and applied in 
Britain (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). One of the theory's basic premises is that 
policy environments vary between sector and over time and that this will impact 
upon the way that policy networks operate in particular circumstances. In general, 
however, Britain is described as having a tendency towards relatively closed, 
consultative government compared with other countries of similar income (Jordan 
and Richardson, 1982). Consultation is seen as important in order to simplify the 
policy process and to ensure the legitimacy of political decisions. The right to join 
consultations, however, is not a given and access to government is generally 
limited (Anand, 1997). Regularised access to government is granted only to those 
groups which abide by the ‘rules of the game’ (Rhodes, 1992). Rhodes (1986) has 
identified five broad types of policy network operating within Britain (see table 
below). This typology is not argued to be exhaustive, and it is stressed that the 
types mentioned are not hermetically distinct. Any particular policy area may 
include facets of more than one broad type of policy network.









Stability, highly restricted membership, vertical 
interdependence, limited horizontal articulation 
Stability, highly restricted membership, vertical 
interdependence, limited horizontal articulation, 
serves interest of profession.
Limited membership, limited vertical 
interdependence, extensive horizontal articulation. 
Fluctuating membership, limited vertical 
interdependence, serves interest of producer. 
Unstable, large numbers of members, limited vertical 
interdependence.
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Policy communities are characterised by relatively stable relationships between a 
highly restrictive membership. Members of a policy community are dependent 
upon each other because of their shared service delivery responsibilities and are 
insulated from other networks and from the public, including parliament. All 
members of the policy community have a high level of resources and their 
relationship is based on resource exchange. Professional networks are 
characterised by the pre-eminence of professionals in policy-making. Professional 
groups enjoy significant power within the policy process due to their virtual 
monopoly of expertise and a tightly controlled system of entry to their ranks. 
These networks manifest a substantial degree of vertical independence whilst 
insulating themselves from other, non-specialist networks. Inter-governmental 
networks are based on the representative organisations of local authorities and 
have a broad association of interests that includes all local authority services. 
Producer networks are dominated by economic interests, whether public or 
privately controlled and are heavily dependent on industrial organisations for 
delivering goods and expertise. The term issue network is used to refer to the 
policy areas that encompass a broad range of groups, all of which have an interest 
in a particular policy area but who have very varied levels of interaction with each 
other. Issue networks have a correspondingly limited degree of consensus.
R The health service and policy networks
The health profession is the most frequently cited example of a professional 
network (Rhodes, 1992). Through their professional monopoly, doctors are 
thought to enjoy relatively autonomy from, and power over policy-makers. 
Professional groups are in a relatively strong position to influence the policy 
process. In a differentiated society, specialised occupational skills “create 
relationships of social and economic dependence” which strengthens professional 
groups’ influence over policy outcomes (Johnson, 1972; 41). The medical 
profession, with its virtual monopoly over highly technical, specialised and 
important skills has a vital and dominant role in the health field (Larkin, 1988). 
The government is reliant on members of the medical profession not only for the
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information they can provide but also their co-operation in implementing policies, 
since doctors are crucial to the delivery of healthcare.
Is this, however, an accurate picture of the health policy environment? Smith 
(1993) argues that though doctors have important resources they are not 
necessarily able to dominate the policy process. In a comparison of healthcare in 
Britain and the United States he demonstrates that the relationship between 
government, the medical profession and policy outcomes is highly varied, 
dependent on a range of factors. In the US, doctors have proved unable to 
consolidate a strong autonomous centre of power. State intervention in health has 
tended to be limited and ad hoc. This has created a relatively hostile relationship 
between doctors and governments. The US’s federal system creates a relatively 
fragmented system of political sovereignty and decision-making authority is divided 
among legislatures, executives and courts. The predominantly private system of 
health care has meant that insurance companies have become an enormously 
influential voice in the policy process. Overall, the health arena has so great a 
range of semi-autonomous participants, with such divided opinions and interests 
that the system effectively amounts to an issue network.
In Britain, Smith argues, the fact that medical professions have a relatively 
dominant position in health policy-making is very largely a factor of the way the 
National Health Service (NHS) evolved. Before the NHS was created, decision­
making power was divided between privately endowed hospitals, the state and a 
relatively fragmented medical profession. When the post-war labour government 
began to broach the idea of a new, state-run health service they found that the 
number of relatively powerful participants in the health arena made achieving 
consensus almost impossible. It was only by nationalising hospitals and thereby 
removing private hospital trusts from the equation that real progress was made 
towards achieving a comprehensive health service that was free at the point of 
entry. In so doing, however, they put considerably more power into the hands of 
health professionals. There followed a series of compromises made with the health 
profession -  for example giving them clinical autonomy, which made them the main 
arbiters of health spending and guaranteed them a central place in policy-making.
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The effect of these compromises was to enable the development of a closed policy 
community between the Department of Health and health professionals.
Smith goes on to argue that during the Eighties this health community was the 
subject of serious attack by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, whose government 
had been elected on the basis of cutting public expenditure and reducing the role of 
the state. By the mid- to late-eighties, Britain's National Health Service was in 
serious financial and management difficulties. The Griffiths report of 1983 had 
heavily criticised the NHS's policy of 'consensus' management and in particular 
management's heavy reliance on doctors -  rather than people with known 
management skills. By the second half of 1987, after a third consecutive 
Conservative general election victory, it was well publicised that wards were 
regularly closing down for lack of funds. By the end of the year, the Royal 
Colleges had issued a warning that serious action needed to be taken (Wall and 
Owen, 1999).
The government’s perception of these problems in the health service was based on 
a new-right ideology. Dismissing claims of under-funding, they argued that 
inefficiency and the insinuation of special (professional) interests into government 
were the real causes of the growing problems in health service delivery (Powell, 
1976; Goldsmith and Willets, 1988). The result was a series of measures that were 
explicitly aimed at reducing medical control over the health service. After failing to 
reach agreement with the British Medical Association the government announced a 
system of cash limits and internal markets in order to control expenditure. A new 
cadre of managers was introduced to separate spending decisions from a purely 
clinical standpoint. Finally in 1988, a review of the Health Service was carried out 
by a small group of politicians, civil servants and advisors from new right think 
tanks such as the Adam Smith Institute and the Centre for Policy Studies. No 
representatives from either the BMA or the Royal Colleges were included on any 
of the working groups. Klein points out that ‘'the review was a private affair. It 
was designed to produce policy options for the Prime Minister, not a consensus 
about theNHS” (Klein, 1989: 237).
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These actions, Smith argues, were to radically undermine the health policy 
community. Though doctors still have influence, the health policy arena has moved 
from being a relatively closed policy community to an issue network involving 
more participants and a wider spectrum of opinions. The following chapter will 
discuss how the Global AIDS Strategy impacted upon this changing political 
landscape. It is also an interesting example of the exercise of agency and structural 
power to achieve particular goals. Both the post-war and Thatcher governments 
showed political acumen and independence of thought to achieve change. They 
were, however, ultimately only able to do so because they were able to change the 
administrative and legal structures within which conflicting groups operated. Their 
agency power was underpinned by structural advantage.
2. Sub-Saharan Africa and the ‘developing country policy 
environment9
The political environment in developing countries has become an increasingly 
important focus of research in recent years, spurred on by the desire to explain the 
on-going under-development of low-income countries. Why is it that a succession 
of development interventions over the last thirty years has largely failed to generate 
economic growth within a stable political environment?
The last decade has seen a growing consensus within donor organisations that on­
going underdevelopment is the result of a failure in governance. Governments in 
developing countries have come under increasing attack for resisting pressures for 
democratisation, for endemic corruption, clientalism and state-centred inefficiency. 
In 1989 the World Bank made a firm statement that unstable policies, public 
institutions and the misappropriation of funds by political elites for their personal 
gain were at the heart of sub-Saharan Africa’s economic crisis (World Bank, 
1989). Since then donors have made government reform and a net reduction of the 
state’s role a key development target (Batley, 1999).
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Over the last ten years Africa has seen a wave of democratic reforms, including the 
introduction of multi-party elections in almost every country in the continent, the 
lifting of press restrictions and the removal from power of hitherto impregnable 
national ‘fathers’. In part, these political changes have been brought about by 
internal campaigns against authoritarian governments (Strange, 1996; Bratton, 
1994; Young, 1993). Civil society organisations have played a part in lobbying for 
reform and their profile has risen accordingly. These indigenous pressures for 
reform have, however, received considerable support from external agencies, 
particularly in the form of political and economic pressure from the donor 
community. The collapse of the Berlin Wall helped to generate a consensus that 
liberal democracy was the most effective way of promoting economic and political 
stability. Equally, it marked the end of the Cold War. Corrupt, abusive 
governments that had learned to rely on support from the West or the Soviet Union 
in return for political alignment suddenly found themselves isolated and unable to 
withstand mounting pressure for reform.
The donor community has tried to encourage political reform by various means 
including making it a condition of lending and debt relief (Hearn, 1999). Multi­
party democracy, bureaucratic accountability, a reliable judicial system and 
freedoms of association, information and expression are seen as pre-conditions of 
competent government (Landell-Mills and Seralgeldin, 1991). Constitutional 
reform is, however, seen as being only one part of the process of democratic 
consolidation. Civil society organisations are being actively encouraged by 
adjustments in aid flows towards the independent media, NGOs, human rights 
organisations, electoral committees and opposition parties (Hearn, 1999). There 
has been a considerable rise in the activity of local organisations over the last 
decade. Economic and political liberalisation has increased the number of 
businesses, business associations and independent media. State retrenchment has 
led to an increase in local self-help groups, supported and often catalysed by larger 
NGOs. The wave of social and economic problems that has hit Africa, 
compounded by food insecurity, government retrenchments and the AIDS 
epidemic has meant that locally-organised groups are becoming increasingly 
important providers of support and services. The Global AIDS Strategy’s
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recognition of the contribution of non-government organisation is a reflection of a 
wider donor trend towards more inclusive interventions.
There is, however, a debate about the extent to which these forms of support have 
genuinely fostered a more democratic, inclusive policy environment. Recent 
elections in Africa have been strongly criticised for being flawed or unfair, 
essentially remaining a forum for on-going power struggles rather than the 
construction of democratic institutions (Ottaway, 1997). In many states existing 
elites have been able to use the ‘advantages of incumbency’ to retain power 
(Strange, 1996; Bratton, 1994). There is considerable doubt about whether five- 
yearly multi-party elections are an adequate means of ensuring accountable 
government in regions where the activities of urban-based political parties seem far 
removed from the day-to-day realities of the majority of the population (Bratton, 
1999). Similarly, attempts at supporting local, non-government organisations have 
been criticised for killing the spirit of ‘voluntarism’ with which small organisations 
were formed (Wallace, Crowther and Shepherd, 1998). The requirements of donor 
accounting procedures entails establishing accounts departments and a cadre of 
professional staff who are likely to come from relatively prosperous and well- 
educated households. External funding can also risk shifting staffs primary 
affiliation away from its members. Staff will put forward proposals that they know 
will satisfy donors, rather than acting as advocates for its membership (Robinson, 
1996).
Given industrialised countries’ apparent monopoly over structural power compared 
with developing countries, we might expect that it would be possible for them to 
ensure that their poorer neighbours comply with particular policies. Such 
assumptions underpin the increase in conditions that are put on lending and debt 
relief. Yet despite this, the governments of developing countries retain 
considerable scope to avoid or adapt donor prescriptions (See, for example, 
Moseley et al, 1995). The result is something of an impasse. Donors blame 
undemocratic, clientalist governments for the failure of development interventions. 
Yet at least partly because of the same problems, development interventions 
designed to improve government performance often meet with failure.
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Explanations for this on-going failure depend on one’s understanding of the 
underlying cause of this tendency towards unaccountable, authoritarian 
government. Explanations fall across a spectrum of opinion. At one extreme are 
those who argue that it is largely due to a cultural predisposition to 
authoritarianism. At the other, are those who argue that the causes are essentially 
external to developing countries. The shared experiences of colonialism, capitalist 
penetration and state formation in a dependent position in the international 
capitalist economy fostered the conditions for state elites to take political and 
economic control.
For obvious diplomatic and political reasons, arguments that authoritarianism is 
innate in developing countries are underplayed by international organisations. 
They are, however, implicit in much of the writing on good governance. The 
World Bank’s (1989) statement on corruption was a relatively rare example of an 
international organisation giving its frank appraisal of the underlying problem. 
Various authors, however, claim that ‘development discourse’ is underpinned by 
what they would regard as eurocentric and value-laden biases (Mohan, 1997; 
Ferguson, 1990). Even the neo-populism championed by Robert Chambers has 
been criticised for its rosy, eurocentric caricatures of rural people from developing 
countries (Brown, 1998). Positive stereotypes of the community-minded, 
traditional peasant culture are readily inverted to become a set of cultural 
‘obstacles’ for effective, populist development interventions (Brown, 1998). 
Cultural-predisposition arguments were also surprisingly common at the expatriate 
social occasions I attended during my five months’ fieldwork in Zambia. Senior 
representatives from a number of UN organisations, NGOs and bilateral agencies 
forcefully expressed the view that it was the ‘African way’ to misappropriate funds 
for personal gain.
The academic literature has also seen a resurgence of cultural explanations for 
corrupt and inefficient government. For some, Africans’ traditional loyalty to their 
tribal kin undermines the development of a democratic and pluralistic society 
(Gellner, 1994). Unlike the ‘modem’ man of Western democracies, the centrality
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of primary affiliation in ‘traditional’ societies means that their citizens are unable to 
be neutral in office and their ability to develop other sorts of identity -  based on 
their class, their profession, their club membership and so forth is compromised. In 
a similar vein, Bayart (1993) argues that African politics are characterised by a 
zero-sum attitude to power that predates colonial rule. Politics can be seen in 
terms of elites struggling for power according to a zero-sum logic. Economic 
scarcity has led to the politics of ‘extroversion’, persistent attempts by African 
leaders to supplement their own resources with those from outside. Thus, 
potentially competing elites can fuse together to form a single dominant class 
centred on control of the state. In Uganda, for example, for several years after 
independence multi-party elections were made meaningless by the way in which 
political elites switched parties or formed coalitions so as to remain in power 
(Mamdani, 1976).
Primary affiliations certainly remain a critically important part of African social 
relations. Such affiliations fall in to four main types; groups based on kinship, 
territory, traditional political affiliation and cultural affinity (Chazan et al, 1992). 
Kinship ties are perhaps the most important social relation and also have economic 
implications. Ties set up expectations and obligations and many economically 
successful Africans will be aware of the expectations of their extended families. 
Kinship ties are also closely linked with affiliations based on territory or 
geographical community, which remain significant despite the drifts of migrant 
labour and urbanisation. Home-town organisations are prominent forms of urban 
social organisation.
Networks based on kinship and territoriality are often linked to traditional political 
institutions such as chiefs. Though these have been altered radically by colonial 
rule and independence, they remain an important factor of African political life. 
Even now rural land in Africa is frequently allocated by hereditary chiefs (Scott, 
1998). In rural areas they are often the most visible form of government and have 
de facto , if not de jure responsibility for day-to-day affairs. As custodians of 
traditional culture, they also wield significant influence over the attitudes and
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expectations of their constituents. Cultural biases, such as against women or 
young people, can be reproduced by traditional political structures (Scott, 1998).
Notwithstanding the obvious significance of traditional African political structures, 
however, the argument that corrupt and paternalist government is an inevitable 
consequence of these structures has significant weaknesses. In the first place, prior 
to colonial rule Africa was comprised of numerous, often mobile ethnic groups 
with very different patterns of behaviour and levels of contact with outside groups. 
It is hard to see how one innately ‘African’ pattern of behaviour can emerge from 
such diversity. Secondly, it over-estimates the neutrality of Western systems of 
social organisation (Etzioni, 1993). A sense of community, kin or clan identity 
does not necessarily compromise other forms of affiliation. Precisely because ties 
based on community and kin are personal and specific, it follows that they are not 
all-embracing and do not impede other forms of affiliation and identity action. 
Finally, these approaches tend to underplay the variety of effective, independent 
organisations and institutions of contemporary Africa (Hearn, 1999, Healey and 
Robinson, 1992).
At the opposite end of the spectrum are those who argue that the problem is a 
result of external factors in general and capitalism in particular. The penetration of 
capitalist modes of production into the developing world simultaneously 
exacerbated differences in income and status and created the conditions for an 
authoritarian state. Alavi (1972) uses a class-based approach to understanding 
administrative structures in developing countries. In the post-Colonial state, he 
argues, the base of the state apparatus inherited at independence was that of the 
colonial metropolis. It represented class forces in the colonial power and was 
specifically designed not to represent the interests of any one of the indigenous 
classes in the society. When the colonists withdrew, the bureaucracy began to rest 
on the support of two classes, the landed classes and metropolitan elites. In effect, 
it mediated between the interests of these two factions. These factions, however, 
were sufficiently weak to allow bureaucracy some degree of autonomy. Hence an 
‘over-developed’ state that appropriated a large part of the economic surplus for 
use in bureaucratically directed ‘development’ activity. Saul (1974) picked up this
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line of argument, arguing that in Tanzania, unlike Pakistan about which Alavi’s 
arguments were based, there were no strong indigenous classes to be subordinated. 
Instead, bureaucrats sought to subordinate pre-capitalist social formations. 
Administrators, he argued, could be seen as a class in their own right, acting in 
their own interest to appropriate the means of production.
Some authors caution against over-emphasising the autonomy of the administration 
in Africa, arguing that states there have neither effective authority nor functioning 
state structures (Sandbrook, 1985). Others differ with Alavi and Saul by arguing 
that the administration does not now constitute a distinct class, but simply 
presented a new arena for power battles between existing elites (Leys, 1976). 
What such arguments do, however, is to draw attention to the ways in which 
political power has accumulated in the hands of a well-placed minority, and to 
some of the obstacles to creating independent, autonomous organisations that 
represent broad sections of the population. They also have very negative 
implications for the success of development interventions. Ferguson (1990) argues 
that ‘development activities’ in low-income countries achieve nothing other than to 
extend bureaucratic control and income inequality into remote, poor regions.
The polarised debate on whether unrepresentative government is the result of 
colonial imperialism or African croneyism is overdrawn. It is perhaps more useful 
to see the problem as one of co-determination. The on-going under-development 
of in low-income countries is the result of a complex mixture of indigenous and 
exogenous factors evolving over many decades (see, for example, Chazan et al, 
1992; Hyden and Bratton, 1992). The circumstances of colonialism and 
subsequent independence uprooted traditional institutions of political accountability 
and replaced them with structures that focused political and economic power in the 
hands of a weakly-accountable and politically insecure minority. In effect the 
grafting of alien institutions to societies that have evolved from different cultural 
and political systems have created hybrid administrative cultures and structures.
Grindle and Thomas (1991: Chapter Five), argue that though developing countries 
are clearly different in terms of their socio-economic and cultural backgrounds,
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their common experiences of colonisation, de-colonisation and relative dependence 
in the global political economy has created certain features which can be cautiously 
generalised as the developing country ‘policy environment’. These policy 
environments are characterised by the presence of a relatively small number of 
decision-makers with a disproportionate influence over policy evolution. 
Developing countries tend to have dispersed and relatively youthful populations 
with high levels of illiteracy. This has the effect of concentrating power in to the 
hands of an educated elite. To a large extent, these elites operate within state 
organisations.
The process towards authoritarianism was assisted by the centralised institutions 
governments inherited at independence (Mamdani, 1976). Colonial government set 
a precedent of absolutist and centrist government based on the needs of the 
metropolis. Economic resources in the colonial state tended to be narrowly based 
and heavily dependent on the world market. In some cases, ailing traditional 
systems were invigorated by the wealth that colonial rule brought with it, serving 
to exacerbate social and economic stratification (Mamdani, 1976). Britain’s policy 
of ‘indirect rule’, for example, deliberately exploited traditional leadership systems 
to consolidate colonial authority (Laitin, 1985).
Approaching independence, colonists’ strategic imperative was to identify 
“potential political and administrative elites who could gradually be trained to 
assume the enlarged responsibilities of the colonial state” (Young, 1988: 53). The 
relatively small number of Western-educated people found careers in state 
institutions. The Soviet Union provided an important role model for newly 
industrialising countries and, in the context of the Keynesian political climate in the 
West, development aid was targeted towards developing a competent central 
administration. The result was to create a civil service with a disproportionate 
influence over the allocation of resources. Donor funding was critically dependent 
on producing a development plan and import-substitution was considered to be the 
best way forward for developing countries. This could only be achieved through 
state control of the economy. In a pre-industrial nation, the state was considered
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to be the only economic unit large enough to catalyse the process of rapid 
industrialisation.
While economic and political power has been concentrated into the hands of a 
relatively small number of people, the relative paucity of information upon which to 
base policy decisions has meant that decision-making tends to be based on intuition 
and experience rather than solid empirical evidence (Grindle and Thomas, 1991). 
This in turn means that political and economic decisions are relatively easy to 
challenge. Policy outcomes are thus a function of who has the most political 
power. This problem is exacerbated by the conditions of underdevelopment, with 
relatively large demands being placed on the public sector and relatively few 
resources with which to meet them. Heavy dependence on primary exports makes 
the economy highly volatile. Reliance on imported manufactured goods makes 
developing countries vulnerable to changes in the world economy. The result has 
been relatively high levels of political instability compared with the industrialised 
North. With power and wealth concentrated within a small state elite, political 
participants have a high ‘incentive to invest’ in political disruption, while those in 
power divert funds towards maintaining support (Ake, 1973)
3. The policy environment in Zambia
Zambia is a typical example of the heavily indebted, low income, ‘over-developed’ 
sub-Saharan state. Zambia’s political boundaries encompass twelve distinct 
language groups that had no political linkages prior to colonialism. Two kingdoms 
dominated the region in the 19th Century; the Lunda and Luba in the North, East 
and West of Zambia, and the Bemba in the South. Both kingdoms had complex 
economies, including mining, copper and iron smelting and regularly traded with 
the Portuguese. In the early part of this century, the British South Africa Company 
gradually secured control over the region. Originally, the area now called Zambia 
was seen as an appendage to Southern Rhodesia and was used as a source of cheap 
labour for the mines there. The introduction of a hut tax on all properties ensured 
that men of working age had to find wage-employment in farms and mines, at once
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integrating them in to both the cash economy and the colonial administration. The 
British government administered colonial rule from 1924 to 1964.
Copper finds improved the colony’s profitability and became its economic 
mainstay. Despite this, the state remained small with its emphasis on tax collection 
and the maintenance of public control. The civic structures of colonial and, later 
post-colonial society adopted Western models, evolving in response to white 
settlers, government and black urban class interests (Hamalengwa, 1992). This left 
a clear dichotomy between the institutions of government and urban society on one 
hand, and that of rural communities on the other (Copestake, 1998).
Despite radical economic and political changes in the past one hundred years, 
traditional systems of affiliation remain strong. Lineage and kinship remain the 
most important affective relationships in Zambia. Largely unacknowledged by 
government and donors alike, traditional headmen retain important powers in 
relation to land allocation and the settlement of civil disputes. A representative 
survey found that Zambians felt as strongly affiliated to chiefs and headmen as they 
did to modem political parties (Bratton, 1999).
At independence in 1964, nationalist leader Kenneth Kaunda was charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring that ethnic identities did not undermine the emergence of 
a modem, national identity. All too frequently, loyalty was secured through 
patronage within a centralised administrative system (Momba, 1989). In common 
with other African countries, Zambia adopted increasingly statist economic 
policies, a trend that was strongly supported by Keynsian economic advisors from 
the industrial economies. The majority of the country’s revenue came from its 
state-owned mining interests, a situation that reinforced the culture of state 
patronage and dependency. In 1974 Kaunda introduced a single party constitution 
and as a result was to remain in power until 1991.
Zambia’s economic and political history has been critically influenced by its 
dependence on copper revenues. British colonial policy towards what was then 
called Northern Rhodesia was the integration of the country in to the British
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colonial plan. Zambia’s ‘comparative advantage’ lay in its supplies of copper. 
Manufacturing and farming sections were neglected, shortfalls being augmented 
from other British colonies in Southern Africa. At Independence, copper 
accounted for 90 per cent of Zambia’s exports, a figure which remained the same 
right up until the 1980s (Clark and Allison, 1989). Until the mid-70s, favourable 
copper prices meant that Zambia’s dependence on copper remained relatively 
unimportant. The fact that Zambia’s agriculture sector was unable to provide 
cheap food for its urban population could be tackled through government maize 
subsidies. The state provided employment in its extensive and often inefficient civil 
service.
In the mid-1970s, however, the price of copper fell at the same time as prices in 
imports, particularly oil, rose. By 1982 Zambia was having to sell four times as 
much copper to buy the same volume of goods as it had in 1970, yet copper 
reserves were rapidly depleting (Clark and Allison, 1989). Adverse terms of trade 
were compounded by serious problems of rent-seeking, corruption and inefficiency 
(Good, 1988). The government failed to utilise loans on its intended recipients and 
seriously mismanaged development programmes. At the same time, the gap 
between rich and poor were growing. Between 1975 and 1983, the top 5 per 
cent’s share of national income rose from 35 to 50 per cent (Good, 1988).
In 1982, Zambia began embarking on a World Bank Structural Adjustment 
Programme, which had the explicit aim of cutting government expenditure. 
Despite this, internal and external pressures made cuts almost impossible. The 
government was forced to continue unsustainable employment and maize subsidies 
in order to maintain its dwindling public support. In so doing, government 
spending increased to over two times its revenue. On-going political instability in 
neighbouring Mozambique, South Africa, Zaire and Angola disrupted trade at the 
same time as increasing the country's expenditure on defence. Inflows of refugees 
put a further strain on state finances.
Zambia was also suffering from both internal and external debt. By 1984, Zambia 
was paying around 60 per cent of its foreign exchange earnings to service external
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debt (Clark and Allison, 1989). The budget deficit was borrowed from commercial 
banks and the Central Bank of Zambia, which in effect meant fuelling inflation by 
printing more Kwacha, the Zambian currency. By 1985, the IMF had lent Zambia 
more than any other sub-Saharan country and by the end of 1986, it was more than 
$100 million in arrears. Zambia’s repayment and interest on IMF loans alone were 
estimated at over 30 per cent of its export earnings (Good, 1988).
In addition to foreign debts, government agencies were increasingly becoming 
indebted to each other, adversely affecting their operations. In 1987, for example, 
the state-owned Zambia Airways Corporation owed the Department of Civil 
Aviation K1 million. By 1989, it owed K4.8 million, which it was paying off at the 
rate of K100,000 per month. Vital services at Lusaka’s international airport were 
by then dangerously inadequate (Good, 1988). In 1986, the government owed the 
Bank of Zambia nearly Kl,900 million in uncleared overdrafts, partly incurred to 
finance unconstitutional state expenditures, exceeding the allowable limit by more 
than K860 million (Good, 1988).
In late 1986, the IMF offered a short-term rescue package, conditional on a 
comprehensive set of financial policies designed to limit the budget deficit and 
reduce payment arrears on its debt. The currency was devalued, wages frozen and 
import-controls instituted. Copper prices continued to fall and the IMF loan 
package served to increase its debt load. Devaluation made debt service 
repayments more difficult. In 1987, total long term debt represented 227.5 per 
cent of GNP (World Bank, 1989).
On May 1, 1987, President Kaunda declared that the IMF programme had failed, 
that it was being abandoned and that the government was suspending its debt 
payments to the IMF and the World Bank. The flash-points were firstly IMF- 
backed foreign exchange (forex) auctions, which were thought to be diverting 
funds away from priority sectors in favour of foreign businesses and secondly, the 
phasing out of maize subsidies. Both issues provoked fierce hostility towards the 
donor community, who were seen as latter-day imperialists. In 1988, Zambia 
launched a combined ‘New Economic Recovery Programme’, the main aim of
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which was to stabilise the economy and, by controlling inflation, increasing profits 
and investment. An important feature of the programme was that it involved 
imposing a limit on debt service of 10 per cent of forex earnings after the forex 
needs of the mining sector, airlines and oil and fertiliser imports had been deducted. 
Donors reacted quickly, cancelling promised aid programmes. Shortly after 
Kaunda stopped the IMF programme, Britain announced that it would withhold a 
grant of £9.3 million. West Germany, Britain and the US soon decided not to 
extend any further aid until a further deal with the IMF was agreed (Young, 1989). 
Economic conditions rapidly worsened, especially for the poor. In late 1987, about
18.0000 people were said to be facing starvation in the Luangwa district, with
65.000 in the same condition in the Mumbwa district west of Lusaka. Food riots 
became more common and were met with state violence (Good, 1988). 
Opposition to Kaunda and to single party democracy began to grow. The trade 
union movement became an increasingly important vehicle for political dissidents. 
Businesses were becoming increasingly unhappy about onerous state controls and 
financial mismanagement. The churches provided platforms for popular dissent.
In 1991, the government was effectively forced to hold its first multi-party 
elections since independence. Kenneth Kaunda was voted out by a broad-based 
opposition coalition known as the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD) 
led by trade unionist Frederick Chiluba. This was a historic moment: the first time 
a head of state was removed by election in Anglophone Africa. Given its historical 
significance, voter turnout was surprisingly low at just 46% of the population. A 
mere 14% of registered voters took part in November 1992 local government 
elections. There remains a general suspicion of political parties and, particularly, 
the probity of many politicians (Bratton, 1999).
The high hopes of the general election have, in general, been met with 
disappointment. A culture of presidential croneyism reappeared with remarkable 
speed (Simulanyi, 1996). The shared goal that had held MMD’s loose coalition 
together disappeared as soon as Kaunda was out of office. Increasingly, Chiluba 
began to rely on support from the influential Christian fundamentalist movement. 
The country was declared a Christian state in 1993 and began to attract investment
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from fundamentalist Christians from abroad. In 1994 an evangelical Christian 
businessman from Britain chose Zambia to be the base of the African division of his 
successful second-hand car dealership as well as the site for a powerful new radio 
transmitter which was used to broadcast his ‘Christian Voice Radio’ across East 
Africa. Having found religion after a visitation from the deity in a car park in 
Dagenham, he regarded the on-going success of his commercial ventures as 
evidence of divine support for his particular form of'Christian commerce1.1
In 1996, MMD were voted back to power in a second multi-party election. For 
many, the elections were flawed. Prior to the election Kenneth Kaunda’s party 
UNIP refused to stand and Kaunda himself urged the public to boycott the 
election. Several observers, including the Zambian Independent Monitoring Team 
and the international NGO Human Rights Watch declared the election not free and 
fair by international standards.
A. The Health Policy Environment
A t the time HIV/AIDS was first identified, Zambia was in the thick of acrimonious 
negotiations with the international community. This, combined with its dire 
economic situation had had a significant impact on health services. At a time when 
poverty was increasing, the health service (amongst others) was being cut back. 
Under the IMF programme, health represented a declining share of the government 
budget. It is estimated that the real value of the 1986 budget was only a quarter of 
its 1983 level (World Bank, 1986). For obvious political reasons, however, the 
government was loath to cut urban employment, so retrenchments have tended to 
occur in primary health — especially in rural areas — and on essential drugs (Clark 
and Allison, 1989). Health services were also affected by the problems of internal 
debt. In 1987, the University Teaching Hospital in Lusaka owed its main supplier, 
Medical Stores Ltd K8 million (Young, 1989). Poor pay and low morale had led 
to a significant outflow of qualified doctors. The shortages also affected non­
government services. UNICEF claimed that all their programmes were affected by 
the crisis and that their immunisation schemes collapsed completely as transport
1 Interview with general manager of Christian Voice, in 1994.
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became difficult to obtain and fuel shortages affected cold-storage of essential 
drugs and vaccines (Clark and Allison, 1989).
Zambia’s health service began to suffer dramatically. In the early 1990s, the 
Ministry of Health conceded that there were a series of inadequacies in the 
provision of health service. It was recognised that resources were being used 
inefficiently due to an over-emphasis on expensive hospital care and a 
corresponding under-resourcing of the most accessible facilities such as health 
centres (Simms, Milimo and Bloom, 1998). There were also substantial 
inequalities in health service provision. This inequality was partly urban/rural — a 
reflection of the concentration of health funding in hospitals. However, there was 
also an inequality between regions, caused partly by the way that donors tended to 
focus health interventions on particular regions or programmes (MoH, 1994). 
These problems had direct implications on health. Between 1980 and 1991 the 
proportion of Zambian children dying before reaching five years of age rose from 
15 to 19 per cent. Over the same period, under-five mortality in Eastern Africa 
and Africa actually declined (Simms et al, 1998).
Summary
In this chapter, I have reviewed the policy literature on policy networks in Britain. 
In Britain, a relatively close health policy community was under assault from the 
right-wing government. New actors had been included in decision-making process 
and professional groups were deliberately excluded from key policy forums. 
Funding problems and health service delivery inequalities were causing real 
pressures on the National Health Service.
I then went on to discuss the policy environment in developing countries generally 
and Zambia in particular at the time the Global AIDS Strategy was operationalised. 
In Zambia, the political and economic environment was even more fraught. The 
country was reaching economic and political crisis. Debts acquired over the 
previous thirty years had brought the relationship between the government and the 
donor community to crisis-point. At the same time, the government was facing
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considerable pressures for political reform, particularly from the donor community. 
Meanwhile, the majority of the population was undergoing a rapid decline in 
government services, standard of living and health status. In many rural areas, 
traditional forms of authority were at least as important as the remote, 
impoverished and largely urban government agencies.
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Chapter Five: 
Building a consensus: evidence, argument & persuasion
Introduction
In 1989, Majone published a critique of a particular form of quasi-scientific 
management literature that appeared to assume that policy-decisions are, or could 
be, the result of a rational, informed appraisal of different policy options. Such 
approaches, he argued, misunderstood the complexity and creativity of the 
scientific process. Rather than being clinically objective, scientific theories evolve 
out of process of thesis and antithesis. Scientists present competing theories to the 
scientific community and to the public until eventually some form of -  often 
temporary -  consensus is reached. The scientific community can not, for example, 
give us one clear, consensual answer as to the existence or, causes of global 
wanning. Instead, we are presented with a range of competing theories as to its 
significance and potential impact. Experts use evidence and argument to persuade 
policy makers that theirs is the most plausible explanation for external 
phenomenon.
In the policy-making arena, this type of evidential ambiguity has far-reaching 
implications. In an already politicised process, the relative weight accorded to 
particular perceptions of problems will have significant implications on the nature 
and scale of policy interventions. Not only must experts show that they have a 
plausible understanding of an issue area, but they must show that a particular policy 
response can achieve a desired end. In an area like HTV/AIDS, where scientific 
knowledge was incomplete and contested, the level of access to decision-makers 
groups, the persuasiveness of their arguments and the perceived quality of their 
evidence are of crucial importance.
In this chapter I will discuss how the WHO AIDS programme built up a body of 
evidence which they then deployed to achieve a provisional form of international 
consensus about the scale of the epidemic. The chapter is divided into three
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sections. In the first section, I will discuss the early responses to HTV/AIDS 
between 1981 and 1987. The WHO had a relatively limited involvement in policy 
development during this period. In both Britain and Zambia, a number of doctors, 
public health workers and specially-formed voluntary organisations established 
small issue networks, stimulating their respective government to organise 
responses to the emerging problem. In Britain, the problem was partly focused on 
finding ways of containing the growing public panic about the new ‘plague’. 
Doctors and voluntary organisations in Zambia, who were seeing far greater 
numbers of AIDS patients, were concerned with finding low-cost methods of 
patient care.
In the second section, I will discuss how the WHO AIDS programme became an 
increasingly important repository of information and expertise about HIV/AIDS, 
providing a platform for international exchange of information on the issue. By 
presenting a clear, persuasive argument that HTV/AIDS was a serious, yet 
potentially controllable problem, the WHO helped to set the international AIDS 
agenda according to liberal, public health values. In 1985, the WHO set up a small 
department called the Special Programme on AIDS (SPA) to provide advice and 
technical support on issues as safe blood supplies and surveillance. From late 
1986, however, the programme began to take an increasingly proactive role in 
publicising the issue internationally. During the period 1987-1989, the relationship 
between the WHO AIDS programme’s organisational growth, and the growth of 
the international response to AIDS was iterative. As the programme became 
increasingly high profile within the international community so too did the issue of 
AIDS, which then began to attract increasing amounts of donor funding, thereby 
raising the profile of the WHO programme still further.
In the third section, I will discuss the organisational growth of the programme and 
the mobilisation of international funding for HTV/AIDS. By presenting HTV/AIDS 
as a serious, yet manageable problem of world health, the WHO became a logical 
conduit for donor funding. In 1987, the small WHO AIDS division became 
integrated into the administrative structure of the WHO as the Global Programme
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on AIDS (GPA), receiving undesignated donor funding in its own right and 
launching its own programmes.
1. The early responses: 1981 - 1987
The development of AIDS policies has been presented as a rational bureaucratic 
response to a situation that had the potential for significant political and economic 
disruption (Day and Klein, 1989). Its mature responses certainly had elements of 
this form of top-down approach. The earliest stages, however, were very largely 
bottom-up, the result of informal alliances between public health doctors, scientists, 
clinicians and activists (Berridge, 1996). In both Britain and Zambia people who 
shared an interest in AIDS began to form small issue networks, pooling their 
knowledge, experience and interest to generate solutions to the emerging problem.
What is now known as AIDS was first observed in West Coast US. Young gay 
men were starting to present unusual symptoms, which were soon followed by a 
rapid and dramatic physical decline and eventual death. It was initially thought that 
the phenomenon was associated with the ‘gay lifestyle’, but there soon developed a 
serious epidemic in New York which was associated with poor inner-city 
communities, particularly IV-drug users, their partners and children. Gradually, the 
link with sexual transmission, blood and blood products was made. Though the 
clinical course of the new disease was clarified in 1982, the retrovirus (later called 
HTV), was not identified as causally associated with AIDS until 1983 (WHO, 
1987). The first reliable diagnostic test did not become available till 1985.
This early period of scientific uncertainty about what the disease was or how to 
control it meant that the clinical responses to AIDS were largely ad hoc, the result 
of small numbers of interested clinicians responding to this influx of new illnesses. 
Importantly, however, the nature of the both NGO and medical responses to 
HTV/AIDS were very much affected by the organisational cultures and structures 
that were in place when AIDS first manifesting itself.
I l l
A. The grass roots response in Britain.
i. The medical response
The first diagnosed case of AIDS in Britain was reported in The Lancet in 1981. 
Thereafter more and more cases started being identified, mostly through Genito­
urinary Medicine (GUM) Clinics. From the patients’ point of view, GUM clinics 
had the advantage of providing confidential, open-access healthcare. Gay men 
could be assured that they could remain anonymous if they so wished and did not 
need to have a referral from their General Practitioner (GP). GUM clinics had a 
long tradition of non-judgmental treatment dating back to report by the Royal 
Commission on Venereal Diseases during the First World War (Berridge, 1996). 
Here, Britain first evolved its pragmatic public-health line on sexually transmitted 
diseases. It was in the overall public interest to provide confidential treatment for 
people, because to do so would lessen the risk of a wider epidemic.
Clinical responses to the new cases were focused in three London hospitals: St. 
Mary’s, the Middlesex and St. Stephen’s. Doctors with a growing interest in AIDS 
represented a wide range of specialities: from GUM specialists, through 
epidemiologists, virologists, gastro-enterologists and dermatologists. Gradually, 
loose networks began to develop between professionals involved with AIDS. An 
AIDS collaborative group was established and began to meet monthly. A small 
number of experts became what have been termed AIDS ‘missionaries’ touring 
around meetings and conferences trying to generate interest in the problem and find 
solutions to it (Berridge, 1996). In May 1983, the Lesbian and Gay Switchboard 
organised the first national conference on AIDS in the UK. An audience of around 
200 people attended, who were in essence the AIDS issue network (Berridge, 
1996). Doctors, epidemiologists and gay activists listened to a speech given by the 
director of the Gay Men’s Health Crisis from New York and had a chance to swap 
information. Afterwards, the Gay Medical Association drafted an educational 
leaflet for GPs that was paid for and distributed by the Health Education Council.
Despite this growing interest, official funding for AIDS research started relatively 
slowly. Academic clinicians were responding on an essentially individual basis to 
the new and poorly understood problem. The first official Medical Research
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Council (MRC) grant for AIDS-related research went to Anthony Pinching at St 
Mary’s in 1983. The MRC then decided to set up an AIDS working party that 
began its work in October of the same year. This committee was advisory only, its 
terms of reference being to review knowledge of AIDS in the UK and abroad, and 
to encourage contacts between researchers (Berridge, 1996). A Commons Social 
Services Committee was later to criticise the committee for being slow in its 
response to AIDS and for turning down requests for research projects “with great 
potential...with minimum or no justification being given” (HSMO, 1987: 30). It 
was found that the burden for AIDS research had fallen on individual clinical 
academics “taking a very severe personal toll on those working with it in the face 
of continual cash shortage and staff under-resourcing (HMSO, 1987: 25).
To a great extent, the delays in funding are a reflection of the MRC’s 
organisational history. A traditionally responsive supplier of research funding, the 
MRC’s allocation for ADDS was roughly appropriate to the relatively small number 
of AIDS cases that had been recorded (Berridge, 1996). In the interim, it seem 
that the “clinical academic structure has managed to retain a flexibility which the 
general provision ofNHS services has lost” (HMSO, 1987: 25).
ii. The NGO response
The medical profession was not alone tackling AIDS. The voluntary sector raised 
a raff of well-organised and high profile responses to HIV/AIDS. The AIDS self- 
help movement was started with the death of a gay man called Terrence Higgins in 
the summer of 1982. In the final stages of his illness, medical staff used double­
barrier nursing methods, which caused extreme concern amongst his friends, gay 
activists and interested medical staff alike (Berridge, 1996). The isolated and 
demeaning circumstances of his death prompted his friends to form an 
organisation, the ‘Terry Higgins Trust’ in November 1982. The organisation was 
originally formed to raise funds for medical research. It soon, however, began 
expanding, becoming a major advocate and service-provider in its own right. In 
June 1987, after an acrimonious meeting with the original founders, the Trust was 
re-organised into a new, more formal ‘Terrence Hggins Trust’. It had five key 
action areas: fund-raising; media and information; medical social services (the
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origins of the buddy scheme); social services and finally, financial work. Body 
Positive, a self-help group for people who had been diagnosed HIV+ provided 
another model of AIDS NGO. Started in 1984, Body Positive established various 
local groups around Britain.
The response to HIV/AIDS from the gay community has to be seen in the light of 
pre-existing policy objectives and debates (Berridge, 1996). Gay organisations had 
developed clear health dimensions to their advisory and counselling activities — 
self-help groups such as Group B for those who were hepatitis B carriers were 
already in existence. The response to AIDS thus fitted into pre-existing gay 
medical and health paradigms. It provided a gay organisational and political focus 
which was lacking after the disintegration of some of the gay political organisations 
such as the Campaign for Homosexual Equality by the early 1980s (Berridge, 
1996).
Increasingly, these organisations began to work with government to provide 
services to people affected by AIDS. From late 1983, the new Chief Medical 
Officer Donald Acheson began to draw gay representatives into an informal 
alliance with government. They were invited to meetings at the Department of 
Health1 (DoH) and began to receive small amounts of funding from the 
department. The London Lighthouse was particularly well funded, and essentially 
took on a role of health service provision, providing government-subsidised care 
for the terminally-ill. Staff from the Lighthouse worked closely with government, 
and were invited discuss their experiences with senior members of the Ministry of 
Health, including Health Minister Norman Fowler.2
To a large extent, NGOs were used “because they were there.”3 Both Department 
of Health and NGO representatives acknowledged NGO’s relative expertise in the 
new area in the interviews. Surprisingly, however, the Conservative government 
also found some common ideological ground with AIDS activists. Andrew
1 In 1988, the Department of Health and Social Security was divided into two separte ministries. 
The health section subsequently became known as the Department of Health.
2 Interview with Director of the London Lighthouse.
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Henderson, director of the government subsidised London Lighthouse describes a 
sub-group within government as having been supportive o f direct service provision 
from NGOs, because of the Conservative antipathy to the “proliferation of local 
government.”
The period was, however, marked by tension between different sections of what is 
sometimes, somewhat glibly, termed the gay ‘community’. AIDS provided a clear 
opportunity for the ‘moral majority’ to attack the gay social and political agenda, 
as well as ‘remedicalising’ homosexuality. For some, particularly members of the 
Terrence Higgins Trust, the best way to help gay men was to form alliances with 
government. For others, this course of action was to erode some of the 
achievements of the gay movement, a regressive move towards the 
remedicalisation of AIDS. There was a real fear that co-operation with the state 
would lead to eventual co-option. Some of the Gay Switchboard volunteers 
remained deeply suspicious of collaboration with government (Berridge, 1996).
Though some NGOs moved towards a more mainstream, service-provision role, 
lobbying was still seen as being one of their most important roles. “HIV and AIDS 
exposes those things in society that could be called the opposite of the feel-good 
factor. It’s easy for governments to say ‘Ah yes’... but actually nothing happens.”4 
‘1 can’t remember any civil servant ever saying... ‘We are doing this because of the 
UN resolution’... Action happened when people chained themselves to railings, or 
we had a big march.”5 Even amongst those NGOs who worked with government, 
there was still an anxiety about the tension between the two roles, “Once a door 
opens, you actually get co-opted into the process anyway.”6
This tension remained a key dilemma within the AIDS voluntary sector. THT 
director Tony Whitehead was later to regret their instinct to look after AIDS 
patients rather than taking to the streets in the way US groups had done (Berridge, 
1996). Notwithstanding, the balance of power in relation to AIDS slowly shifted
3 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
4 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
5 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
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towards the Terrence Higgins Trust’s approach. By early 1984 the Trust moved to 
offices in London and by February had begun to operate a help-line. It also 
became the first explicitly gay organisation to receive charitable status and by 1985 
was hiring full time staff.
iii. The establishment o f the liberal line
In the first two years after AIDS was first identified in Britain, the issue was very 
much a minority concern of a small number of people who had been directly 
affected. From 1983, however, things began to change as cases began to arrive in 
greater numbers. A BBC Horizon programme Killer in the Village, showed how 
what was then referred to as AIDS was affecting the gay community in Greenwich 
Village in New York. The programme was widely discussed and the London Gay 
Switchboard reported being ‘inundated’ with calls from gay and straight members 
of the public.
By 1985, the antibody test had revealed an ‘iceberg’ of further cases. That and the 
revelation that heterosexual spread was not only possible, but very common in 
other parts of the world made AIDS a serious public and political issue. The 
political struggle centred around the tension between liberalism and a focus on 
individual rights on one hand, and more punitive but also essentially collective 
responses on the other. Public health officials and gay activists alike wanted to 
adopt a non-punitive approach, which did not stigmatise people affected by AIDS. 
This was a pragmatic as well as ethical stance. From the public health point of 
view, to confine people with AIDS, or to criminalise or re-criminalise behaviours 
associated with the transmission of HIV would drive the problem ‘underground’. 
The atmosphere of intolerance would deter people that may be at risk from the 
virus from coming forward for testing, advice and support. From the political 
activist viewpoint, AIDS threatened to provoke a backlash against gay people and 
a consequent escalation of violations of their human rights.
6 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
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There was, however, intense pressure for a punitive response to HIV/AIDS. This 
came in part from the media and public opinion, however it also came from 
professional groups within the health sector. The Advisory Committee on 
Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) laid out guidelines in January 1985, advising the use 
of disposable plastic aprons, gloves and eye protection, and limiting post-mortems 
only to the strictly necessary. Health professionals were extremely anxious about 
risk of transmission to HIV/AIDS. Cases were recorded of live patients being 
transported in plastic bags, of hospital staff refusing to work with AIDS patients 
and of putting up their own AIDS ‘warning’ signs above patients’ beds (Berridge, 
1996).
Despite this, 1985 saw the early construction of a liberal response through 
Department o f Health and Social Security (DHSS) policies and in particular the 
influence of public health lobbies and Chief Medical Officer Donald Acheson. 
Health Minister Sir Norman Fowler is often credited with spearheading Britain’s 
relatively energetic response to HTV and AIDS. However, his interest in, and 
approach to AIDS was heavily influenced by a small group of senior health 
bureaucrats at the DHSS, including Donald Acheson. Policies, Acheson explains, 
were not based primarily on human rights arguments, but on the 'driving- 
underground' arguments learned from their experience of dealing with infectious 
diseases. Others shared this perception that liberal AIDS policies were informed 
primarily by a medical consensus on the optimal way of handling infectious 
diseases. “There is a tendency to suggest that the gay community agenda was 
highly influential. Not really. I think liberal medics were far more influential.”7
In 1986, a Cabinet Committee was formed to look into the matter, chaired by the 
then Deputy Prime Minister, Willie Whitelaw and including Norman Fowler, the 
Education Secretary Kenneth Baker, Nick Edwards the Welsh Secretary and 
Malcolm Riflrind the Scottish Secretary. The same year, a group of senior health 
bureaucrats at the DoH organised an international tour that had the specific 
intention of shocking government ministers into action. It started with a trip to the
7 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
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WHO offices in Geneva, where Norman Fowler describes hearing a “sobering 
account of how Jonathan Mann, [who later became director of the GPA], saw the 
world-wide position ...[B]y 1992 there would be over half a million deaths from 
AIDS -  and the total could rise to as high as three million” (Fowler, 1991). Visits 
to Berlin, Amsterdam and San Francisco reinforced the scale of the problem and 
showed him examples of essentially liberal, predominantly NGO, approaches to the 
problem.8
This pressure from liberal public health bureaucrats found a sympathetic audience 
amongst a sub-group of government whose outlook was essentially liberal- 
paternalist. Norman Fowler was certainly deeply affected by what he saw. Donald 
Acheson remembers him saying that if, in twenty years time, he would think ‘I did 
too much’ he wouldn’t mind. But he would never for give himself if he thought he 
hadn’t done enough. Sir Norman himself describes finding “the antipathy towards 
AIDS sufferers incomprehensible. Disease is disease whether it is sexual or not... 
You do not have to condone the conduct to want to help the casualties” (Fowler, 
1991: 250). Acheson regarded Willie Whitelaw as having made an important 
contribution to maintaining the liberal line on AIDS policies. A commanding 
presence, he made sure the matter was taken seriously and that fellow Cabinet 
members paid attention. On one occasion, when there was talk of making 
Commonwealth scholars have mandatory HTV tests, Acheson remembers him as 
having been quite adamant, “He just said ‘No. We can’t do this’”. Robert 
Armstrong the Cabinet Secretary was also regarded as important in this respect. 
As one of the most senior bureaucrats in the country, he had ensured AIDS was 
given sufficient Cabinet time.
In June 1986, an ex urbe dispatch was sent to the Cabinet Office from the High 
Commissioner of Zambia. Written in “remarkable prose”9, it said that between 30- 
40% had been found positive on the test sites. The virus was clearly transmittable 
by heterosexual spread and it was by now clear that AIDS could become a serious 
problem amongst the general population. On September 21, 1986, the Daily
8 Interview with Donald Acheson, former Chief Medical Officer.
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Telegraph used the leaked document as evidence to support the introduction of 
screening for African visitors. Other paper’s picked up the story and lurid articles 
foretold the possibility o f an epidemic. As information about the disease leaked 
out, public anxiety began to grow. Acheson remembers a ‘wave of terror’ about 
risk o f transmission from beer mugs, coughing and sneezing. Doctors reported 
increasing numbers o f patients coming to them for help and advice and politicians 
were being quizzed about the problem in their constituencies. There was a 
considerable lobby from within and outside parliament to deal with the problem 
quickly.
The lobbying was, however, relatively dispersed and poorly organised, coming in 
the form of newspaper leaders, tabloid exposures and disapproval from individual 
ministers, MPs and members of the public. It could not provide a convincing 
framework from within which to organise public responses to HIV/AIDS.
What emerged was a triumph for a particular form of liberal consensus around 
AIDS, for traditional modes of health policy making which had long been heavily 
reliant on the power of the medical profession, but which Thatcherite reforms 
presumed to have overturned, for an elite rather than a populist view of what 
policy should be. This established a form of response with its focus on individual 
rights and responsibilities and on individual behaviour, which was all of a piece 
with the general trend of post-war health policy in Britain.
(Berridge, 1996: 55)
In early 1987, Britain launched its first ‘Don’t Die of Ignorance” campaign. The 
campaign was frank and hard-hitting and emphasised the threat to all from 
HIV/AIDS. Despite this, there was only one formal complaint from the campaign, 
from an MP who had yet to read the leaflet. For Donald Acheson, ‘it seems you’re 
protected by medical degrees, to some extent, if it’s clear you’re acting 
responsibly”. It has been argued that campaigns were deliberately designed to 
emphasise the threat to everyone so as to difiuse the threat o f a public backlash 
against ‘high risk’ groups and to prepare the ground psychologically for
9 Interview with Sir Donald Acheson, former Chief Medical Officer.
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controversial moves such as the introduction of government-run needle exchanges 
(Day and Klein, 1989). Sir Donald denies that their strategy was so deliberate, 
ctthat makes us sound like Napoleon”. In practice decisions were made on an ad  
hoc basis in response to the rapidly escalating problem or HTV/AIDS.
It is clear that Britain’s response to HTV/AIDS was informed by the influence of 
liberal medical ideas. But these ideas were not shared by large sections of the 
public or even the medical profession as a whole. Neither were they, in 
themselves, the ultimate ‘cause’ of the development of HTV/AIDS policies in 
Britain. Liberal policies were formed where these somewhat controversial ideas 
found a niche in existing institutions and organisational structures. Firstly, Britain 
had a long-established set of liberal-paternalist institutions, whose connected rules 
“prescribe behavioural roles, constrain activity and shape expectations” (Keohane, 
1986: 3). To a great extent, senior medics were trusted by government and public 
alike. The National Health Service provided a long-standing model of public, 
paternalist responses to health problems. More than that, however, these sets of 
institutions had spawned organisational structures — for example the network of 
anonymous, open-access GUM clinics — that supported such a liberal, paternalist 
approach to AIDS. Finally, liberal policies were formed where the individuals who 
supported them had the power to incorporate them into policy. Senior health 
bureaucrats enjoyed high-status jobs in government and significant influence in 
health policy development. Ultimately, pressure groups could only raise 
consciousness about particular issues. It was the health bureaucrats who were able 
to establish the trend of government policy.
B. The grass-roots response in Zambia
i. The medical response
Like Britain, the initial responses to HTV/AIDS in Zambia came from its medical 
community. In January 1993, Dr. Anne Bayley, a general surgeon at the University 
Teaching Hospital (UTH) began to notice an increase in the numbers of patients 
with Karposi’s Sarcoma, a hitherto rare form of skin cancer which was particularly 
associated with older men in East Africa but which is common amongst people 
with AIDS. Dr Bayley had been accustomed to seeing a steady 8-12 cases a year.
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In January 1983, however, she saw six new and atypical cases. Patients were 
younger that she would normally expect, were better educated and did not respond 
to the usual treatments. She saw several manifestations of the disease on the face 
and trunk, which she would not expect and there was a link with lung disease and 
cyanosis. By June 1983, she had seen a total of 13 atypical cases, three of which 
were women. Having had a special interest in the disease for several years, she 
was aware of the unexplained increase in Karposi’s Sarcoma in young homosexuals 
in the US through medical reports. By mid-1983 she was beginning to make the 
link with her own patients. Her findings were written up in a paper for a meeting 
of the Association of East African Surgeons. Throughout 1984, and 1985, Dr. 
Bayley made contact with researchers from abroad to publicise the phenomenon. 
She sent samples to a researcher called Robert Downing from Porton Down, UK 
who was writing a paper on the subject in The L ancet. In December 1984, she 
invited a doctor from the National Cancer Institute of Bethesda, Maryland, to the 
March 1985 Regional Meeting of the Association of Surgeons of E. Africa to 
discuss cases of HELV Hi-related disease. In April 1985, Dr Bayley attended the 
First International AIDS Conference at Atlanta, Georgia where she interested a 
number of doctors in her findings.
By 1985, two years before WHO resolution 40.26 was ratified, Zambia first began 
official responses to HTV/AIDS. In July, a team of medics from the Centre of 
Disease Control in Atlanta came to do a study in Lusaka and the first cases of HTV 
were formally identified. Surveillance was done in a number of sentinel sites 
including the antenatal and STD clinics and the army. Overall, an alarming 15/16% 
of the tests proved HIV+. In November, Dr Bayley presented these findings at the 
first AIDS in Africa Conference in Brussels.
When the CDC team arrived, the medical school decided to arrange a meeting with 
the visitors, the Ministry of Health, and interested doctors. From this ad hoc 
arrangement, an AIDS Surveillance Committee was formed. By 1986 
representatives from the UK’s ODA, the London School of Tropical Medicine, the 
Wellcome Trust and the Zambian Medical Research Council and the Ministry of 
Health met to discuss the growing AIDS problem. In June 1986, a first mini-
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conference on AIDS was organised in Lusaka. In 1987 a national poster campaign 
was launched by the government, around the same time that Britain started its 
‘Don’t Die of Ignorance’ series.
The WHO was not a primary catalyst to Zambia’s response to HTV/AIDS during 
this period. On an individual level, Eric van Praag of the WHO’s Lusaka office 
was described as a “benevolent, switched on and supportive presence”, though a 
behind-the-scenes player. He provided letters o f reference to support claims for 
donor funding and backed local interventions. Though, from 1985, the WHO gave 
technical advice to the Surveillance Committee and initiated a safe blood 
programme, it was not regarded as being particularly helpful as an organisation. 
One Zambian doctor recalls being told by the WHO representative of a 
neighbouring country in 1986 that Zambia had more pressing concerns with which 
to deal.
/'/. The development o f AIDS NGOs in Zambia
From 1986, a small number of interested Zambians and expatriates began to find 
ways of coping with the growing AIDS problem. For many people with AIDS and 
their families, there was little within their power other than to try and alleviate 
some of the symptoms and obtain what medical help was available. A small group 
of predominantly Lusaka-based professionals, however, had the resources and 
commitment to establish more organised interventions. A network of people who 
were involved in health welfare interventions in various forms began to encourage 
each other to develop strategies for coping with what was seemed set to become a 
very serious problem.
In late 1986 Christy Baker, a British doctor trained in Zambia started doing AIDS 
education in schools. Encouraged by her husband -  a teacher -  Dr Baker obtained 
permission from the Ministries of Health and Education to start awareness-raising 
sessions. Dr Baker was aware that children were likely to be most influenced by 
peer pressure. Thus, when two boys approached her after one of the sessions to 
ask her what they could do, she suggested they start a pupils’ ‘anti-AIDS club’. 
Pupils chose the mantra ‘no sex before marriage, no adultery, be compassionate’.
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Though deeply Christian, Dr Baker worried that this was a bit naive. However, 
she maintains that it was very much the children who dictated the moral direction 
of the clubs. The idea of the clubs soon spread. Norad began to support them 
with equipment and they started to attract other funding. By 1990, the Anti-AIDS 
clubs had an office and paid staff.
A series of diplomatic tea-parties at the British High Commission became an 
unlikely catalyst of concern about HTV/AIDS in Zambia. Anne Bayley and Tony 
Pinching, a visiting researcher from St. Mary’s hospital in London, convinced High 
Commissioner Sir Kelvin White and his wife Sue that AIDS presented a serious 
problem for Africa.10 In June 1986, Sir Kelvin was to write the dispatch that 
provoked such a reaction in Britain. He and his wife also used the High 
Commission as a place to introduce people to each other in order to generate 
support for the HTV/AIDS initiatives.
In 1987 Alan Howarth, a British Psychiatrist based in Lusaka, began running a 
counselling programme for people with ADDS. Responsible for mental health on a 
country-wide basis, he sat in Dr Bayley’s surgical clinic and Dr Hira’s STD clinic 
and began to develop ways of giving counselling to people with AIDS. Essentially 
he established a ‘snowball’ training scheme, bringing together health professionals, 
nurses and medical assistants to spend a week discussing the basic facts about 
AIDS and general counselling techniques. He also encouraged trainees to discuss 
sex more openly, a subject he claims is still considered taboo. He then sent these 
groups back to work to practice what they had been taught. After a couple of 
months, they had another training course with more role play and real pre-test and 
supportive counselling. Over the next year he selected the most committed people 
for further training, who in turn started their own training courses. The scheme 
continued snowballing in this way until he had established a cadre of skilled 
counsellors.
10 Interviews with Anne Bayley, Tony Newton, Sir Kelvin and Sue White.
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Also in 1987, politician Rodger Chongwe, Alan Haworth, and local businessmen 
came together to establish an NGO that would specifically deal with AIDS called 
the Family Health Trust. It was clear that AIDS would have complex ramifications 
for families and communities. In the first place, patients would have to be cared 
for. Zambia’s chronically under-funded health service would be largely unable to 
support AIDS patients in hospitals, and anyway many people preferred to be ill at 
home. The deaths of previously healthy adults would leave their dependants 
vulnerable, families may be stigmatised and so on. The Trust was established to 
provide counselling and home-based care for people with AIDS. Virginia O’Dell, a 
US nurse trained in paramedics who had moved to Zambia with her husband who 
was working for the French NGO Medecines Sans Frontieres, was appointed as a 
research assistant. Part of her responsibility was to recruit five Zambian nurses and 
paramedics to provide a home-care service in Lusaka. This home-care team 
received early support from WHO representative Eric van Praag. In the same year, 
a young Australian doctor called Ian Campbell working for the Salvation Army at 
Chikenkata established an AIDS Surveillance, Prevention and Care project as well 
as a Home-Based Care programme at the near-by Monze hospital.
Though most of these early responses were initiated by the non-government sector, 
they did have some high-level support. In 1988, President Kenneth Kaunda was a 
keynote speaker at the Stockholm 4th International AIDS Conference and spoke 
movingly of the death of his son from AIDS. It was a bold move and he was the 
first international figure to admit to being so personally affected by the illness. He 
then urged the international community to take the problem seriously. At the time 
of my fieldwork, Kaunda was under house arrest on suspicion of involvement with 
an attempted coup in 1997. After some negotiation with the authorities, I was 
allowed to interview him at his house where he told me that he had felt he “had to 
do something about this terrible disease” and had embraced the opportunity of 
publicising its effects.
Despite this high profile support, there was still a great deal of resistance to AIDS 
interventions. Early ‘AIDS activists’ described on-going battles to get senior 
politicians and bureaucrats to take the problem seriously and publicise the
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information that was becoming available. Dr. Bayley remembers being told by one 
senior bureaucrat that “the President can say what he likes. You can’t.” Professor 
Pinching, who conducted early research into HTV/AIDS in Zambia, remembers 
encountering great resistance to publicising the problem from Zambian civil 
servants. Early epidemiological evidence suggested that prevalence was highest 
amongst relatively well-off, professional men — exactly the sort who were 
responsible for making policies. For more than one of the interviewees, their 
reluctance to publicise the issue was fuelled by personal fear for their HTV status as 
well as anxiety that their friends, colleagues and families would infer that they had 
been having extra-marital sex.
Despite these on-going battles, NGO responses to AIDS continued to mushroom. 
In 1989 Father Michael Kelly founded Kara Counselling, with the help of funding 
from the Swedish aid agency NORAD. Kara opened a drop-in centre and later 
started giving free testing with associated counselling. In 1990, the organisation 
started an AIDS education outreach programme, to factories, companies, schools 
and training organisations, using people who were HTV+ and who had been trained 
by Kara as AIDS educators.11 In September 1990, a two-day AIDS conference for 
non-government organisations was held in Lusaka. In 1991, the year democratic 
elections put the Movement for Multi-Party for Democracy (MMD) in power, 
Kara established a therapeutic day-care centre in Lusaka, which offered a free 
course in Positive-Living, with skills training to people with AIDS.
Though these interventions were essentially indigenous, designed to respond to 
particular, highly contextual problems, each of these early interventions shared a 
similar, dialectical relationship with the international community. Each was started 
by people whose privileged access to international resources, relative self- 
confidence and personal contacts enabled them to launch organised interventions. 
Every intervention was built primarily around the particular skills of the charismatic 
individuals who started them. In the majority of cases, the interventions were
11 Interview with Senior Medical Officer for STDs and AIDS.
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started by, or had high profile support from ex-patriates. In the rest of cases, the 
initial leaders were particularly well-connected Zambians.
These international connections facilitated the flow of money to support organised 
interventions. The same connections then enabled information about them to be 
disseminated internationally. The British High Commissioner galvanised British 
attitudes to HIV/AIDS through his pungent report of June 1986. Similarly, 
information about Zambia’s experiments in responding to HTV/AIDS were soon to 
receive international attention. The Chikenkata projects, for example, were 
supported by Actionaid, who used them as models for interventions in other 
countries. Dr Campbell, who subsequently became a high profile international 
AIDS expert for the Salvation army, also wrote up the Chikenkata experience in 
the Strategies fo r Hope series, which were specifically designed to provide models 
and ideas for interventions elsewhere (Campbell and Williams, 1990).
At the same time as having a close relationship with international organisations, 
these NGOs also had relatively close relationships with government. Rather than 
being pressure groups, these organisations were essentially ‘insider’ groups, 
working collaboratively with government. Though they may not have agreed with 
the government on the significance or approach to ADDS, they nonetheless worked 
with them. In the case of the Family Health Trust and Alan Haworth’s counselling 
training sessions, the government provided staff and premises. There was no 
evidence of pressure group activity in the form of demonstrations or direct action.
Summary
Between 1981 and 1989, both Britain and Zambia developed indigenous NGO and 
government HTV/AIDS interventions. Relatively small communities of
professionals who were alarmed by the implications AIDS had on health, 
advertised the problem and developed strategies for dealing with it. These 
networks worked relatively closely, and in both countries saw themselves as AIDS 
missionaries, involved in something that was frightening but also a professional and 
personal challenge.
126
The WHO was not a primary catalyst to these responses. Indeed, both Britain and 
Zambia developed information and interventions that were used as templates for 
interventions in other countries. As an organisation, WHO did not play a very 
active role in AIDS interventions at this, early stage of the disease. Individual 
WHO staff did, however, support these networks. In the case of Zambia, this 
support came in the form of financial and technical assistance, as well as advocacy. 
In Britain, this support took the form of providing evidence and information that 
would support indigenous networks requests for tolerant government interest in 
the problem.
2. 1987 -  1989: The World Health Organisation and the 
internationalisation of AIDS.
In many respects, HTV/AIDS had always been an international issue. Clinical and 
scientific information about the disease had been published internationally, 
international conferences had been organised and policy-makers like Donald 
Acheson had kept a close eye on developments from abroad. There had, however, 
been no formal attempts at genuine international policy co-ordination. WHO had 
responded relatively slowly to HTV/AIDS, only establishing a small sub-division 
called the Special Programme on AIDS (SPA) in 1985, and maintained a relatively 
low international profile on the issue. The gradual nature of its involvement was at 
least in part because of a lack of high-level support for the issue. Halfden Mahler, 
Director General of the WHO till 1987, was considered by some to have a bit o f “a 
blind spot about AIDS”, telling one of his co-workers at WHO that he regarded the 
problem as essentially moral. More than this, WHO did not have a large 
programme for sexually transmitted disease. In the early 1980s, only one person 
was working in this area (Berridge, 1986).
Between late 1986 and 1989, however, this changed. In 1987, every country in the 
world endorsed the Global AIDS Strategy, mandating the specially-formed Global 
Programme on AIDS (GPA) to take the lead in co-ordinating international AIDS 
interventions. It became the chief conduit of donor funding for HTV/AIDS and, by 
1989, became the largest single WHO programme, directly funding interventions
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around the world. This section of the chapter discusses how the WHO programme 
achieved this rapid growth and its impact on the ‘AIDS missionaries7.
A  Evidence and argument
The process between WHO’s initial involvement in HIV/AIDS and becoming the 
leading international advocate of international AIDS interventions was an iterative 
one. WHO staff used evidence and argument to persuade policy makers that the 
issue was gravely serious. This in turn led to the diversion of funds to AIDS, 
thereby increasing their organisational capacity and their international profile. It 
provides an interesting example of how a sub-group within an organisation can 
seize the initiative in new policy areas, thereby affecting organisational as well as 
policy development (Majone, 1989). It was during this period that the WHO/GPA 
had its most decisive influence over the development of British AIDS policies. 
AIDS missionaries and SPA/GPA staff kept in regular contact and were able to 
support each others attempts at publicising the issue and framing it within a liberal- 
public health paradigm.
The first breakthrough in terms of the WHO’s involvement with AIDS was when 
the Ugandan Minister of Health conceded publicly that his country needed help 
with its emerging AIDS problem. In 1986, Jonathan Mann, a medically qualified 
epidemiologist was seconded to WHO from the Centre of Disease Control in 
Atlanta. In November of that year, he and Mahler gave the UN General Assembly 
a special briefing on AIDS, the first time that it had set aside time to discuss a 
health topic (Berridge, 1996). One of the most significant moves the SPA made 
was to gather together the epidemiological evidence from around the world to 
create a mathematical model, the Delphi Study, to estimate how AIDS would 
impact upon world health (WHO, 1989a). Though recorded incidence of AIDS 
was relatively low at this time, WHO argued that the problem was under-reported, 
and estimated that between 5 to 10 million were infected with HTV and that 
between 15 and 20 million would have become so by the year 2000. Current 
estimates of global HTV prevalence are over twice as high as these early projections 
(UNAIDS, 1998). They were, however, high enough to demonstrate that without 
intervention, AIDS was going to become a serious medical problem.
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This information was then publicised in regular WHO updates. The programme 
worked closely with the media to generate interest in the problem. A series of 
press releases In Point o f Fact, brought news about expressions of commitment 
from governments and UN organisations, WHO initiatives and, above all, evidence 
about the potential impacts of AIDS. Then, the SPA began to support various 
international forums for discussing and publicising the issue of HTV/AIDS.
By funding research and collating epidemiological evidence from around the world, 
the SPA was able to show that AIDS had been widely identified, that it could affect 
Africa and Asia, as well as the States, heterosexuals as well as gay men. In the 
early years of AIDS, many policy-makers thought that the problem would not 
affect them and could be safely ignored. In developing countries, books and 
articles had appeared arguing that AIDS was a problem only for American 
homosexuals and that it was a disease of the decadent West (Chiramuuta, 1987). 
In the West, particularly in the United States, AIDS was often seen as a problem 
for developing countries and ‘high risk’ groups. As late as 1987, US President 
Ronald Reagan had hardly mentioned AIDS, despite America having the largest 
recorded prevalence of AIDS in the world (Fowler, 1991: 250).
The primary purpose of the WHO publications was to underline the significance of 
the problem to all policy-makers. Information was collected, processed and 
publicised so as to make maximum impact. During a visit to the GPA offices in 
1994, a senior economist explained to me the process by which they came up with 
models of the potential economic impact o f AIDS. GPA staff gauged that 
politicians and policy-makers would only really take notice of HIV/AIDS it they 
were persuaded that it was likely to affect business and government revenues. 
Various ways of calculating economic impact were experimented with until the 
GPA team arrived at the method that produced the highest figures. The 
WHO/GPA staffs' explicit intention was to produce alarming statistics that could 
then be used to pressure governments into taking the problem seriously.
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Staff at the SPA and subsequently GPA collected evidence about successful 
interventions from around the world. The idea was not only to scare policy­
makers, but also to provide them with potential solutions. In so doing, the WHO 
became an increasingly important source of advice. Jonathan Mann established 
groups to look into particular problems as they arose, thereby creating a centre of 
expertise to which national policy-makers could go for help. Donald Acheson, for 
example, referred to WHO for advice on the knotty problem of the testing of 
occupations for which good health is critical: airline pilots, machine operators, train 
drivers and so on. At the time there was great concern about the ‘dementia’ that 
was associated with AIDS and pressure to conduct compulsory testing to screen 
out people who were HQV+ and therefore presumably at risk. Sir Donald asked 
Jonathan Mann to look into this, a research group was set up and it was found that 
the dementia was only associated with the very final stages of AIDS and not HTV 
and therefore mandatory testing would be unnecessary.
Throughout 1987, senior British health bureaucrats such as STD/AIDS specialist 
Peter Exon and Donald Acheson kept in regular contact with WHO staff to 
calculate ways they could help each other to raise the profile of the illness and fend 
off pressure for punitive responses. Though the DoH did not regard itself as being 
in any way led by the GPA, contact between the two organisations was regular and 
intense. Donald Acheson had close personal links with Jonathan Mann, and spoke 
to him frequently about ways of tackling the HIV/AIDS problem. “There was a lot 
of informal discussion and influence... At one time we used to have regular 
meetings once a month or., two...and when Jonathan Mann came over he would 
normally visit... It wasn’t a big conspiracy, there just weren’t that many people 
involved... Everybody knew everybody”.12 At the time, professional exchange was 
actively encouraged by the DoH and people were actively encouraged to do short 
consultancy stints with the GPA. This level of exchange was said to have 
decreased since the department was “slimmed down... we just can’t afford the 
luxury... now.”13
12 Interview with Senior Medical Officer for STDs and AIDS, DoH.
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Despite this regular communication, none of the DoH staff interviewed regarded 
themselves as in any way led by the WHO. They saw their role more as guide to 
the WHO/GPA, based on their experience of developing AIDS policies. This self 
image is somewhat exaggerated. British policies had been strongly influenced by 
the NGO response in the US and by Holland’s liberal approach to controlling HIV 
amongst drug-users (Fowler, 1991). What is clear, however, is that the 
relationship with SPA and, from 1987, GPA staff was dialectical. Staff did not feel 
bound by the strategy, but rather shared information to help to develop their own 
policies.
Britain, however, only sought advice from the WHO on specific, technical areas. 
In general, its policies were developed internally, after seeking information from a 
variety of sources, including the WHO. A common view amongst interviewees 
from WHO, Britain and Zambian bureaucrats was that while the WHO gave help to 
everyone, it was developing countries that stood to gain most from the WHO 
expertise. "The people who benefited the most were those for whom there was 
almost no possibility of having experts in anything at all. The Ministry of Health 
may consist of five people. The importance of WHO is inversely proportional to a 
country’s wealth. Poor countries are able to pull up-to-date information off the 
shelf, correctly based in terms of science.”14
The WHO/GPA seemed to act as nexus for formulating ideas and policies about 
HTV/AIDS. One of the most striking things about the British interviews was the 
degree of consensus that existed about HTV/AIDS and policies designed to tackle 
it. People from very different organisations had broadly similar views about the 
extent of the problem, problems that had been encountered and areas in which the 
policy response had been weak. To some extent, this consensus seems to have 
been facilitated by the regularity with which international conferences were 
convened, combined with the dissemination of research findings, project reports 
and policy statements from a wide range of organisations throughout the world. 
The WHO/GPA were an important facilitator of this type of exchange of ideas and
13 Interview with Head of Population and Reproductive Health Section, ODA
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information. Though there were complaints about some of the WHO/GPA’s 
operational procedures, all the interviewees expressed the view that the basic 
conceptual approach was sound. It appeared that they were able to absorb, 
synthesise and disseminate information about the epidemic in an effective and 
persuasive way.
R Persuasion
The collection of evidence, no matter how exhaustive, is not enough in itself to 
influence policy. To be effective it must persuade influential policy-makers that the 
information is plausible and that it can be used as a basis for making effective 
policies. The WHO/GPA had no legal sanction with which to force policy-makers 
to comply with its agenda, so its influence was very much based on presenting itself 
as a neutral, accurate and practical source of information. The extent to which 
policy-makers did find its arguments compelling was very much a factor of its 
perceived legitimacy. Thus, though it had no coercive power, it was perceived as 
having authority.
i. Organisational Authority
The first facet of the WHO/GPA’s authority was that the WHO was regarded as 
reliable, objective and technically-expert organisation. Successes with the 
eradication of diseases such as smallpox had confirmed its reputation as a leading 
health agency. The AIDS programme benefited from the esteem in which its 
parent organisation was held.
The perception of its authority was useful in persuading policy-makers to adopt 
particular responses to HIV/AIDS. All but one of the British interviewees 
mentioned that they used the WHO’s perceived authority to back up their claims. 
It was thought that “people pay attention to their pronouncements” and that you 
“couldn’t exaggerate the importance of having a WHO flag.”15 “As soon as you 
write WHO, somebody will sit up and take notice. That’s what you’re doing. 
You’re using it cleverly to influence people who are going to know far less than
14 Interview with former staff of the DoH.
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you do, but who have more power than you.”16 Donald Acheson regularly used 
the WHO to back up claims on the grounds that it was authoritative. The fact that 
the WHO/GPA was regarded as a high-profile and authoritative voice 
internationally meant that members of the AIDS issue network saw it as a useful 
vehicle for affecting other countries approach to the problem and, ultimately, to 
add weight to their own approach to the problem.
However, the GPA quickly developed its own reputation for expertise. “It was the 
lead agency, pulling together the best minds in the world to deal with the 
problem.”17 The “sheer weight of organisational skill was an important 
complement to national AIDS programmes.”18 There was a significant degree of 
consensus amongst the UK respondents that the overall strategy was the right 
response at the time. All the respondent's thought the strategy’s basic principles 
were sound. ‘I t  wasn’t so much a liberal response, as a realistic one... the 
argument was successful, because it was right”. If it had been a punitive response, 
it would have been disastrous.”19 It was felt that the having WHO approval helped 
to galvanise action, “has anything else been put on the world’s agenda quite so 
quickly?”20
The other strength of the WHO was that it had genuinely international 
organisational infrastructure. As well as the headquarters in Geneva, it has offices 
in Washington, regional offices and, in many cases, country offices as well. It 
therefore had relatively easy access to other UN organisations, as well as 
developing countries and provided a central organisational framework for 
international consensus-building around the issue of HIV/AIDS. It could provide 
useful evidence about the global nature of the epidemic and information about the 
ways in which policy initiatives were impacting upon the problem. Its system of
15 Interview with Director of the HTV/AIDS Alliance, London.
16 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
17 Interview with Head of Population and Reproductive Health Section, ODA
18 Interview with Director of the HTV/AIDS Alliance, London.
19 Interview with director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
20 Interview with Director of the UK NGO AIDS Consortium, London.
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national programmes created “some sort o f bureaucratic place...[which was] an 
essential first step to having some sort of response by governments.”
//. Charismatic authority
Much of the GPA’s influence in the early years was derived from a small group of 
hardworking staff who toured the world ‘selling’ the problem and the GPA’s 
potential role in resolving it. In Britain, a small number of medics began to work 
with regularly with WHO/GPA staff in Geneva, providing each other with advice, 
encouragement and information. The GPA’s first director, Jonathan Mann made a 
particular contribution in this respect and has been widely acclaimed for the energy 
with which he travelled the world, persuading policy-makers that HIV/AIDS was a 
serious problem. Four of the interviewees mentioned his charisma, “he was very 
charismatic. He really sold the programme and he sold the problem.”22 His 
charisma and personal commitment to the problem was argued to have been 
instrumental in generating the interest of the international community and 
maintaining the commitment of other ADDS workers. “There was an astonishing 
loyalty. None of the people I was involved with had any experience of working at 
international level. Jonathan Mann was very welcoming, individually kind, 
supportive and encouraging.”23 He was also an extremely charismatic speaker. It 
is said that his speech at the London Summit of Minister’s of Health in 1988 
‘electrified’ the audience, creating a real sense of shared responsibility and 
concern.24
Interviewees also expressed respect for the way in which the WHO/GPA framed 
the problem. They were “visionaries” who “said good things”25 and said them well. 
‘The cogency and eloquence with which Jonathan Mann and others framed AIDS 
was helpful. It made us feel more confident, because we had a framework.” As 
well as respecting various GPA staff on a personal level, it was also seen as
21 Interview with Director of the UK AIDS Consortium, London.
22 Interview with Senior Medical Officer for STDs and AIDS, DoH.
23 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
24 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
25 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
26 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
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important that the GPA were respected by others. “They provided an absolutely 
essential imprimatur of multilateral authority.”27 Their pronouncements could be 
taken and used to put pressure for changes in HTV/AIDS polices.
The WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy had a psychological impact on the people 
working in the AIDS field. AIDS work was often disheartening. Some of the 
founders of AIDS organisations were HIV positive themselves and some were 
becoming ill and dying. It was also seen as an uphill struggle to get AIDS to be 
taken seriously and sympathetically. “What we did look for, and what we got, was 
a level of leadership... a global vision of how to look forward. When you’re 
surrounded by cruel indifference at best... it encourages people in what they were 
doing.”28 In moving the problem into an international arena, the GPA’s strategy 
seemed to generate new visions and new solidarities. “There’s also a, I don’t know 
whether in trying to get NGO agendas into something like the UN, it creates, 
automatically a sort of solidarity amongst NGOs.”29
in. Constitutional authority
The final aspect of the GPA’s authority was its perceived neutrality as a UN 
agency. This neutrality was thought to give its pronouncements weight. “Only 
global organisations have the impact in terms of credibility and power of 
influencing national government.”30 A UN organisation can provide a high profile, 
prestigious international platform. This was thought to be a significant factor in 
persuading politicians to sign the Global AIDS Strategy, whether they were 
convinced by its contents or not. “The way in which the UN works is peer 
pressure. When you get together a bunch of ministers who turn up because of 
diplomatic considerations, considerations about how they look on an international 
stage., you can .. supply sufficient peer pressure for people to sign up to things 
which if it was just within a national context they wouldn’t dream of doing. "31 The 
same NGO worker remembered seeing a harassed health minister at the 40th
27 Interview with Director of the HIV/AIDS Alliance, London.
28 Interview with Director of the Terrence Higgins Trust, London.
29 Interview with Interview with Director of UK NGO AIDS Consortium.
30 Interview with Specialist in Sexual Health Programme, OD A.
31 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
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World Health Assembly, when the Global AIDS Strategy was first endorsed, 
anxiously ringing up his staff to find out their policy on AIDS. Disappointed by the 
answer, he shouted, “Then get one.”
As a UN organisation, the WHO could also provide a neutral forum in which to 
discuss the problem of HIV and AIDS. ‘The GMC provided a useful mechanism 
for articulating what the demands are, to achieve consensus.32 A similar sentiment 
was expressed by the ODA. “As a UN organisation, the GPA is constitutionally 
obliged to include a range o f nations on its GMC... In terms of partnership and... 
‘ownership’ of an issue, it is far better to have a forum where problems can be 
articulated clearly and at a global context”.33 National-level bureaucrats began to 
sit on the GPA’s various board, as will be discussed in more detail below. The 
GMC was composed of government representatives from various countries and 
intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations were granted 
observer status (WHO/GPA, 1996: 61).
Governments became committed to sending representatives to international 
meetings in which the problems of HTV/AIDS were discussed. In Britain, Donald 
Acheson became very closely involved with the GPA. The UK has a historically 
close relationship with the WHO and maintains a strong official presence there. 
The CMO is responsible for representing the UK government at the WHO in the 
Minister’s absence, which was most of the time and was present at all the WHO 
meetings on HTV/AIDS. The representatives of the UK’s Department of Health 
and Overseas Development agency felt that lobbying the WHO/GPA was an 
important part of their role. Both organisations tried to influence the GPA 
formally, through public statements and their positions on the General Management 
Committee, and more informally.
In addition to bring experts together, the WHO/GPA served as a means of 
providing leverage to national lobbyists interested in ‘selling’ the HTV/AIDS 
problem to policy-makers. Five of the UK organisations interviewed mentioned
32 Interview with Director of Impact, London.
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that the WHO was a useful source of information and statistics. The fact that they 
provided information about the extent of the problem internationally was regarded 
as important in underlining the potential threat to Britain. In many ways the 
interviewees appeared to approach the WHO/GPA and the Global AIDS Strategies 
as discerning consumers, using them to substantiate their arguments and to apply 
pressure to individuals or organisations they sought to influence. On a day-to-day 
level, this came from WHO/GPA pronouncements. All but one of the respondents 
thought that at the time WHO were held in respect by the international community 
and that their pronouncements carried weight. They could therefore cite the WHO 
when making requests for extra funding or lobbying for particular policy 
innovations. Once governments had signed the resolutions, for whatever political 
or diplomatic reason, national and international pressure groups were in a stronger 
position to lobby governments to abide by its terms.
In other circumstances, AIDS workers would collaborate with the GPA to react to 
what they perceived as retrograde national developments. In 1987, shortly before 
the London World Summit of Ministers of Health a small group of UK civil 
servants met GPA staff to discuss how best to fend off a potentially stigmatising 
change in testing procedures which was being pushed forward by the then health 
minister Virginia Bottomley. The group agreed to exploit the London Summit, 
duly opening it with a speech by Jonathan Mann emphasising Britain’s exemplary 
stand on HTV and human rights. Later, civil servants explained to the minister that, 
in the circumstances, it would embarrass Britain internationally to change Britain’s 
health policies. The existing, policy remained unaltered. On another occasion, the 
GPA, DoH and representatives from Australia and New Zealand met up to discuss 
how best to deal with a campaign in the Murdoch press which stated that the link 
between HTV and AIDS was unproved.34
3. The international mobilisation
Between 1985 and 1987, the WHO helped to generate more and more interest in 
AIDS. This in turn, lead to greater investment in HTV/AIDS. The signing of
33 Interview with Specialist in Sexual Health Programme, ODA.
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Global AIDS Strategy in 1987 gave official endorsement to the Global Programme 
on AIDS (GPA), the WHO programme for implementing the strategy. The GPA 
was to be attached directly to the office of the Director-General of WHO and 
operated within WHO’s policy and programme framework. The GPA was 
organised into five programme areas, which directly echoed WHO’s organisational 
structure:
1. Programme Direction: the Office of the Director
2. National AIDS Programme Support
3. Scientific and Technical Units
□ Biomedical Research
□ Epidemiological Support and Research
□ Health Promotion
□ Social and Behavioural Research
□ Surveillance, Forecasting and Impact Assessment
4. Management, Administration and Information
5. Regional and Inter-country Support.
In addition to this, a three-tiered advisory structure was created to provide GPA 
with guidance. The first structure was an external management review called the 
GPA Management Committee, or GMC. The GMC was to act as an advisory 
body to the Director-General of WHO, making recommendations on the 
programme of activities and budget of GPA, its financing and management, 
progress towards achievement o f its objectives, and ways of improving GPA co­
ordination with relevant organisations.
The GMC was to represent the interests and responsibilities o f WHO’s external 
partners collaborating with WHO in the implementation of the Global AIDS 
Strategy. Membership of the board included:
1. Representatives of donors of undesignated funding for the programme
34 Interview with DoH participant at the meeting
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2. Representatives of two governments from each of WHO’s six regions
3. Representatives of the six major inter-governmental organisations contributing 
to the implementation of the Global AIDS Strategy, as well as the chairman of 
the Global Commission on AIDS.35
Other intergovernmental organisations and non-governmental organisations deeply 
involved in the Global AIDS Strategy were, on request, granted observer status.36
The second structure was the Global Commission on AIDS (GCA), which gave 
broad policy, technical and operational guidance. This was responsible for advising 
the Director General on scientific priorities for the GPA research agenda. It 
reviewed global HIV/AIDS trends and developments, provided expert guidance on 
GPA’s global activities, advise on the establishment of scientific working groups 
and review and evaluated GPA activities from a scientific, technical and operational 
viewpoint. The final structure consisted of a series of steering committees. 
Detailed scientific guidance for priority components of the GPA research agenda 
were led by specially-formed steering committees, brought together by the GPA’s 
Director General.
Support for the Global AIDS Strategy came predominantly from official 
development assistance (ODA), which transfers funds from the industrialised donor 
countries to international agencies, governmental and non-governmental ADDS 
programmes in developing countries. Official Development assistance is defined as 
“aid administered with the promotion of economic development and welfare as the 
main objective; it is concessional in character and contains a grant of at least 25%” 
(Laws; 1996: 375). The table below shows contributions to the Global AIDS 
Strategy from 1986 to 1993, the only years for which full sets of figures are 
available. ‘Bilateral’ funding refers to direct grants from a donor agency to a 
government project or programme. Multi-lateral funding refers to undesignated 
funding to an international agency. During this period, the majority of multi-lateral 
funding for AIDS interventions was paid to the WHO/GPA. Multi-bilateral
35 UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO, World Bank and the EC
139
funding refers to money spent to an international organisation for designated 
projects.
After a rapid rise from 1897 to 1990, funding began to decline. Though the figures 
for 1993 appear to rise again, this increase is attributable to the fact that because of 
the time the survey was done they include multiple-year grants extending beyond 
the end of 1993. Elsewhere this has been adjusted for (Laws, 1996).
Table 5.1: Total Contributions to the Global AIDS Strategy 1986- 
1993 ($US million)
Channel 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
Bilateral 0.11 15.3 39.40 64.8 98.9 125.01 129.8 146.49 619.81
Multilat/bilat 13.21 30.69 30.16 31.58 23.53 26.69 31.11 186.97
Multilateral 30.26 63.42 65.58 81.73 75.0 75.5 76.69 471.18
Total 0.11 58.77 133.51 160.54 212.21 223.54 231.99 257.29 1,277.96
Note: Figures for 1993 provisional as of August 1995. These amounts include multiple-year 
grants extending beyond 1993.
Source: Laws, 1996
After the endorsement of the Global AIDS Strategy in 1987, the WHO/GPA grew 
rapidly. By November 1988, the GPA was actively collaborating with 140 
countries to form national AIDS programmes (WHO, 1988c). Within two years, it 
was the largest programme in the WHO, an unprecedented growth rate within the 
organisation (WHO, 1996: 2). The number of WHO/GPA staff grew from just two 
in 1986 to 400 in early 1990 and financial resources at GPA’s disposal increased 
from USS1 million to over US$80 million in 1990 (WHO, 1996: 2).
Although nominally a global strategy, the GPA’s express priority was giving advice 
and technical assistance to countries with limited financial and technical resources. 
“Assistance was especially provided to countries requesting help in carrying out
36 WHO/GPA/DIR/88.7; 1988: 11
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rapid assessments of the epidemiology of HTV in their national setting to and to 
improve diagnostic, laboratory and blood screening capacity” (WHO, 1997: 3). 
The WHO had acknowledged expertise within this technical realm and provided 
much needed resources and experience.
In parallel with this technical assistance, between 1987 and 1989 the GPA 
concentrated on getting basic technical information to as broad a range as possible 
to scientists, public health officials and policy-makers (WHO, 1987). Here too, the 
emphasis was on the redistribution of knowledge from North to South. Basic 
information which was “freely available in industrial countries” should be made 
accessible to low income countries (WHO, 1987: 54). In January 1988, the GPA 
launched the World AIDS Series with the aim of providing “state-of-the art 
information to all” (ibid). They produced materials for the general public as well 
as technical resources such as manuals and protocols.
At the same time, WHO continued its international forums, which aimed to help 
the co-ordination of AIDS interventions worldwide. World AIDS Days and AIDS 
summits were the most high-profile of these efforts, but the WHO also organised 
international conferences and meetings between private pharmaceutical companies 
and non-government organisations.
WHO has described the period between 1987 and 1993 as the ‘institutionalization’ 
phase of the international response to HIV/AIDS (WHO, 1997). Not only was the 
GPA was integrated into the administrative structure of WHO and established an 
extensive programme of assistance to (mostly low-income) member states. The 
unprecedented in-flow of donor resources to WHO/GPA supported a much more 
direct managerial involvement in low-income countries. The National AIDS 
Programme Support (NPS) section was established to promote and support 
national governments to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate “strong and 
comprehensive national AIDS programme, in conformity with the global strategy 
for the prevention and control of AIDS” (WHO, 1988c: 5). WHO established 
National AIDS Control Programmes (NACPs) within Ministries of Health to 
“develop policies, identify strategies and co-ordinate national activities” (WHO,
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1988c: 5). In many cases, the start-up costs of these NACPs were funded directly 
by the WHO/GPA itself, who also provided staff. Three WHO staff were normally 
appointed: a technical officer, who was responsible for managing the programme, 
an information and education expert and an epidemiologist. These staff took on a 
direct and active role in administering and implementing AIDS interventions in 
low-income countries.
Summary
Britain and Zambia’s responses to HIV/AIDS in the early years of the epidemic 
were broadly comparable. In both countries, small groups of doctors noticed 
unusual cases, initiated small research programmes and exchanged information 
internationally with their peers. Alongside this, small interest groups began 
launching initiatives by or on behalf of people affected by HIV/AIDS. Together, 
these groups pressured governments into organising formal responses to 
HTV/AIDS. Both countries launched AIDS information campaigns in early 1987, 
before the Global AIDS Strategy was endorsed. The only significant difference 
was in the relationship between these interest groups and government and the 
international community. In Britain, AIDS interest groups retained some form of 
‘outsider’ lobbying role on government, alongside closer collaborative work with 
government agencies. In Zambia, AIDS organisations at this time were all 
essentially ‘insider’ groups. Though the individuals who started them may have 
differed with government on the significance of the problem, from the start they 
operated within a government framework, effectively providing health services. 
They were also more dependent on funding from external bodies such as Norad. 
The WHO did not play a veiy significant part during the early stages of these 
responses. In both countries, support such as it was came from interested 
individuals such as the SPA director Jonathan Mann and the Zambia representative 
Eric van Praag.
From late 1986 the WHO began to take a more active role in disseminating 
information about HTV/AIDS and generating a consensus greater consensus about 
appropriate responses to it. The WHO/GPA had four effects at this stage of the
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epidemic. In the first place, it used epidemiological evidence to establish the view 
that HIV/AIDS was a serious, trans-national problem, rather than being the 
parochial concern of some ‘high-risk’ groups. In the second place, it amplified 
existing pressure from national interest groups. Thirdly, it helped to mobilise 
international aid funding. Finally, it provided a bureaucratic space from which to 
launch international interventions.
During this period, the greatest impact of the WHO appears to have been the 
influence of persuasive ideas. The strategy had no coercive effect and its economic 
impact at this stage was limited. The Strategy embodied a liberal-medical way of 
conceptualising a problem that stressed its significance while presenting a set of 
solutions to minimise its effects.
Expert opinion from a number of other countries was used to formulate these 
policies and information was being disseminated through conferences and 
international journals. But by modelling itself as the key international body with 
the expertise and infrastructure to tackle HTV/AIDS, the GPA became an 
important vehicle for explaining and justifying policy innovations. International 
epidemiological evidence collected and disseminated by the WHO, combined with 
their clear policy statements, became part of the arsenal used by senior health 
professionals’ to explain, justify and develop policy.
There is some evidence that the more international the work of the relevant health 
professional became, the less they were guided by national-level pressures for 
punitive approaches to HIV/AIDS. One former GPA worker explained “The 
attacks I heard most often were n o t... about it being too liberal. Because these are 
the circles of sort of over-educated international bureaucrats ... the debate was in a 
liberal paradigm... only the most radical dissidents talked about things outside those 
parameters.”37 Policies were developed according to a liberal, public health 
attitude to disease, which ultimately gave individuals responsibility for containing 
risk.
37 Interview with Director of the HIV/AIDS Alliance.
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However, while the ideas and values of these bureaucrats were undoubtedly 
influential, it was the fact that they operated within an organisational framework 
that had the means to launch policy initiatives, that ultimately directed funding 
towards them in the early years of the international response.
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Chapter six 
Organising and implementing the ‘global9 strategy
Introduction
The previous chapter analysed the agenda-setting and formulation stages of 
HTV/AIDS policies and the evolution of the Global AIDS Strategy from the 
working papers of a small sub-division of WHO to the focus of a significant 
transfer of donor funding from North to South. This chapter discusses the 
WHO/GPA’s impact upon AIDS policy development from 1989 to 1995, when the 
GPA was closed down. Until 1989, responses to HIV/AIDS and the relationship 
between national organisations and the WHO/GPA were broadly comparable, 
albeit on different scales. Local doctors and non-government groups campaigned 
to draw attention to the emerging problem. Staff at the WHO/GPA supported 
their lobbying to government and provided technical support and authoritative 
information about specific issues surrounding HTV/AIDS. From 1989, however, 
when the very considerable resources generated by the WHO/GPA began to be 
channelled directly into AIDS interventions, these relationships quickly diverged, a 
trend that was in large part a reflection of the countries’ different status as funder 
and fundee of WHO programmes.
This chapter is divided into two main sections covering the development 
HTV/AIDS policies in Britain and Zambia respectively. Each analyses the main 
development in HTV/AIDS policies over the period, before addressing the three 
research questions; to what extent were the objectives of the Strategy achieved, in 
what ways did the WHO/GPA’s Strategy impact upon national AIDS policies; and 
what were the main factors that influenced this impact?
British HTV/AIDS policies had two distinct dimensions, domestic and international. 
Domestic policies, relating to the prevention of HTV infection and treatment and 
services for UK residents affected by AIDS, were largely developed by the 
Department of Health, though other government departments including the Home 
Office and the Ministry of Education were also affected by AIDS issues.
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International AIDS policies were largely the responsibility of the Overseas 
Development Agency (ODA), and were predominantly concerned with controlling 
HIV infection in developing countries.
Without having a central National AIDS Programme, the British government 
launched a strong, if somewhat inconsistent response to AIDS. The medical/public 
health core of the AIDS issue network gradually consolidated a central power to 
define policy, launching relatively well-funded interventions that reflected medical 
preferences. There were, however, challenges to the dominant, public health 
approach to AIDS, particularly in non-health policy areas such as the prison service 
and education. The WHO/GPA’s influence over the development o f domestic 
policy was relatively limited, confined to advice, technical support and consensus- 
building through its international meetings and conferences. It had a more 
significant impact upon the way that Britain spent its overseas aid, though this 
influence declined over time.
In Zambia, the WHO/GPA had a more direct influence on policy development. In 
1989, the WHO/GPA began funding, and administering a ‘National’ AIDS 
programme. Its staff managed the programme and its offices were housed in the 
Zambian WHO headquarters. The early, largely indigenous organisational 
responses became institutionalised within this WHO/GPA umbrella programme and 
became increasingly dependent on donor funding. Over time, however, various 
factors served to undermine AIDS interventions. In 1991, a government less 
sympathetic to the liberal premises enshrined in the National ADDS Programme was 
voted into power. Internal and external factors led to a decline in donor funding to 
the AIDS programme and the AIDS programme began to falter.
I. The development of AIDS policies in Britain.
A. Policy development: normalisation and bureaucradsation
The previous chapter discussed the early ‘war-time’ responses to HIV/AIDS, as a 
relatively diverse issue network of ‘AIDS missionaries’ launched ad hoc responses 
and campaigned to develop a liberal consensus around the issue. These early
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responses were largely voluntaristic in nature, catalysed by committed individuals. 
From 1987, however, there began a gradual process o f what Berridge (1996) has 
termed the “normalisation... professionalisation and institutionalisation” (Berridge, 
1996: 155). of the issue. HTV/AIDS became to be seen less as an emergency 
epidemic and more as chronic illness which affected relatively small sections of the 
population. In the process, the AIDS issue network settled into relatively distinct 
‘inner’ and ‘outer’ circles. The central core of medics, public health experts and 
politicians -  the traditional members of Britain’s health policy community -  
consolidated a central power to define policy. AIDS policy development during 
this time reflects most clearly the preferences of this group.
A number of factors assisted the gradual ‘normalisation’ o f HIV/AIDS as a policy 
issue. The first was the Cox report published in 1989, which revised existing 
projections of HTV prevalence downwards, from 10,000 new cases in 1992 to 
2,000 -  5,000 (HMSO, 1989). Effectively, the report removed the threat of an 
immediate heterosexual epidemic. Bio-medical advances also helped to redefine 
AIDS within a ‘chronic disease’ model, rather than an emergency epidemic. In 
1987, the UK granted approval for the use of azidothymidine (AZT) as a palliative 
medicine. The average life expectancy for people with AIDS was being prolonged, 
if only relatively briefly, but it provided hope for longer-term remedies. People 
with the HTV virus, medics and AIDS activists alike embraced the idea that AIDS 
was not necessarily the decisive fatal disease it had seemed.
As AIDS became ‘normalised’, it was became increasingly institutionalised within 
NHS structures. Increased funding saw a rapid expansion of paid posts in health 
authorities. The AIDS Unit in the DHSS grew quickly, and by early 1987 had 34 
full-time staff. The Expert Advisory Group on AIDS (EAGA) which had been 
dominated by a relatively small group o f ‘AIDS missionaries’, became more heavily 
represented by civil servants and its proactive and defining role in policy 
development began to decline (see Berridge, 1996: Chapter Eight). Within 
government, official committees proliferated. Soon, seven other official advisory 
groupings were supplying guidance on AIDS-related issues such as its impact on 
the NHS and HIV/AIDS and drug misuse. At the end of 1987, EAGA’s small
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central group was nearly doubled in size and its numerous sub-groups reorganised 
into just four core issues: monitoring and surveillance, blood-screening, psychiatry 
and health care workers.
Outside government, what had been fairly ad hoc funding became regularised 
within a framework of grants to health and local authorities. AIDS organisations 
and services proliferated, and so too did costs. In 1987-88, £25.1 million was 
spent on AIDS-related health services. By 1990-91, this had risen to $125 million 
(Berridge, 1996: 166). Funding began to be targeted direct to local authorities, 
mainly for services such as specialist social work posts and home-based care to 
people with AIDS. Increasingly, service responses shifted away from the specialist 
towards dominant models of service provision. Throughout the late ‘80s and early 
‘90s, for example, AIDS policies began shifting treatment and services away from 
hospitals towards home-based care. This shift towards community care was very 
much in-line with the departmental agenda for other vulnerable groups including 
drug-users and the mentally ill. It was seen as more cost-effective than hospital- 
based interventions, and more patient-friendly. Health, housing and social services 
were being more closely integrated with a view to keeping patients at home, rather 
than hospital. In 1990, these trends were formalised by the Community Care Act. 
AIDS had moved from being a specialist issue, to one that could be tackled within 
dominant policy models (see Berridge, 1996: Chapter Seven).
The gradual ‘normalisation’ and ‘institutionalisation’ of AIDS was equally apparent 
in health education and research as well as the non-government sector. The MRC 
integrated its AIDS research into its normal funding mechanisms. The Health 
Education Authority (HEA) moved away from high profile, mass media AIDS 
awareness campaigns into more wide-ranging community-based education. During 
the late 1980s, AIDS education had been vertical programme within the HEA that 
absorbed £10 million out of the Health Education’s £24 million budget (Berridge, 
1996: 201). By 1989, this was seen as disproportionate to the scale o f the problem 
and AIDS education was reorganised into a more broad-ranging sexual health 
programme. Though funding remained high, it was spread horizontally and could 
be used for other programmes. Voluntary organisations were also rapidly
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institutionalised. In the early 1990s, nearly 80% of overall funding for AIDS 
organisations came from statutory sources (Berridge, 1996: 176). Generalist 
organisations such as the Citizens Advice Bureau and Dr. Bamardo’s began to 
provide AIDS-related services in addition to the first, specialist NGOs.
As AIDS became institutionalised within the health service, the relative influence of 
non-government groups began to decline. During the early emergency responses, 
AIDS missionaries had value to senior-policy in their unique insight into and 
experience of the emerging problem. By the late eighties, however, their 
comparative advantage was being eroded, as the government were becoming more 
directly involved with HIV/AIDS service provision. Though organisations like the 
THT, Landmark and the Lighthouse Trust continued to receive funding from 
government, they increasingly found themselves sidelined from important policy 
decisions.1 In part, this was due to internal organisational problems. The THT, for 
example, found the leap from a small, gay pressure group to a major service 
provider created ideological and personality clashes (see Berridge, 1996). Yet 
while it was conceded that the government had some legitimate doubts about 
pouring funds into small, untested organisations, it was also thought that civil 
servants had revealed a deep-seated anxiety about channelling substantial funding 
into gay-based organisations.2
Instead, AIDS policy development from the late eighties appears to confirm the 
centrality of medical interests in British health policy. The resolutions of two 
contentious issues -  that of anonymous screening and that of infected health 
workers -  are used as illustration. For Berridge (1996: 213), the issue of 
anonymous screening is a “case study in the power of public-health interests, in 
alliance with sympathetic politicians, to define what were considered to be 
appropriate measures to examine the epidemic.” In 1987, the Social Services 
Committee on HTV/AIDS firmly rejected the use of anonymous screening as an 
epidemiological tool in favour of voluntary named testing. The committee were
1 Taped interview with director of Terrence Higgins Trust.
2 Taped interview with director of Terrence Higgins Trust.
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sympathetic to AIDS missionary Professor Kennedy’s view that “screening must 
confer some benefit upon the patient, albeit indirectly, and also that testing will not 
provide the answers to the right questions” (HMSO, 1987: xi). They accepted 
arguments that anonymous testing was a crude tool by which to monitor 
prevalence in the general population and that it raised difficult questions about 
patients giving informed consent. There was also no political support for a course 
of action that could be seen as intrusive and unethical.
Soon, however, senior medics began to question this judgement. In 1988, a Public 
Health Laboratory Service report recommended that anonymous testing should be 
introduced. In The Lancet, a group of past and current presidents of the Royal 
College of Physicians supported the idea and though the Royal College of 
Midwives objected strongly to the moves on ethical grounds, the BMA also came 
out in favour of it. In 1988, Kenneth Clarke, the new Secretary of State for the 
recently independent Department of Health decided to over-rule the Social 
Services Committee decision and to introduce screening (Berridge, 1996: 212).
For Day and Klein (1989), no policy development so clearly reflected the value 
systems of the medical profession than the contentious issue of infected health 
workers. Late in 1985, EAGA set up a sub-group to look at the issue. The subject 
caused great debate, centring around whether doctors should be allowed to 
continue working, whether they should wear gloves and whether they should be 
allowed to conduct invasive techniques. Shortly afterwards, however, the News o f 
the World threatened to publish names of two infected workers. Doctors with HIV, 
it was argued, were knowingly risking the lives of patients. In some cases, their 
employees were aware of their status and were thus failing in their duty of care to 
the public. Given this failing, it was in the public interest to publicise doctors’ 
positive HTV status, so that patients could at least choose whether they wished to 
undergo invasive surgery. The CMO invited Jonathan Mann from the GPA to an 
emergency meeting to respond to this development.3 Subsequently, the 
Department of Health sought and won a permanent injunction against publication,
3 Interview with Senior Medical Officer, DoH.
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arguing that the risk to patients was negligible. The issue did not die down, 
however and continued to attract vituperative articles in the press. Both the BMA 
and EAGA set up committees to look into the issue and both advocated a 
voluntary code of practice that put the onus on the professionalism of workers. 
Infected workers should seek (specialist) advice on whether they posed a threat to 
their patients and make a professional judgement as to whether it was safe for them 
to continue working. Policy was formed on the balance of risks against individual 
rights, but the weighting of that balance was firmly on the side of doctors’ rights to 
continue practising rather than on patients’ rights.
Though medics retained a central power to define policy within the health sector, 
outside the sector, policies were less influenced by the liberal ‘consensus’ on 
HIV/AIDS. The prison service for example deflected Department of Health calls 
to allow condoms and/or clean syringes or sterilising equipment to be made 
available in prison. Their argument was that it would condone illegal behaviour. 
Homosexual sex, they argued, was illegal in a public place. Prisons were public 
and sex was therefore illegal. Equally, they refused to allow needle exchanges, 
despite the fact that they had been introduced outside prisons in 1989 which could 
equally be said to be condoning illegal behaviour. The prison health service was 
outside the National Health Service and came under the Home Office umbrella. 
Doctors did not have secure and regularised access within the policy process, and 
their influence was correspondingly weaker.
R  Achieving the aims
The Global AIDS Strategy had three core objectives: the prevention of HTV 
infection, reducing the personal and social impacts of AIDS and unifying national 
and international interventions. There was a remarkable consensus amongst the 
interviewees about the strengths and weaknesses of responses to HTV/AIDS in 
Britain. All the interviewees thought that Britain had organised a strong and well- 
resourced response to HTV/AIDS and that it had done well compared with other 
industrialised countries. Annual incidence of HTV in Britain was thought to have 
peaked as early as 1985 and with an HTV prevalence of only 0.087 per cent o f the 
population aged 15-49, Britain has a lower prevalence o f HTV than the US (0.514)
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and many of its European neighbours. Amongst others, France, Germany, 
Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Italy and Spain have higher rates of HIV prevalence 
(UNAIDS, 1996). The respondents agreed that the issue had been well publicised 
by the government and that there was a high level of awareness about the disease.
The only complaint about the government’s response in terms of controlling 
transmission of the HIV virus was that it had not dealt well with what one 
respondent termed the ‘chaotic fringe’.4 The approach was based on giving people 
information and encouraging them to minimise risky behaviours. In practice, 
however, people do not have equal capacity to control the degree of risk to which 
they exposed themselves. Prison inmates were officially denied access to condoms 
or clean syringes/sterilising equipment. More often, however, differences in the 
extent to which people could control risk depended on their material, political and 
human resources. The main body of the gay ‘community’, for example, were 
politically organised and relatively well-resourced politically and economically. 
They had therefore been effective in organising themselves to demand services, to 
exchange information and to modify risk behaviours.5 This was not the case of 
intravenous drug-users and, particularly, the homeless, including the mentally ill. 
These groups had found it relatively difficult to organise themselves either 
individually or collectively.
All the respondents agreed that, during the period in question, the government had 
provided a good range of services for people with AIDS. The issue had attracted 
an enviable pool of resources and, in the main, policy had been developed in a 
liberal and non-judgemental way that was in accordance with the overall aims of 
the Global AIDS Strategy. Public records support this unanimous consensus 
amongst the interviewees that the British government had been committed to 
HTV/AIDS and had channelled significant resources into the area. Ring-fenced 
budgets for HTV and ADDS interventions in each of the health authorities rose from 
£61.2 million in 1988/89 to £121 million in 1989/90 (HMSO, 1992). In terms of
4 Taped interview with director of the London Lighthouse.
5 Taped interview with director of the UK NGO Consortium for the Third World.
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research funding, the government spent a total of £129.4 million on HIV/AIDS 
research between 1989 and 1995, compared with £90.3 million on cancer and 
£43.9 million on heart disease over the same period (Hansard, 1996: 3/37). A 
survey of overseas development assistance to HTV/AIDS interventions puts Britain 
as the third largest individual donor, after the US and Sweden. Britain spent a total 
of SUS85.26 million in support of the Global AIDS Strategy between 1987 and 
1993, in addition to the contributions made, indirectly, through the European 
Union (Laws, 1996).
One of the ways in which the WHO/GPA determined that the social impact of 
HTV/AIDS could be ameliorated was to create a non-discriminatory legal 
framework. Though the UK has no specifically anti-discriminatory legislation with 
regard to HTV/AIDS, the interviewees praised the then government for having 
avoided the worst excesses of actively discriminatory legislation. It had no travel 
restrictions, HIV/AIDS was not a notifiable disease and testing was voluntary and 
anonymous. The establishment o f needle exchanges for intravenous drug-users 
was cited as an example of effective, liberal policy-making that had significantly 
helped the control of HTV.6 It was, however, considered a weakness that there 
was no effective anti-discriminatory legislation7 and Britain did introduce one piece 
of specifically discriminatory legislation. In 1985, various sections of the Public 
Health (Disease Control) Act were amended to include AIDS (WHO, 1994: Haigh 
and Harris, 1995). These provisions related to compulsory medical examination -  
if it was in either the person’s interest or that of their family -  and compulsory 
removal and detention to hospital if proper precautions to prevent spread could not 
or were not being taken. Two other sections concerned the handling of the bodies 
of people with AIDS. This legislation was not, however, regarded as a significant 
threat to people with AIDS. It has only been used once and was immediately 
rejected by the magistrate. It was regarded as a piece of ‘panic legislation’ from
6 Taped interview with director of Immunity.
7 Taped interview with directors of Terrence Higgins Trust and International HTV/AIDS Alliance.
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1985, which had no effective force and was designed only for the most extreme 
circumstances.8
Though the interviewees broadly approved o f the government’s approach to 
HTV/AIDS and discrimination, there were a number of criticisms about legislation 
during the period that was not directly to do with HTV/AIDS, but which made 
implementing HTV/AIDS control policies more difficult. For one of the 
interviewees, MP’s refusal to lower the age of consent for homosexuals to sixteen 
publicly condoned discrimination on the grounds of sexuality.9 In 1988, the 
Conservative government introduced the notorious Section 28 of the 1988 Local 
Government Act, which banned the ‘promotion’ of homosexuality by local 
authorities. For some of the interviewees, this circumscribed teachers’ ability to 
give a rounded AIDS education in schools.10
C  The WHO/GPA Strategy*s impact
The WHO/GPA had relatively limited direct or formal impact on British AIDS 
organisations. None of the representatives of domestic AIDS organisation 
interviewed felt bound by the terms of the Global AIDS Strategy, or regarded the 
WHO/GPA’s pronouncements as other than a useful source of information. It did, 
however, retain two areas of influence. The first was as a centre of discussion and 
information. Representatives from a broad range of AIDS organisations continued 
to attend its international conferences, to sit on its management committees and 
exchange information with its staff. Its second area of impact was in Britain’s 
international AIDS policy. The ODA channelled a significant proportion of its 
overseas spending on HTV/AIDS through WHO/GPA AIDS programmes, though 
spending through this channel declined over time. International NGOs used WHO 
conferences and the international endorsement of the Global AIDS Strategy as a 
source of political leverage against the governments of other countries.
8 Taped interview with director of Immunity.
9 Taped interviews with directors of Immunity and Terrence Higgins Trust
10 Taped interviews with Terrence Higgins Trust and Immunity.
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i. The WHO/GPA and domestic polices
After the initial ‘war-time’ response, when WHO/GPA staff played a key role in 
persuading policy-makers of the issue’s significance, its influence on HIV/AIDS 
policies within Britain began to decline. Signing the ‘Global’ Strategy was not 
seen as having an ultimately binding effect on policies. Given that Britain was a 
high-income country that had developed some expertise in HIV/AIDS policy, the 
GPA did not seek to establish a National AIDS Programme in Britain. British 
organisations regarded themselves, and were regarded by the WHO/GPA as 
competent to develop its own policies. None of the representatives of AIDS 
organisations interviewed regarded themselves as having been directly led or co­
ordinated by the WHO/GPA. Neither did it fund any British interventions. None 
of the interviewees consciously sought to design their programmes so as to be in 
alignment with the WHO/GPA, and representatives of the DoH, ODA and NGOs 
expressed surprise at the idea in interviews. Representatives of the DoH did not 
see themselves as being in anyway ‘led’ by the WHO/GPA. “We wished to align 
our policies with them... but certainly, there was absolutely no sense of getting 
their approval.” Elsewhere, it was said, “we weren’t trying to get anything from it 
[meetings with the GPA]. We were putting in. We saw ourselves and were 
received, I think, ... as very much in the lead on developing policy on HTV and 
AIDS”11
Similarly, domestic AIDS NGOs had a limited involvement with the WHO. WHA 
Resolution 42/8 acknowledged the role of NGOs in the struggle against ADDS. 
“The GPA’s Director’s office works closely with the WHO Programme for 
External Co-ordination (COR) on communication links for a full, active and regular 
dialogue between GPA and its external partners, to promote the involvement of 
non-governmental organisations in AIDS prevention and control activities and to 
ensure international co-ordination in conformity with the Global AIDS Strategy” 
(WHO/GPA, 1988: 6). Despite this, British NGOs had a limited contact with the
11 Taped interview with programme officer at the DoH.
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WHO. Other than some small grants for exchange programmes,12 the UK NGOs 
that provided services in Britain received no funding from WHO/GPA and did not 
regard them as being particularly relevant to them. The WHO/GPA and the Global 
AIDS Strategy were seen as being for low-income countries.
Though the direct and formal impact of the GPA on UK AIDS policies was 
limited, there was regular contact between staff at the GPA and AIDS 
organisations. Barbara Kelly, the chief civil servant involved with AIDS at the 
ODA became chair of the GPA management committee. So to did Donald 
Acheson, who was also on the executive board o f the WHO. Some of the original 
‘AIDS missionaries’ such as Tony Newton and Brian Gazzard were invited on 
WHO-fimded consultancies to low-income countries. DoH staff continued 
professional exchanges at the WHO/GPA head-quarters in Geneva. All the 
interviewees had been to international fora organised by the GPA and four 
regularly attended the six-monthly General Management Committee meetings.13 
These international conferences were seen as very important. At the time, 
“international co-operation was really the fifth arm of our strategy”.14 They were 
seen as important networking opportunities, “because there were a lot of people 
there who also see it as a key networking activity.”15
ii. The WHO/GPA and overseas policy
Though the WHO/GPA had a relatively limited contact with domestic AIDS 
organisations, both government and non-government, it had a more direct role in 
the allocation of Britain’s official development assistance. Between 1987 and 
1993, the Overseas Development Agency (ODA) channelled over 60 per cent of its 
HIV/AIDS funding directly through WHO/GPA programmes in undesignated
12 Taped interviews with representatives of the London Lighthouse, the UK Consortium for the 
Third World and the Terrence Higgins Trust.
13 Taped interviews with Directors of Immunity the UK Consortium; DoH staff member, ODA 
officer.
14 DoH former staff member
15 Taped interview with representative of UK NGO Consortium.
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funding. A further 12 per cent was for designated projects to be administered by 
the WHO/GPA The table below shows Britain’s overseas development assistance 
for AIDS interventions by funding channel. Here again however, the WHO/GPA’s 
influence declined ova* time. The GPA was seen as a short-term measure for 
distributing assistance, but in the longer term the ODA administered more and 
more of its aid programmes directly.
For the ODA, the emerging problem of HIV/AIDS highlighted the issue of whether . 
donor funding was best spent through the ‘bilateral’ agreements between donor 
and recipient governments or through multi-lateral agencies like the WHO/GPA.
In general, the perceived advantage of multi-lateral agencies is that they can 
provide expertise, broad access and some economies of scale. Their disadvantage, 
however, is that once donors give funding to them, they lose control over how 
their money is spent.16 A compromise is to give a multi-lateral agency ‘designated’ 
funding for a named project. This type of funding is termed multi/bi-lateral aid.
Table 6.1: Britain’s contributions in support of the Global AIDS 
Strategy (US$ million)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total
M ulti-lateral 5.19 8.22 7.27 8.47 8.27 7.83 8.4 53.65
M ulti-Bilateral 0 2.5 1.5 0 3.13 3.42 0 10.55
Bilateral 0 0 4.2 3.4 3.9 1.9 7.7617 21.16
Total 5.19 10.72 12.97 11.87 15.3 13.15 19.16 85.36
Source: Laws, 1996
The ODA regarded the WHO/GPA as having some “comparative advantage” over 
bilateral projects. In addition to their specialist knowledge, they had a pre-existing 
system of regional and national offices, and could thereby “get to places individual
16 Interview with former ODA programme director.
17 Estimate based upon figures supplied for fiscal year reported on in survey.
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donors may never reach.”18 Budget cuts during the 1980s had meant that the ODA 
had reduced the number of countries they gave money to directly and the 
WHO/GPA were a way of filling the gap. It was also thought that multilateral 
organisations enjoyed a more stable relationship with recipient countries. “Even 
when we’re talking to a recipient government, we’re only one donor. That 
relationship is an on-going one. They may like us one day and not the next.”19
Even within the realm of overseas development assistance, however, the ODA did 
not regard themselves as being led by WHO. Staff* described being aware of a 
trade-off between the comparative advantage offered by targeting funds through 
multi-lateral organisations and the inevitable consequence that they would have less 
direct influence over the way things were done. As time went on, staff at the ODA 
began to believe that the WHO/GPA were expanding into areas in which it had no 
‘comparative advantage’. As knowledge of HTV/AIDS expanded, a consensus 
emerged that vulnerability to HIV and AIDS was dependent on wider development 
issues, such as people’s general physical well-being, their education and freedom of 
choice. ODA staff objected to the way the GPA was moving into development 
areas such as human rights, gender issues and poverty alleviation that they felt 
were the concern of other UN agencies. This was perceived as inefficient; “it is far 
better to have fairly tight-knit organisations, which have a tight mandate. It’s 
dangerous to keep expanding the mandate.”20
The ODA tried to compensate for their lack of direct influence by making “impact 
at a number of levels from the top-down to field level.” One of their main 
objectives was to make sure that “the programme maintains its strategic focus, 
prioritised to represent value for money.” ODA staff would join the GPA’s 
appraisal or monitoring missions. Their field officers would go to co-ordinating 
meetings with UN agencies and generally take any opportunity to put the ODA
18 Taped interview with former ODA programme Director.
19 Taped interview with former ODA programme Director.
20 Taped interview with ODA programme Director.
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message across.21 ODA representatives tried to ensure that their bilateral 
programmes complemented existing programmes, but their aim was to augment 
perceived gaps in GPA programmes rather than allow themselves to be ‘co­
ordinated’ by WHO. Gradually, ODA funding via the WHO fell as a proportion of 
overall funding on HTV/AIDS interventions abroad. The WHO/GPA were seen as 
a short-term means of allocating funds quickly. In the longer term, they preferred 
the closer, bilateral arrangements that gave them maximum ‘control’ over 
spending. The WHO/GPA were seen as entering into non-health areas in which 
had no expertise.
This ambivalence about multi-lateral funding via the WHO/GPA was not particular 
to ODA staff. Donor representatives of other funding agencies were also 
suspicious not just of the WHO/GPA in particular but of multi-lateral funding in 
general. The figure below shows the breakdown of overall donor funding to the 
Global AIDS Strategy by funding channel. The proportion of undesignated 
funding via the WHO fell steadily over these six years, from over fifty per cent, to 
just over 30 per cent. This finding corroborates interview evidence from the ODA 
and funding agencies in Zambia, which suggests that the WHO/GPA was seen as a 
short-term means for establishing AIDS interventions quickly. In the longer term, 
donors preferred to fund bi-lateral projects, over which they had greater control 
and which were more tightly focused.
21 Taped interview with ODA programme Director.
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Not all the respondents, however, shared the ODA view that the WHO/GPA had 
expanded its remit too widely. The issue raised the most divergent views in what 
were otherwise a broadly consensual set of interviews. Overall, interviewees 
regarded the WHO/GPA’s liberal, public health approach as the ‘right way’ to deal 
with the issue, and it was thought that the international community, motivated by 
the WHO/GPA, had responded relatively quickly to a serious and complex 
problem. On the question of how broad the WHO/GPA’s remit should have been, 
however, ODA and NGO staffs opinion contrasted. All the NGO representatives 
expressed the view that the WHO/GPA had been too focused on health 
interventions and were slow in addressing wider issues such as poverty and human 
rights. “There was a reaction against huge, specialised AIDS programmes.”22 It 
was felt the GPA did not deal with small community groups effectively23 and that 
they were not addressing important issues such as education; “they were interested 
in amelioration, rather than anything to do with social change.”24
22 Taped interview with director of International HIV/AIDS Alliance.
23 Taped interview with directors of International HIV/AIDS Alliance and UK NGO Consortium.
24 Taped interview with director of the London Lighthouse.
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UK NGOs who worked in developing countries had more direct experience of the 
WHO/GPA yet here again they did not regard themselves as being in anyway led 
by them. Indeed, the chair of the UK NGO Consortium described her members as 
being “up in arms” about ultimately abortive attempts by WHO to try to direct 
their activities. They regarded their own operational experience of HTV/AIDS 
interventions and working with local-level organisations as in many ways superior 
to that of the WHO/GPA25 Essentially, they were seen as an inter-governmental 
organisation, that had a limited understanding and expertise in their own, non­
government arena. They were, however, perceived as having a technical expertise 
that would be useful to governments in low-income countries and, importantly, as a 
high-profile inter-governmental organisation, they could provide a platform for 
putting political pressure on governments. The British NGO movement, led by the 
UK AIDS Consortium, continued to lobby the WHO/GPA in various forums, 
seeing them as a “key path” to putting pressure on governments for policy reforms. 
NGOs took an organised and active role in lobbying the GPA, “Oh, endlessly. We 
did it all the time.”26 On one occasion, NGOs objected in a complete bloc to the 
GPA’s candidate for a GPA/NGO liaison position. Another candidate was found. 
In 1990, UK NGOs boycotted an NGO summit organised by the GPA in San 
Francisco, objecting to the US government’s stance on immigration for people with 
HIV/AIDS. “What people wanted to do was to change the entry restrictions. But 
at that point, the key path for doing that was seen to be GPA.”27 This lobbying 
was thought to have a knock-on effect. The following year, the GPA itself 
boycotted an international conference on AIDS hosted by the Thai government, 
which itself had travel restrictions, a blow to the success of the conference and to 
the diplomatic standing of the Thai government.
D. The key determinants of the WHO/GPA Strategy9s influence
Various factors constrained the WHO/GPA Strategy’s influence over policy
development. The first was policy timing. By the time the WHO Strategy was
25 Interviews with directors of International HIV/AIDS Alliance and UK NGO Consortium.
26 Interview with Director of UK NGO AIDS Consortium.
27 Interview with Director of UK NGO AIDS Consortium.
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operational, Britain had already felt the impact of HIV/AIDS and had begun to 
evolve its own policies. Department of Health representatives were clear that they 
were contributing to the WHO/GPA’s understanding of the problem, rather than 
gaining from it. Related to this, was the relative difference in resources between 
the WHO/GPA and the Department of Health. Until 1989, the WHO/GPA was a 
relatively small department within WHO. Its main activities were pooling and 
disseminating extant research and forming work groups to look into specific policy 
areas. In comparison, the DoH had considerable resources to develop its own 
policies and an elaborate institutional infrastructure with which to implement them. 
Even after 1989, Britain did not receive, or expect to receive, financial or technical 
support from the WHO/GPA; “though the programme was supposed to be global, 
in practice it was very much centred on developing countries”.28
A second determinant was the WHO/GPA’s lack of jurisdiction of policy making. 
One of the areas in which Britain diverged most dramatically from the ideals 
embodied in the Global AIDS Strategy was its legislation. Britain enacted some 
actively discriminatory legislation (pertaining to the compulsory detention of 
people infected by the HTV virus) and failed to develop specifically anti- 
discriminatory laws. The WHO/GPA had no jurisdiction over UK policies and 
could not compel it to change its legislation. Changes in statutory legislation were 
more affected by internal institutional and political policy constraints than Britain’s 
formal undertaking to establish a non-discriminatory legal framework. The failure 
to introduce anti-discriminatory legislation was partly influenced by Britain’s legal 
system, which has an historic reliance on case law. Drafting and endorsing primary 
legislation in Britain is difficult and time-consuming compared with other European 
countries, preferring things to be kept on a voluntary footing where possible. “So 
you could argue that though our policies and strategies follow the global 
programme, unlike some countries, many countries in fact, we didn’t enshrine them 
in legislation.”29 To illustrate the point, by 1994, Britain had made only eight 
separate statutory innovations relating to HTV/AIDS. France, however, had
28 Taped interview with Senior Medical Officer at the DoH.
29 Interview with Senior Medical Officer at the DoH
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eighty-one separate orders, circulars, decrees and notices including legislation that 
actively prohibited discrimination against people on the grounds of the HTV status 
(WHO, 1994b).
A more significant underlying constraint to creating an anti-discriminatory legal 
framework along the lines endorsed in the strategy, was an undercurrent of 
hostility to the liberal assumptions underpinning the public health approach to 
HIV/AIDS. ‘Section 28’ banning the ‘promotion of homosexuality’ by Local 
Authorities, for example, was introduced at a time when the DoH was actively 
trying to promote sex education, especially regarding homosexual sex. The 
development of HTV/AIDS policies in Britain involved an on-going tension 
between the cogency and urgency of the liberal ‘public health’ view of HIV/AIDS 
and its undoubted political sensitivity. The ‘public health’ view prevailed where 
medical experts had regular, institutionalised access to policy-makers. Retreats 
into conservatism occurred when policies where developed in those parts of 
government that had less sustained contact with these types of liberal/medical 
arguments such as the Home Office (supplying condoms to convicts and section 
28).
In chapter four, I discussed the way in which Britain’s health policy community 
was under assault from the Thatcher government for perceived inefficiencies 
brought upon by the dominance of health professionals within the health policy 
environment. Despite this assault, the long-term development of HIV/AIDS 
policies indicates that the medical/public health core of the AIDS issue network 
retained a central power to define policy, developing well-resourced services for 
people with HIV/AIDS that were based on liberal, public health principles. Over 
time, these services became less specialised in nature, and were increasingly 
institutionalised within existing paradigms of health care and social services.
The medical consensus on HTV/AIDS did not, however, extend throughout British 
policy and there is evidence of a clear break in the influence of this public health 
approach outside the health sector. The inconsistency in approach between 
different sectors indicates the influence of the policy community in the development
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of health policies. The liberal approach to AIDS was not a generic ‘medical’ or 
‘moral’ value, it was an argument put forward by specific sub-groups of public 
health bureaucrats and senior doctors who were closely involved in formulating 
government policy. Liberal policy choices were political and highly contested, they 
were not adopted because the government and public had been persuaded by 
international ‘epistemic’ liberal public health arguments in any general or 
permanent way. Many people in government, within civil society and in the health 
profession itself were resistant to the way AIDS policies were developed.
Health policy, however, was largely informed by the liberal-medical values of a 
relatively small number of senior health bureaucrats. Together, medics, 
bureaucrats and senior politicians were able to push through a series of liberal 
HTV/AIDS interventions in spite of political resistance. Interviewees from a wide 
cross-spectrum of AIDS organisations agreed that Britain’s response to AIDS had 
been generous in scale and liberal in approach, compared with both overall 
government policy of the time and other industrialised countries. The 
WHO/GPA’s most significant influence stemmed from its ability to support this 
community with advice, technical information and means of applying political 
pressure on the government.
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2. Zambia and the global programme
If, after 1989, the WHO/GPA’s relationship with British AIDS organisations was 
largely based on attendance at conferences, information-sharing, personal contacts 
and professional exchange, in Zambia the WHO/GPA took on a direct operational 
role, funding, administering and co-ordinating official responses to HIV/AIDS. 
This section of the chapter discusses the development of AIDS policy in Zambia 
from 1989 to 1995 when the GPA was disbanded. It discusses the establishment of 
the WHO/GPA AIDS programme and the creation of what I will term a ‘donor- 
dependent network’, an interdependent network of weakly-accountable 
government actors, health bureaucrats, donor agencies and large NGOs. Each of 
these groups had some ability to influence policy, but none had a decisive influence 
over its direction. The result was policy interventions that were relatively 
bureaucratic and ineffective. The consensus amongst interviewees was that Zambia 
had been relatively successful in organising a centralised, high profile AIDS 
programme. Where it had been less successful, however, was impacting upon rates 
of transmission and in attitudes towards HTV/AIDS.
A . Policy development
Up until 1989 doctors developed and co-ordinated Zambia’s government responses 
to HIV/AIDS. Prompted by the alarming results of the CDC teams sentinel testing 
in 1985, the government established an AIDS Surveillance Committee that met 
once a month and became the primary forum for a small group of medical AIDS 
‘missionaries’ to pool information about HTV/AIDS and to plan interventions, such 
as the 1987 poster campaign. As time went on, however, the donor community 
began to take a more active interest in low-income countries’ responses to 
HIV/AIDS. Late in 1988, a donor-initiated review of the Surveillance Committee 
criticised its medical-focus, and suggested that its membership should be expanded 
to include specialists from other disciplines such as social science and the law.30 
The review recommended that a specially formed secretariat should act as an AIDS 
steering committee, developing strategies and advising government on issues
30 Interview with former member of the AIDS Surveillance Committee.
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surrounding HIV/AIDS. The original Surveillance Committee was duly disbanded, 
but the multi-sectoral committee that was supposed to replace it was never 
established. “It was a bad time to be starting something new. Zambia was in 
difficulties. People were not on the committee full time and it was operationally 
difficult. The committee was never appointed.”31 Instead, in 1989 the WHO 
established a central AIDS programme in its offices in Lusaka. The ‘Zambian 
National AIDS Prevention and Control Programme’ (NAPCP) was initiated the 
WHO/GPA and funded by donors through bi-lateral grants and the GPA’s own 
sources of multi-lateral funding. Nominally under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Health, the government’s main contribution to the programme was to re-deploy 
Ministry of Health staff to the new programme.32 In a resource-poor policy 
context, the WHO/GPA-sponsored NAPCP became the focus of Zambian AIDS 
interventions. The circumstance of its creation, however, is still a source of 
rancour amongst some of the senior local doctors who duly lost their pro-active 
policy role. “The NAPCP took over the function of the National AIDS 
Surveillance Committee... Basically, they had all the money and they were 
organised. Our idea just fizzled out."33
In many ways, Zambia’s NAPCP was typical of the national AIDS programmes the 
GPA was establishing around the world and bore the strong imprint of the WHO. 
Even the name NAPCP was a generic title applied to all WHO’s AIDS 
programmes. The NAPCP had five programme areas. Programme Management; 
IEC and Counselling; Laboratory/Blood Transfusion; STD care, and 
Epidemiology. Thus, it reflected the WHO’s philosophy, organisational structure 
and technical expertise. Effectively it represented an administrative ‘ideal type’ of 
state-sponsored, liberal public health interventions. It had a central management 
base and provided technical support with which to monitor the epidemic’s 
development and to ensure a safe blood supply. Its information and education 
department operated on the liberal principle that the way to control the epidemic
31 Interview with former member of the AIDS Surveillance Committee.
32 Interview with NAPCP Technical Officer (programme manager).
33 Interview with former member of the AIDS Surveillance Committee.
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was to inform the public of health risks. It was then up to the individual to ensure 
that they took the appropriate steps to avoid infection. Staffing at the NAPCP was 
also strongly influenced by the WHO/GPA Three of the programme’s most 
senior, full-time executive staff were expatriates from WHO: an epidemiologist, an 
education and information specialist and a technical officer, who oversaw the day- 
to-day management and administration of the programme (Thuo, 1998: 31). These 
three categories of senior staff were typical of WHO/GPA national AIDS 
programmes throughout the developing world.
The programme did, however, also reflect indigenous developments in AIDS 
interventions and several of the original ‘AIDS missionaries’ began to work from 
within the NAPCP structure. Successive programme managers □ Dr. Himonga, 
Dr. Msiska and the current manager Dr Moses Sichone □ were all local doctors 
who moved over to the NAPCP from the Ministry of Health’s University Teaching 
Hospital. Alan Haworth’s counselling training for health professionals continued 
throughout the period and got funding directly from the WHO in Geneva. The 
training service was housed at the WHO offices and got funding, advice and 
administrative support from them. Though called NAPCP employees, Haworth 
and his colleagues, were not full-time and were paid for by the Ministry of Health 
(Thuo, 1998). The programme also differed from generic WHO/GPA programmes 
in that Zambia’s indigenous AIDS NGOs were brought in under the NAPCP 
umbrella and began getting funding via the WHO/GPA. The Family Health Trust 
expanded, providing AIDS education as well as clinical outreach services to people 
with AIDS. It still provides all official home-based care for the Lusaka-urban area 
and operates from the government-owned central hospital and the hospital 
automatically refers its HIV+ patients to the trust. Home-based care quickly 
became seen as one of Zambia’s most successful, indigenous responses to AIDS 
and was heavily promoted by the NAPCP. It was perceived to be an advantage to 
allow terminally ill patients to be with their families rather than alone in hospital. It 
also cost less than equivalent hospital treatment (NASTL, 1994a). Similar home 
based care services mushroomed throughout the country, and by 1993, there were 
52 such services run by either NGOs or the government (NASTL, 1994a). There 
were, however, on-going problems about funding these relatively expensive clinical
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out-reach initiatives. Though home-based care was cheaper than hospital, it still 
stretched Zambia’s limited health budget. By 1994 it was officially acknowledged 
that only 33 of these programmes were actually operational (NASTL, 1994a: 10). 
One government home based care team I visited in the large, rural district 
Mazabuka had no access to vehicles. The team of nursing staff could therefore 
only visit people within walking distance of their office.
Organisationally the NAPCP occupied a complex and ambiguous position. It was 
designed as a vertically integrated, specialist AIDS programme. Effectively, it 
represented an ensemble of donor-sponsored AIDS service providers, supported by 
government staff seconded to the programme. Officially, it came under the 
umbrella of the Ministry of Health but in practice, it operated largely independently 
of it. To some extent, the creation of a separate administrative space served to 
distance AIDS interventions from the state. Up until 1989, for example, 
multilateral funding for AIDS interventions were paid to the Zambian Ministry of 
Health via a WHO Imprest Account. In 1989, financial services were ‘streamlined’ 
by establishing a separate NAPCP bank account disbursed and administered by the 
WHO/GPA’s technical officer (Thuo, 1998). Zambia’s ‘national’ programme was 
funded by donors and had no clear mandate to develop government AIDS policies.
The WHO/GPA’s office in Zambia adopted a proactive approach to attracting and 
co-ordinating donor interventions. Just as on the international level the 
WHO/GPA seized the initiative in promoting HTV/AIDS as an issue, so did the 
GPA’s Lusaka office at the national level. The table below shows the donor funds 
that were mobilised by the WHO/GPA for the NAPCP, and indicates the speed 
with which funding flooded into an almost entirely new programme. The donations 
shown include both multi-lateral contributions (undesignated funding to the 
WHO/GPA) and multi-bilateral grants (ear-marked funding disbursed via the 
WHO/GPA. Given that the Government of Zambia’s entire budget for health was 
only around $6 million at this time (UNZA 1998), the vertical AIDS programme 
represented a significant new source of funding for health interventions.
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The rapid inflow of donor fluids is illustrative of the success with which the 
WHO/GPA had publicised the AIDS issue and galvanised responses to it. In part 
because of the WHO’s efforts on the international stage, donor agencies like 
Britain’s ODA had become sensitised to the problem of AIDS in developing 
countries. They were therefore willing to channel funding through a recognised 
programme that had been authorised by a respected international agency like the 
WHO. Similarly, the Norwegian development agency Norad originally channelled 
two-thirds of its funding for AIDS interventions through the NAPCP.34
Total funding to the programme, however, quickly began to fall. Part of the 
decline was due to factors that were external to the Zambian programme. During 
1991 there was a marked increase in HIV prevalence in South East Asian 
countries, and the WHO/GPA trust funds were being shared amongst a greater 
number of countries. The decrease in spending for 1992/3 partially reflects this 
sudden constraint on funding for AIDS interventions. In 1994-1995, contributions 
fell again. By this time, the closure of the GPA had already been announced, 
causing donors to delay funding while they waited to see how the AIDS
34 Interview with Norad health and population specialist, Lusaka.
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programme would develop.35 There was, therefore less money available to 
implement the programme as it was originally conceived.
However, declines in funding patterns were also the result of changes in policy at 
donor agency’s headquarters. The ODA’s Zambian office, for example, went some 
way towards developing a £1.5 million proposal for HTV/AIDS care, which was to 
last five years from 1994 and was designed to develop cost effective models of 
service delivery and strengthen district capacity to provide such services 
(GRZ/ODA, 1994). The programme was, however, cancelled shortly before it was 
due to start because of a change in the ODA’s policy on health interventions. In 
essence, the ODA decided that supporting sector-wide reform would be more 
beneficial to the country than a vertical programme, such as the proposed 
HIV/AIDS Health Care Programme.36
Bilateral agency’s funding policies were also influenced by changes in their 
relationship to successive governments. In 1991, the Movement for Multi-Party 
Democracy (MMD) were voted into power. The newly elected president, 
Frederick Chiluba, is a Christian fundamentalist, and declared the country a 
Christian state in 1993. In common with the increasing number of fundamentalist 
Christians in Zambia, Chiluba is thought to see AIDS as an essentially moral 
problem, a judgement from God for immoral behaviour. Chiluba has never gone 
officially ‘on-record’ as being against liberal AIDS interventions. During his time 
in office, however, the President has only made three public statements about 
ADDS. In the most recent, in June 1997, he said that what was needed was ‘a cure, 
not condoms’ {Times o f Zambia, 1998: 1). In more private forums, Chiluba has 
made it clear that he disapproves of the liberal assumption that AIDS should be 
prevented by promoting condoms, which he regards as tantamount to promoting 
carnal sin. In 1993, a director of Zambian national television authorised a 
transmission of a series of HTV/AIDS adverts that were broadcast three or four 
times a night. Chiluba denounced the campaign at an Evangelical meeting, asking
35 Interview with Norad representative, Lusaka.
36 Interview with DfID Health and Population Officer, Lusaka.
170
the congregation what was happening to Zambia when you could switch on the 
television and see this sort of campaign. Shortly afterwards, the director was 
sacked, only six weeks after taking on the post.37
There were also on-going doubts within the AIDS issue network about the 
effectiveness of a vertical AIDS programme that was not integrated with other 
health initiatives or with the activities of other ministries. In 1992, after lobbying 
from within the Ministry of Health, the national STD and leprosy programmes 
were integrated with the AIDS programme and NAPCP was renamed the National 
AIDS/STDs/TB and Leprosy programme (NASTL, 1994b: 2). In April 1993, a 
National Consensus Workshop on HIV/AIDS agreed that the AIDS programme 
was too medically focused and that the Second Medium Term Plan should develop 
a more multi-sectoral approach to HIV/AIDS (Thuo, 1998). Zambia’s official 
responses to AIDS had come almost exclusively from the Ministry of Health and 
NASTL, and no other ministry had developed any significant policies on 
HIV/AIDS. NASTL asked every ministry to appoint an AIDS ‘focal point person’ 
was then sent on a week long residential training course funded by NASTL 
(NASTL, 1994b). NASTL was to provide logistical and technical support to 
focal point people in order to stimulate broad-ranging AIDS policy interventions 
across the public sector.
The effect o f the initiative, however, was limited. In the first place, many of the 
appointed focal point people had a low status within their ministry and did not have 
the authority to make radical changes to policy.38 In the second place, the 
‘training’ had been rather didactic awareness training, rather than an attempt to 
stimulate creative responses to AIDS.39 Thus, once they returned to their work, 
AIDS focal point people tended to carry on doing what the NAPCP had been 
doing -  put up posters and distribute condoms within their ministries. They did not 
incorporate an AIDS dimension into their day-to-day activities, and the new ‘multi-
37 Taped interview with anonymous doctor at the University Teach Hospital, Lusaka.
38 Interview with former Minister.
39 Interview with project director within the NAPCP.
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sectoral’ approach never materialised. By the end of 1994, a US-sponsored 
consultant was seconded to NASTL to develop a more process-oriented approach 
to stimulating official responses. The aim was to work with focal point people to 
identify their ministry’s comparative advantage in terms of HTV/AIDS and to 
develop their own initiatives.40 Her appointment and approach created some 
tension with NASTL. The GPA were thought to be suspicious of what they 
regarded as a vague and unquantifiable intervention. By the end of 1995, however, 
14 of 95 ministries had begun to develop at least a draft AIDS strategy and some 
had begun to implement AIDS specific policies. In 1997, the Ministry of 
Communications and Transport, allowed condoms to be sold in Post Offices, which 
has helped distribute condoms more widely, especially in rural areas. The same 
year the Ministry of Science and Technology began an HIV/AIDS curriculum to 
run in parallel with vocational training.
Despite these slow advances, by 1994/1995 NASTL was in difficulties. By that 
time it was not only clear that the GPA were shutting down, but there was a 
consensus developing that the Zambian health sector required wholesale reform. 
Donors began withhold funding from the AIDS programme as they waited to see 
how the programme would develop. Other donors, like the ODA, began 
redirecting funds towards sector-wide health reforms and away from vertically 
integrated programmes like NASTL. Though still in operation, it had less funding 
than had been anticipated at its inception and its services were being stretched to 
the limit. Finally, at the end of 1995, the WHO/GPA was shut down. Staff 
continued to work at the NASTL offices, but morale was low and programmes 
curtailed.
R  Achieving the aims
There was a general consensus amongst the respondents that Zambia’s response to 
AIDS had been disappointing. Though the majority of the interviewees regarded 
the creation of the NAPCP as an useful step in that it created a high-profile 
administrative space from which to co-ordinate AIDS interventions, it had limited
40 Interview with former member of NAPCP staff
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success in achieving the overall objectives of the strategy: preventing the 
transmission of HIV, alleviating the personal and social impacts of HIV infection 
and AIDS and mobilising and unifying national and international efforts. The 
current estimate of adult prevalence of HTV in Zambia is 19.9 per cent, making it 
one of the worst affected countries in the world. Only Botswana and Zimbabwe 
are thought to have a higher prevalence of HTV (UNAIDS, 1996). Neighbouring 
Uganda has made substantial inroads into controlling the spread of the disease 
(UNAIDS, 1999). The table below shows the breakdown by district.
Table 6.2: Zambian Adult Prevalence Estimates of HIV by
Province, 1997 (Ages 15 and older)
Province Adult (%) Urban (%) Rural (%)
Central 20.8 29.8 16.7
Copperbelt 23.4 25.3 15.7
Eastern 14.7 31.7 12.7
Luapula 22.8 28.9 21.1
Lusaka 26.5 29.9 13.4
Northern 18.9 29.8 16.8
North Western 11 23.6 8.7
Southern 16.8 31.7 12.1
Western 17.5 24.5 16.1
Nat. Total. 19.9 27.9 14.8
Source: M inistry ofHealth/Central Board o f Health, 1997
There was a broad consensus amongst the interviewees that though the majority of 
people had heard of AIDS; this knowledge has not translated into changes in 
behaviour, a perception that is backed up by various Knowledge, Attitude, Practice 
and Belief (KAPB) studies (Chela, 1992; Malibata, 1994). In one survey, 35% of 
respondents had had a sexually-transmitted disease in the previous year and only 
34% reported using condoms, despite the fact that 99% were aware that AIDS was 
spread by sexual transmission (Gaisie, Cross and Nsemukila, 1993). Dry sex, which
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greatly increases the risk of vaginal or penile abrasions during sex, is widely 
practised in Zambia and significantly increases the risk of infection from HTV 
(Malibata, 1994. Similarly, the widespread practice of sexual cleansing, whereby a 
widow is ritually cleansed of her dead husband’s spirit by having sex with a close 
relative of her dead husband, represents a threat of infection if her husband died of 
a sexually-transmitted disease (Abrahamsen, 1997).
Zambia’s AIDS prevention interventions were predicated on the assumption that 
greater understanding of the disease would eventually lead to behaviour change. 
Like Britain, however, the weakness of the approach was that not everyone enjoys 
equal ability to control the degree of risk to which they are exposed. The range of 
choices available to people are constrained by the economic, social and political 
resources available to them and to power relations within their society. Women in 
Zambia are rarely able to refuse unsafe sex due to their subordinate position 
toward their husband or partner. Condoms are widely associated with prostitutes 
and a woman who requests their partner to use one is often assumed to be either 
promiscuous or accusing their husband of infidelity (Abrahamsen, 1997). Women 
who depend on men economically or for the social status they gain from being 
married, are reluctant to jeopardise their relationships by insisting on monogamy 
and/or the use of condoms during sex (Abrahamsen, 1997). Equally sex work or 
offering ‘sexual favours’ in return for gifts or services may be an integral part of 
poor womens’ survival strategies. As one NGO worker explained, women are 
often faced with the choice of having unsafe sex, thereby running the risk of dying 
in several years, or refusing it and face the more immediate threat of starving.
The second objective of the Strategy was to reduce the personal and social impacts 
of the disease. One of the clearest themes to emerge from the interviews was that 
Zambia’s response to AIDS had been bureaucratic and that there was nothing ‘on 
the ground’ for people affected by AIDS. There was an overwhelming consensus 
amongst the interviewees that the burden of care for people with AIDS has fallen 
on households and, increasingly, community-based organisations such as church 
groups. Within households, AIDS affects women disproportionately. Women 
have to care for the ill and develop survival strategies as household incomes fall
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(Abrahamsen, 1997). Given the lack of hospital places, in general people are left 
to die at home, often without the most basic facilities or palliative care. 
Discrimination against people with HTV/AIDS was widespread, sustaining denial of 
the problem.
Just under a quarter of the respondents regarded ‘red tape’ and obstructive 
bureaucracy as major obstacle to implementing eifective education campaigns and 
health services. Policy responses were ‘all on paper’, with little ‘on the ground’. 
Two explanations for this tendency emerged from the interviews. For the majority 
of local staff, the bureaucracy was symptomatic of a shortage of funds for the on­
going costs of AIDS interventions. Donors had created an administrative space to 
co-ordinate interventions, but had not given enough money to run services 
effectively. Attempts to alleviate the personal and social impact of HTV/AIDS 
were constrained by the shortage of resources for day-to-day care and treatment. 
Though there is a policy of treating people with AIDS-related illnesses, for 
example, in practice doctors are only able to treat the most common AIDS-related 
illnesses such as malaria and TB. Because of the shortage of resources for 
diagnostic tests, even at the central hospital, diagnoses are usually made by clinical 
observation.41 In rural areas, which are less accessible to both government and 
non-government health services, treatment is even harder to obtain. Shortage of 
funds had also affected the administration of the AIDS programme. Though the 
WHO/GPA set up a sentinel system that provides data for estimating the extent of 
HIV infection, financial constraints have meant that 1994 is the only year in which 
data is available from each of the sentinel sites (MoH, 1997). NASTL staff 
complained that though donors had offered to pay for the production of 
educational leaflets and posters, they had no money to actually disseminate the 
educational material in their possession. When I visited the NASTL, one side of 
the office was lined with fading boxes of posters that were waiting for funds to be 
released for their distribution. Both government and NGOs provide home-based 
care to people with AIDS, but services are focused in urban areas and can provide 
only limited support to primary care-givers.
41 Interview with medical specialist University Teaching Hospital, Lusaka.
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Other explanations for the bureaucratic and ineffective response focused around 
low-key but nonetheless effective resistance from Zambian officials. The majority 
of the representatives of AIDS organisations I interviewed shared the perception 
that influential members of the government were hostile to AIDS interventions. 
These representatives saw a clear distinction between the official Ministry of 
Health view -  that HIV/AIDS was a serious health and development problem -  and 
that of senior civil servants and members of government, who thought the problem 
was essentially a moral one. In Zambia’s somewhat tense political climate this has 
made many AIDS activists reluctant to be too proactive about AIDS interventions. 
In interviews, representatives of donor, government and NGO organisations said 
that they had been actively discouraged from promoting AIDS as an issue by 
members of government. It was also thought that many politicians, including 
Ministers of Health, had deliberately underplayed the issue, for fear of losing their 
jobs. This political hostility has been evident from the very earliest stages of AIDS 
and was thought to have significantly undermined indigenous and donor-funded 
AIDS interventions in the country.
The ‘bureaucratic’ and top-down criticisms were not just levelled at the official 
government responses. It also applied to the large, NASTL-sponsored NGOs. 
Staff from smaller NGOs and community-based organisations thought that the 
NGOs provided expensive, localised services in urban areas. In the first place, 
AIDS NGOs tended to congregate in the main urban areas to maintain close 
relationships with their funders. This had the effect of concentrating services in 
small areas, often actually duplicating services. Both Kara and the Family Health 
Trust offer counselling training in the Lusaka urban area, for example. Donor 
accounting procedures meant that NGOs had to recruit trained staff and divert its 
energy into putting in proposals. They maintained large, well-equipped offices, 
with support staff, and 24-hour security, all of which diverted resources away from 
their intended recipients. The director of one major NGO “[has] the feeling that 
the main beneficiaries of [the NGO] were the employees... I end up spending my 
time and effort keeping them employed and I’m not happy with the work they’re 
doing is making the impact it should. You end up with massive NGOs, you end up
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with administrators, cleaners, guards. The overheads. You wonder if the 
beneficiaries are getting the value out of it. I don’t see why I should be keeping 
these sixty people fed. If I was really convinced they were making a huge 
impact... But when I had just two others, we were doing more work.”
The same director was cynical about the motives of many of the more senior NGO 
staff. "There’s a group of professional NGO people who match the professional 
diplomat people, and to be honest some of them don’t care. They’re all 
accountants and auditors who are anxious to get rid of some of this money. It’s an 
industry. But the things is, a lot of the money doesn’t reach down.” It was also 
thought that donor’s accounting procedures favoured large NGOs against smaller 
community groups, who were rarely able to fulfil their administrative requirements. 
The director of one major NGO thought that part of the problem was that donor’s 
put a crudely conceived emphasis on ‘transparency’, only funding one-off, tangible 
projects such as expensive residential conferences and workshops. Obtaining 
money for on-going projects such as a series of non-residential seminars was 
almost impossible. He suspected that the problem was that donors found it 
administratively too difficult to monitor and co-ordinate many small projects, so 
instead focused on funding capital costs and training. This view was confirmed in 
interviews with staff from NASTL and UNICEF. Funding disparate community- 
based innovations was expensive and time-consuming and it was therefore 
preferable to fund a small number of core NGOs.
There was a consensus amongst the interviewees that discrimination against people 
with AIDS was widespread, despite the high prevalence of AIDS. In one survey, 
26% of the respondents believed people with ADDS should be isolated (Baggaley et 
al, 1994). In resolution WHA42.34, the government of Zambia undertook to 
avoid legal provisions that may impede the implementation of the strategy and to 
work in collaboration with non-governmental organisations to overcome 
discriminatory attitudes. Though Zambia has no legislation that specifically 
discriminates against people with AIDS, neither does it have legislation that
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spedfically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of their HIV status. All the 
interviewees from AIDS organisations accepted the WHO argument that 
discrimination against people with AIDS was unfair in itself and unhelpful in 
controlling the spread of the disease. Despite this, no case of unfair dismissal or 
discrimination has ever been brought before a court. Interviewees perceived the 
main obstacle to creating a less discriminatory environment to be the absence of 
clear anti-discriminatory legislation. Three interviewees from Civil Society 
Organisations said that this absence made it difficult for them to protect their 
members. A trade union representative said that they had little confidence that 
their cause would be supported if it were taken to a tribunal or court and they 
could not advice their members to risk the adverse publicity. A director of the 
patients’ organisation the Network of People Living With AIDS argued that people 
affected by HIV/AIDS are still unconfident that their rights would be protected by 
the courts. Despite the high levels of prevalence of AIDS, relatively few people 
have ‘gone public’ about their HTV status.
The problems surrounding issues of discrimination were compounded by the lack 
of accessible platforms to air issues surrounding discrimination. For the majority of 
the population, the official state legal system is inaccessible. State courts only 
operate in major urban areas, and are expensive and extremely slow. In the 
absence of specific, anti-discriminatory legislation, one lawyer I interviewed began 
to prepare a claim for compensation from an employer who had dismissed his 
HIV+ client on the grounds that the dismissal had contravened his client’s 
constitutional protection from discrimination on the grounds of social status. 
Sadly, however, the legal process took so long that the client died before the case 
came to court. In the absence of an accessible state legal system, the only legal 
forums effectively available to most Zambians are traditional and local courts, 
presided over by traditional leaders. Zambia has a two-tiered legal system of 
statutory, and customary and traditional law. Where there is no clear statutory law 
-  for example concerning non-discrimination and HTV/AIDS -  traditional leaders
42 In 1997, the Federation of Zambian Employers and the International Labour Organisation 
agreed a policy of non-discrimination in the workplace, though this is not legally enforceable.
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refer to customary laws when making judgements in local courts. Rulings at 
traditional courts have often worked counter to NAPCP policy of non­
discrimination against people with HIV/AIDS (Scott, 1998).
The final objective of the Global AIDS Strategy was to co-ordinate national and 
international efforts to control HTV/AIDS. In setting up the NAPCP, the 
WHO/GPA ensured that official national and international AIDS interventions 
were relatively closely integrated. The organisational structure of the NAPCP was 
such that all the AIDS organisations that fell within its umbrella were in regular 
contact with one and other. In interviews, all representatives of AIDS 
organisations had received some form of financial and technical support from the 
WHO/GPA. If they did not receive regular grants, NGOs received help with 
transport costs and sponsorship to attend conferences. Similarly, all had attended 
meetings and conferences organised by them. The WHO/GPA sponsored four 
main AIDS policy forums. Internally, ‘NAPCP’ staff met once a month for AIDS 
management meetings. The WHO also held quarterly meetings for UN agencies 
and bilateral donors at the WHO offices in Lusaka, which aimed to promote and 
co-ordinate donor AIDS interventions. Once a year, the NAPCP ran a National 
AIDS Conference, which was attended in the main by NAPCP staff, NGOs and 
donor agencies. From 1991, the NAPCP organised an annual meeting for 
provincial and district AIDS co-ordinators. Finally, there was a regularised 
exchange of staff between the organisations. NAPCP staff sat on the governing 
boards of the major NGOs such as the Family Health Trust, and Tasintha. In the 
case of Tasintha -  an NGO that provides support to sex workers -  the presence of 
an NAPCP staff-member on the board was a condition of donor funding.43 
Similarly, staff from donor organisations were seconded to the NAPCP. In 1994, 
the US-funded NGO the Moorhouse Project, for example, sponsored a consultant 
Robie Siamwiza to assist policy development within the AIDS programme. The 
WHO/GPA were also considered essential in brokering relationships between 
donors and NGOs. In many cases, donors funded NGOs via the AIDS
43 Interview with Director of Tasintha.
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programme. NAPCP support was also essential to get direct funding from donors. 
Without NAPCP, and hence WHO/GPA approval, donors would not fund NGOs.
By these means, donor agencies, Ministry of Health staff, the large AIDS NGOs 
and the WHO/GPA kept in regular contact. Within this group, there was a 
significant degree of consensus about the significance of AIDS as a policy issue 
and appropriate responses to it. All the representatives of these organisations 
approved of the general thrust of the NAPCP’s approach in interviews. They 
agreed that AIDS was a serious problem and that the best way of tackling it was 
through education programmes and adopting a policy of tolerance and non­
discrimination so as to bring the problem into the open.
Outside this core group of organisations, however, contacts with the NAPCP were 
more irregular. The forums, organised by the NAPCP and funded by donors, were 
attended by staff from the NAPCP, the MoH, donor agencies and NGOs. 
Meetings were not attended by community groups, religious organisations, unions 
or any other of Zambia’s indigenous civil society organisations (Thuo, 1998). 
Chiluba’s attitude to AIDS and the relatively poor performance of the multi­
sectoral initiative substantiate interviewees’ claims that the message about AIDS 
had ‘not got through’ to people outside this relatively small group of AIDS and/or 
development organisations.
A report produced by the Law Development Commission provides a vivid example 
of how inconsistently the liberal AIDS message has been integrated into policy­
making bodies outside a relatively small group of health and AIDS organisations. 
In 1997, the Law Development Commission was approached by an expatriate staff 
member of NASTL and asked to prepare a report on HIV/AIDS and the law. 
Zambia has no legislation that prevents discrimination one the grounds of HTV 
status, and no cases have been brought before the courts. The commission did not 
endorse the liberal line on AIDS, instead approaching the problem from the point 
of view of its threat to “the structure of families and society as a whole” (Law 
Development Commission, 1997: 1). It made a series of robust recommendations, 
which included “making fornication a felony or misdemeanour punishable by a term
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of imprisonment” (Law Development Commission, 1997; 8). Other 
recommendations were to make a negative testing for HTV an official requirement 
before people could get married and to make knowing transmission of HIV/AIDS a 
criminal offence. During an interview with the authors of the report, it became 
clear that they were unaware of NASTL’s liberal logic, and were surprised that 
programme staff had never got back to them about trying to develop their ideas.
Another example of how non-communication between the NAPCP and non-health 
groups is provided by its relationship with the traditional leadership. As discussed 
in chapter four, traditional leaders retain a significant degree of authority over 
communities, particularly in the rural areas that are difficult, if not impossible for 
government to access effectively. Just as importantly, however, they have 
influence on behaviours and values. In the first place, they are the custodians of 
social norms, customs and values. The issue of HTV/AIDS touches upon deeply- 
felt social values and beliefs, and traditional leaders have a considerable influence in 
the way people approach particular problems. Despite this, no consistent effort has 
been made to involve them in discussions about HTV/AIDS. A senior lawyer with 
a special interest in HTV/AIDS complained that traditional courts were routinely 
acting in discriminatory ways as well as condoning activities, such as sexual 
cleansing, which greatly increased peoples’ risk of infection. In an interview in 
1997, a district headman in Mazabuka province told me in an interview that he had 
only recently properly understood how AIDS was transmitted and that he had 
never been invited to any form of workshop on the subject. Once he had learned 
about the disease, he immediately banned sexual cleansing within his jurisdiction. 
Though traditional leaders have not been targeted for any education campaigns, 
traditional healers began being invited to AIDS training sessions from 1994. These 
conferences are effectively training sessions, teaching healers how to minimise their 
potential for transmitting HTV/AIDS. Healers are taught basic hygiene, how to 
improvise surgical gloves with plastic bags and what health practices they ought to 
avoid.44 They are not organised in such a way as to encourage dialogue between 
the formal and informal health sectors about how to promote behaviour changes.
44 Interview with Rodwell Vongo, Chairman of the Traditional Healers Association.
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C  The key determinants o f the WHO/GPA Strategy*s impact 
One of the most significant determinants of the WHO/GPA’s impact was its 
technical expertise. In a country that had relatively few resources for research and 
policy development, the WHO/GPA provided state-of the-art information about 
HIV/AIDS and expertise and equipment for surveillance, testing and ensuring a 
safe blood supply for transfusions. They also provided an organisational base for 
launching interventions. The WHO/GPA were able to exploit their relative 
expertise in the area, its perceived neutrality and the fact that they had established 
an operational base in Zambia to act as a mediator and funding conduit between 
donor agencies and government. At the quarterly meetings donor meetings, 
participants would try to reach some form of consensus about funding priorities 
and how to allocate resources. The meetings’ aim was to identify areas of priority 
need and for agencies to agree a complementary programme of support that was 
appropriate to each agency’s specialism and programmes.
Like Britain, one of the factors that limited the extent to which the Strategy’s aims 
were achieved was the tension between its liberal public health ideals and a more 
populist conservative morality. Senior politicians were reluctant to alienate their 
political supporters by seeming ‘soft’ on traditional Christian values. In Britain, 
however, the institutionalised position of the health policy community ensured that 
a relatively liberal approach to HTV/AIDS. ‘Retreats into conservatism’ occurred 
in relatively peripheral areas such as prisons. In Zambia, the organisational 
structure of AIDS interventions and the policy environment with which they were 
being implemented created a relatively bureaucratic and ineffective programme.
The effect of the WHO/GPA intervention in Zambia's policy environment led to 
HTV/AIDS policies being developed by what I will term a ‘donor-dependent 
network’, a heavily interdependent network of weakly-accountable state 
bureaucrats, donor agencies, members of government and large, service-providing 
NGOs. The relationship between these groups falls within the definition of policy 
network: a cluster or complex of organisations connected to each other by
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resource dependencies and distinguished from other clusters or complexes by 
breaks in the structure of resource dependencies (Benson, 1982).
The first feature of this network was that all members were weakly accountable to 
the Zambian population. Bilateral agencies are ultimately accountable to their 
electorates at home and have relatively weak and/or opaque systems of 
accountability to their developing country constituencies (Guijt, 1998). As an 
extra-budgetary programme, the WHO/GPA programme depended on bilateral 
donations. Its long-term success, or otherwise, depended on the extent to which it 
could convince donors of its effectiveness. The WHO/GPA were not, therefore, 
directly answerable to the Zambian taxpayer, who bore only the opportunity cost 
of ineffective donor spending. The Zambian and expatriate health bureaucrats who 
were charged with administering and implementing the programme, also had 
relatively little formal accountability to the electorate. The most directly 
accountable member of the network were the executive who could, in theory, be 
voted out of office should policies fail to perform.
The second feature of this network was that all the members were heavily 
interdependent. Boundaries between the various ‘national’ and ‘international’, 
‘government’ and ‘non-government’ groups were unclear. The NAPCP was 
designed and funded by the WHO/GPA. Its senior staff were all expatriates and it 
was housed in WHO offices. The government provided the support staff for the 
programme, but was not directly responsible for its operations. Similarly, formal 
NGO responses were heavily supported by the international community and were 
in many cases started by expatriates. At the same time, however, they worked 
closely with the government. These were not ‘outsider’ pressure groups. Instead, 
all the formal AIDS NGOs relied on government to provide staff. Their role was 
one of quasi-state service provision.
As an extra-budgetary programme of the WHO, the GPA was dependent on 
donors for funding. They had no long-term, reliable source of income and were 
reliant on being able to continue to persuade donors that they were an appropriate 
and useful channel for AIDS funding. They were also dependent on the Zambian
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government, which provided the staff for the NAPCP programme and dominated 
the bureaucratic and political environment within which the programme had to 
work. Equally, all of the organisations involved in the NAPCP were heavily 
dependent on donors. This was not a case of reorganising existing state services or 
stimulating local responses to HTV/AIDS. With a health budget of around six 
dollars US per person per year, the Ministry of Health had no resources to fund 
vertical AIDS programme as it was conceived by the WHO/GPA. The relatively 
expensive technical services provided by the NAPCP would have to rely on 
external funding.
The process o f allocating donor funding is however, a complex and political 
process. Variations in expenditures are an inevitable hazard in programmes that are 
dependent on external donor funding. A broad range of bilateral and multi-lateral 
agencies were involved jointly and separately in negotiations on AIDS spending, 
each one having their own priorities and agendas and each one ultimately 
accountable to their funding sources in the North. There is no clear hierarchy 
between these agencies. Any co-ordination of donor interventions is done in a 
voluntary and ultimately ad hoc basis. A wide range of factors influence decisions 
about the way in which scarce donor resources are allocated. Over time, individual 
agency’s country strategies and priorities are likely to change. Relations between 
government and donor agencies vary. Sometimes, factors external to individual 
programmes affect donor priorities. To this extent, unpredictability of donor 
funding is a predictable phenomenon. Zambia’s NAPCP, however, was designed 
in such a way as made it almost entirely dependent on donor funding.
The final feature of this network was that there was a clear break in the structure of 
resource dependencies between members and non-members. AIDS interventions in 
Zambia were clearly divided between those that came within the NAPCP umbrella 
and those that did not. Non-members had few formal opportunities to participate 
in policy-making and policy meetings were focused around the issue of co­
ordinating member strategies. Those non-government organisations that received 
donor funding and were included in the network played by the 'rules of the game'.
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They were sympathetic to the liberal public health approach upon which the 
programme was predicated and did not act as outsider pressure groups. Those 
groups that did not share these common principles were, such as traditional leaders 
and healers, were effectively excluded from the central core of policy-making.
AIDS policy, then, was developed by a relatively large group of interdependent 
organisations each of which had a limited ability to affect policy development. The 
measures that each group took to limit other group’s influence had the effect of 
making policies that were bureaucratic and ineffective. President Chiluba’s 
government did not sign the Global AIDS Strategy and does not appear to share its 
implicit values. As a state representative, his government may be held to have 
some form of moral duty to uphold the terms of international resolutions, but can 
not be compelled to. In common with all the UN agencies, the WHO operates on 
the principle of state sovereignty and the use of ‘moral suasion’ to influence state 
policies. The ‘donor-dependent’ network operated in such a way that there was 
little incentive for the new government to stop the programme, or to admit 
officially to reservations about it. The government was not funding the programme 
and its only contribution was to reallocate civil servants to the donor-sponsored 
programme. To refuse foreign-funded AIDS interventions would have prevented 
much-needed foreign currency from entering the country. Just as importantly, to 
have done so would have antagonised the donor community more generally, 
jeopardising future negotiations for debt relief and loans. The government would 
have been publicly out of step with the international consensus on an issue that is 
regarded as significant. What the government could do, however, was to limit the 
programme’s more controversial interventions by ensuring that ‘street level’ 
bureaucrats did not ‘over-publicise’ the issue.
Donors then found themselves funding interventions that were being quietly 
undermined by the government in power. Having paid for the establishment of an 
AIDS programme and an information unit, the programme was becoming non- 
operational. Ultimately, however, donors have limited control over the policy 
environment in which their money is spent. Despite the international community’s 
financial and technical resources, Chiluba’s actions demonstrate that senior
185
members o f the executive have leeway to adapt or undermine unwelcome 
interventions. In these circumstances, donors’ only real sanction is some form of 
‘exit’ from the policy arena. The most dramatic form of exit is to stop funding to a 
country completely or, more commonly, to stop funding particular projects and 
programmes. After the initial rush of funding, donor contributions to the Global 
AIDS Strategy internationally steadily declined, a reflection of donor doubts about 
the effectiveness of multilateral interventions on a long-term basis. Such an exit 
strategy was also adopted in Zambia. Norad, for example, has stopped 
contributing to the NAPCP while it waits to see how effective the health reforms 
are and whether the organisation survives the reshuffles.45 A less drastic form of 
exit was to by-pass the government and instead fund NGOs. Since 1992, for 
example, USAID has been funding an NGO called Society for Family Health (PSI) 
to do ‘social marketing’: marketing subsidised condoms. The NGO is officially a 
‘private sector partner’ to the government of Zambia but in practice, its 
relationship with government is strained. An attempt at formal collaboration with 
the government to produce a series of adverts promoting the acceptability of 
condoms was cancelled when the then Health Minister Katale Kalumba ruled that 
they were likely to promote a backlash from church groups and parliamentarians.46 
No formal collaboration has been attempted since. Short of ‘exiting’ the policy 
arena, donors also chose to retain control over the way their resources were used 
by ensuring that they were spent on ‘tangible’ interventions: capital costs, expert 
(expatriate) salaries, conferences and infrastructure (Atkinson, 1999). Rather than 
spending money on the day-to-day running costs of services, they chose to fund 
interventions where they can ‘see where the money’s going’. The result, however, 
was to further undermine the effectiveness of AIDS interventions, creating an 
under-funded organisational infrastructure.
The WHO/GPA were over-stretched and trying to stimulate official responses to 
HTV/AIDS programmes around the world. AIDS presented an extraordinary 
threat to world health and time was of the essence if its spread was to be
45 Interview with Health and Population officer, Norad.
46 Interview with PSI representative, Lusaka.
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contained. The speed with which national AIDS programmes were set up around 
the world meant that to some extent staff workers were compelled to adopt a 
‘cookie cutter’ approach to the programmes, setting up standardised organisations 
and procedures across a broad range of low-income countries.47 Establishing and 
funding a central bureaucratic space from which to monitor HIV/AIDS and to 
direct and co-ordinate interventions seemed like an essential and logical first step. 
In so doing, however, the WHO/GPA funded a programme that failed two of the 
basic preconditions for effective policy implementation (Hogwood and Gunn, 
1984: 199). Firstly, staff at the National AIDS Programme lacked the political 
authority to develop and implement the AIDS policies for which it was nominally 
responsible. The WHO/GPA did not have the mandate to develop government 
AIDS policies, their role was simply to manage and co-ordinate donor-fimded 
health services. Secondly, the WHO/GPA’s AIDS interventions required political 
and financial resources that could not be relied upon when the policy was launched.
47 Interview with a former staff member of the GPA
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Chapter seven:
Summary and conclusion: The Global AIDS Strategy and 
international policy co-ordination
Introduction
This chapter summarises the key points of the thesis, before discussing its implications 
for understanding international co-ordination and international policy interventions. 
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section summarises the arguments I 
have put forward and the main findings of the research. In the conclusion, I will 
discuss the contribution this research makes to understandings international co­
ordination.
1. Summary: The Global AIDS Strategy and the development of 
national policies
The Global AIDS Strategy provides a valuable opportunity to examine international 
co-ordination in a post-Cold War world. Endorsed in its full and final form the year 
the Berlin wall came down, it embodied a fusion of late 20th Century liberal ideals: 
Bretton Woods principles — in that it envisaged a UN organisation leading an 
international response to a world-wide problem — and a more recent re-emphasis on 
liberal pluralism and the significance of non-government groups in a democratic, 
effective polity.
The Strategy was, however, just a resolution and though expressed in bold terms, it 
had no legal force. In chapter one, I posed three questions: to what extent were the 
objectives of the Global AIDS Strategy achieved? In what ways did the WHO/GPA’s 
Global AIDS Strategy impact upon national AIDS policies and what were the main 
factors that influenced these answers? I then reviewed the main, macro-level 
approaches to understanding international relations, arguing that they provide a poor 
framework for understanding. The issue raises questions about the relative influence
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of different groups in the actual development of policies (as opposed to the 
declaration of intent); about the different form s of influence in international policy co­
ordination and, the extent to which low-income affects compliance with international 
agreements. Policy analysis provides a more promising framework for empirical 
investigation of trans-national influences on policies, but approaches such as Lee and 
Walt's (1995) study of international Family Planning interventions are weakened by 
their failure to examine policy development subsequent to apparently consensual 
international conferences. Without proper consideration of each phase of policy 
evolution, it remains impossible to establish whether international agreements have any 
real impact upon policy development or, if they do, how that effect was achieved.
In chapter two, I put forward a framework for understanding the influence of a trans­
national policy strategy. Given the ambiguity surrounding the issue of international 
policy co-ordination, there is a need for detailed, empirical observation of the political 
dynamics involved in generating an international consensus on policy issues and 
implementing agreed policies. In this thesis, policy analysis is used as a micro-level, 
descriptive theory to trace the development of HIV/AIDS policies, to account for the 
different groups involved in policy evolution and to explain how they sought to 
influence policy outcomes. Policy analysis approaches assume that various actors can 
influence policy developments, but that their abilities will be influenced by political and 
economic circumstances. ‘Top-down’ policy analysis has the advantage of a formal 
clarity that facilitates the careful analysis of policy evolution — this study is 
underpinned by top-down insights into the process of making and implementing policy. 
Such approaches can, however, be prescriptive and state-centric, assuming that (state) 
actors have sufficient autonomy to formulate and implement policies and that — with 
proper management — these policies will be a force for social good. They are 
correspondingly weak at explaining situations, like the Global AIDS Strategy, in which 
responsibility for formulating and implementing policy on a contentious issue falls 
between a number of different organisations with no clear hierarchy between them.
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The foremost account of international policy responses to HTV/AIDS tries to offset 
these perceived weaknesses by adopting an ahistorical ‘garbage can’ approach to 
analysing the policy process. International AIDS policy, the authors argue, developed 
relatively randomly as different international organisations competed to claim expertise 
in the emerging issue. The analysis, however, tends to underplay the extent to which 
historical factors influence the choices available to groups and their relative ability to 
negotiate outcomes. Neither does it adequately explore national-level negotiations, 
focusing instead on general trends in donor policies and organisational adaptation 
within international organisations. Society-centred approaches give a more 
comprehensive picture of negotiations at various stages of policy evolution and 
provide a methodological approach that ensures that the unintended, as well as 
intended consequences of policy are captured and analysed. The research design of 
this study incorporates some bottom-up research methods in its broad range of 
interviewees. Here again, however, the approach’s weakness lies in accounting for 
underlying structural inequalities between groups, which will impact upon the way 
policies develop.
Policy network theory provides analysts with a body of theory that avoids both the 
historical specificity and unpredictability of purely pluralist or society-centred 
approaches, and the determinism of either structural or state-centred approaches. In 
policy network theory, it is accepted that more than one group may influence policy 
outcomes, but that not all groups have equal ability to affect change. Some groups or 
sub-groups are able to act collectively, effectively to exclude other groups from the 
policy process. This ability varies over time and is affected by economic, 
organisational and ideological context — the policy arena or ‘environment’. These 
relationships will in turn affect policy outcomes. Thus, in this thesis it has been used 
as a meso-level, explanatory theory.
Various writers have acknowledged the potential significance of policy networks in the 
international policy arena, particularly in regard to low-income countries (Dolowitz
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and Marsh, 1998). Despite this, the theory has not been used for a detailed 
examination of networks in an international context. I therefore developed a 
framework for analysing the various groups involved in the implementation of the 
Global AIDS Strategy, from international organisations to grass-roots community 
groups.
In chapter three, I discussed the methodological implications of this research. One of 
the aims of this study is to look at how differences in income affected the relationship 
between national organisations and the international community. It is clear from the 
discussion of the previous chapters that these relationships are likely to be highly 
contextual. The Global AIDS Strategy was endorsed by every member of the UN and 
the huge differences in political and economic conditions of the signatories, combined 
with various weaknesses in the data available, would make a population-based survey 
unsound. I therefore adopted a case study approach, using Britain and Zambia as 
broadly illustrative of two ‘types’ of relationship with the WHO — that of donor and 
donee. The research was designed to explore the way the relationships evolved and 
how the WHO’s Global AIDS Strategy affected the development of AIDS policies.
In chapter four, I went on to explore the policy ‘environments’ in the case countries. I 
argued that the way in which Britain’s National Health Service was established had 
created an environment in which policy was decided by a relatively closed community 
of government bureaucrats and health professionals. Historically, British doctors have 
had relatively privileged access to decision-making bodies and significant influence 
over the way health policies have been developed (Smith, 1993). I also discussed the 
way in which this community was under deliberate attack from the Prime Minister at 
the time AIDS policy was being formulated. At the same period, Zambia was acutely 
impoverished and undergoing difficulties in its relationship with the international 
community upon which it was dependent for further loans, development assistance and 
debt relief. For historical and cultural reasons, political and economic power in the 
country was focused at the centre, in a weakly-accountable state apparatus. This
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acute shortage of resources and heavy dependence on donor funding and debt relief 
created an environment in which HIV/AIDS policies were developed and 
operationalised by a group of heavily inter-dependent, weakly-accountable national 
and international agencies.
In chapters five and six, I discussed the findings of the research. The Global AIDS 
Strategy’s influence had three, separate yet inter-related facets. In its most obvious 
sense, the Strategy was an internationally endorsed resolution, an international symbol 
of intention. The existence of this resolution had some, limited influence on policy 
development. Pressure groups reported using the fact that governments had signed 
the resolution to reinforce their arguments for liberal policies. Other things being 
equal, politicians are reluctant to appear isolated from the international community. 
UK Health Minister Virginia Bottomley’s change of heart over mandatory HTV 
testing, for example, took place after civil servants had warned her how embarrassing 
it could appear if Britain was to introduce them so soon after the London World 
Summit of Ministers of Health.
The resolution did not just occur in a vacuum, however. It only came about after an 
international exchange of ideas, information and knowledge of HIV/AIDS. This 
exchange took place through journal articles, international conferences and 
professional contacts. Much of it happened quite independently of any formal attempt 
to organise the problem internationally. The second element of the Global AIDS 
Strategy’s influence was to provide a way of organising this knowledge and 
reproducing it in useful, persuasive forms. The WHO became a mediator between 
governments on one hand and the AIDS issue network -  scientists, health 
professionals and NGOs -  on the other. They pooled information about HIV/AIDS 
and disseminated it in a way that would have relevance for governments. They 
processed information into relatively clear guidelines for governments to follow, 
making firm statements about international ‘best practice’. They organised and funded 
international conferences, bringing politicians into contact with experts in the field.
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Their staff ‘sold’ the problem to politicians and health bureaucrats in different 
countries. In so doing, they gave a new and complex problem a safe and familiar 
framework. Though serious, the HTV/AIDS problem was not unmanageable and by 
adopting clear trusted public health procedures, governments could control the 
situation. Just as importantly, governments could be seen to be doing so, both 
nationally and internationally. Much of WHO’s influence on policy came from its 
ability to develop an international consensus on the way to approach AIDS, an ability 
which was in turn dependent on the perception that it provided neutral, policy-relevant 
information. Effectively, what the WHO was doing was to make information about 
HIV/AIDS o f the political realm without being political.
This form of influence was particularly relevant in Britain. At the time AIDS was first 
identified in the UK, the NHS was under assault from government, perceived as being 
wasteful, expensive and unduly influenced by self-interested professional groups 
(Smith, 1993). At the same time, news of the 'gay epidemic' sparked fears amongst 
politicians, the public and health professionals alike and there was considerable 
pressure to adopt a stigmatising approach to those groups who were considered to be 
particularly at risk from AIDS or who were already HIV+. Despite this, health policy 
makers were able to develop an approach to HIV/AIDS that has been called a 
"triumph for a particular form of liberal consensus around AIDS, for traditional modes 
of health policy making which had long been heavily reliant on the power of the 
medical profession, but which Thatcherite reforms presumed to have overturned, for 
an elite rather than a populist view of what policy should be" (Berridge, 1996: 55). 
The WHO/GPA played a key role in helping to achieve this policy development by 
offering evidence about the scale of the problem nationally and internationally. It 
generated projections about the possible economic implications should state actors fail 
to act decisively to control the epidemic. Its staff collaborated with national AIDS 
activists to put pressure on governments. In so doing, it was able to support the 
health policy community in its endeavours to develop HTV/AIDS policies within a 
liberal public health framework.
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As Claude (1966) argued, UN bodies can be an important source of legitimate 
authority because governments perceive them as being important. In a sense, then, 
UN agencies in general and the WHO/GPA in particular have no genuinely 
independent funds, coercive authority, or formal jurisdiction in the countries within 
which they work. Their influence comes largely from their ability to generate 
confidence in their work and the support of their 'co-operating partners'. That 
confidence is, however, never static and unchanging. It changes over time and with 
changes in personnel. In Britain, the ODA's confidence in the organisation declined as 
it tried to broaden its ambit beyond that of public health. In Zambia, the new MMD 
government clearly had a different relationship with the WHO/GPA than Kaunda had 
done.
The final facet of the Global AIDS Strategy's influence was that, having generated 
interest in the HTV/AIDS problem, it could provide an organisational mechanism for 
the administration of overseas development assistance. It became a conduit for donor 
funding and the redistribution of financial, technical and human resources from North 
to South. UN resolution WHA40.26 authorised the establishment of the GPA, which 
then became an important funding body of AIDS interventions in developing countries. 
With incomparable expertise in the field and an established international infrastructure, 
the WHO/GPA became the main channel through which donors funded AIDS 
interventions. This funding element of the Strategy influenced Zambian AIDS policy 
most directly. The WHO/GPA funded a national ADDS programme, situated within its 
offices, paid for interventions and hosted policy co-ordination meetings between 
donors, government and UN agencies. However, Zambia’s externally-funded National 
AIDS Programme has had limited success at changing the behaviours associated with 
infection from the HIV vims. The programme created a centralised and bureaucratic 
administration that did not have the capacity to launch a full-scale governmental 
response yet, with few exceptions, has not been successful in galvanising support from 
the non-governmental sector. The services that are available to people with
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HTV/AIDS are patchy and localised and have been persistently undermined by 
resource shortages.
2. Conclusion
A. Implications for understanding international policy co-ordination
This research has implications for our understanding of international policy co­
ordination. Realist approaches contend that the state acts according to its long-term 
interests. The approach rests upon two assumptions, that *the state* can act as a 
unitary, purposeful actor and that it has clearly-defined, hierarchically ordered 
interests. Logically then, international resolutions are only meaningful in as much as 
they coincide with the state’s existing policy preferences. This research supports 
arguments that the state* is not a unitary actor, but a deeply divided ensemble of state 
agencies, each of which has different priorities, values and operational procedures. 
Furthermore, non-state groups can have a critical impact on the way in which state 
actors construct their interests. At the time the Global AIDS Strategy was signed it 
was not necessarily obvious that HIV/AIDS was a serious international problem, or 
that it should be tackled in according to the WHO's liberal public health values. In 
both Britain and Zambia, key state actors were actively hostile to liberal AIDS 
interventions. One of the more significant impacts of the WHO/GPA on policy 
development was to assemble evidence that managed to persuade state policy-makers 
that HTV/AIDS was a serious problem and that it was in the state's interests to address 
it before the problem became worse. By generating epidemiological evidence about its 
impact, and calculating the disease's potential economic impact, they shifted state 
actor's perceptions about the 'national interest'.
In addition to this form of technical persuasion, the WHO/GPA had another form of 
influence over the way state actors perceived their 'interests'. By using evidence to 
build an international consensus on HTV/AIDS and organising high-profile 
international fora, the WHO were able to generate a situation where diplomatic 
pressure could be put on state actors. State actors do not necessarily have a clearly
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ordered pre-existing set of interests. They have to balance short-term interests against 
longer-term ones, play off political gains with one group against losses with others. 
When, for example, UK Health Minister Virginia Bottomley voiced a preference for 
mandatory testing, DoH and WHO/GPA staff were able to use the London Summit of 
Ministers of Health as a lever to convince her that her idea would draw adverse policy 
to herself, her department and her country. Her short-term strategy for monitoring 
HIV transmission suddenly became less important than maintaining her department's 
international standing. However, the fact that such a stance would be considered 
outside the 'international' norm, was largely a product of the WHO/GPA's efforts at 
constructing a plausible conceptual approach to the issue and publicising the issue 
internationally.
The functionalist approach to understanding international relations assumes that policy 
co-ordination is an inevitable by-product of modernity. Increasing economic 
interdependency inevitably leads to policy convergence and international co-ordination 
is efficient in that it minimises the costs of policy development and reflects the way 
that organisations react to policy issues in an innately conservative way. Such 
approaches undoubtedly offer insight into the pressures driving increasing international 
policy co-ordination. HIV/AIDS provided policy-makers with a new and unexpected 
problem and the fact that WHO was pooling information about it, bringing experts 
together and publishing policy guidelines influenced the way different policy options 
were viewed. 'The WHO' approach to AIDS came with a package of solutions and a 
stamp of multi-lateral approval. Pursuing alternative approaches would necessarily be 
experimental, might involve policy-makers in greater development costs and could 
potentially isolate them from the international community.
Knowledge about HTV/AIDS was developed and disseminated by a genuinely 
international community of scientists, medics, pressure groups and health bureaucrats. 
This group falls within the definition of an 'epistemic' community, a “network of 
professionals with recognised expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
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authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area” 
(Haas, 1992: 3). The fact that AIDS was a new and poorly understood problem gave 
these, non-government actors room to influence policy development by virtue of their 
ability to put forward a plausible framework for understanding complex problems, 
helping states to identify their interests and proposing particular solutions (Haas, 
1992). Though some of the more high-profile AIDS activists came from pressure 
groups and NGOs, the most influential group within this community were undoubtedly 
medical by background. Liberal medics provided a respectable and overarching 
conceptual framework within which to organise ad hoc NGO responses to AIDS. 
Medical professionals comprised the most organised, politically acceptable and 
influential groups and had genuinely international communication mechanisms in place.
However, the research also indicates that the epistemic community's influence per se, 
was relatively limited. In Britain, liberal, public health approaches to AIDS prevention 
and control were only incorporated into policy in areas where liberal, public health 
bureaucrats had institutionalised access to the policy process. In other areas, such as 
Home Office policy on needle-exchanges in prison or the Ministry of Education's 
policies on sex education, Britain has pursued policies that run against the general 
trend of public health policy. Similarly, Zambian members of government have had a 
considerable influence over the direction of HTV/AIDS policies, despite the strong and 
committed interventions from the international community.
The AIDS 'epistemic community' were most influential when members were either an 
integral part of the policy process at the national level — such as the health policy 
community in Britain — or were already accepted as legitimate sources of authority 
and had organisational structures in place with which to lobby governments — such as 
the WHO. Moreover, their most dramatic influence was exerted over a relatively 
short period of time: a time of confusion and mounting panic about the disease. 
Bureaucrats were able to seize initiative in the short term by virtue of putting forward 
a sustained, persuasive argument to explain why certain policy options. In so doing,
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they managed to generate significant funding for AIDS interventions at home and 
abroad — at a time of state retrenchments in health and overseas development 
assistance. This influence was, however, relatively short term. In the longer-term, 
donor agencies began to revert to their more usual bilateral agreements with donor 
agencies and funding for AIDS interventions generally began to decline.
This history of the development of HTV/AIDS policy in Britain and Zambia reveals 
various examples of individuals or groups acting as autonomous agents to influence 
the direction of policy. In the early stages, the 'AIDS Missionaries' publicised and 
'sold' the problem to policy-makers. Government bureaucrats worked with 
WHO/GPA staff to put pressure on governments. President Chiluba quietly redirected 
policy away from the high-profile mass-media campaigns that were being advocated by 
the WHO. These acts of agency power were, however, relatively random and ad hoc, 
dependent on the initiative and skills of individuals. In the longer term, the relative 
influence of different groups in policy development was largely path dependent, a 
function of the extent to which group preferences were institutionalised within existing 
political and ideological frameworks.
Chapter two provided a discussion of 'agency' and 'structural' power, arguing that 
structural power resided in four separate, distinguishable but related structures: 
security; production; finance and knowledge. In this area of low-politics', the 
structures of finance and knowledge proved particularly important determinants of 
relative group influence. Much of the WHO/GPA's influence derived from the fact 
that it provided government agencies with knowledge and information that was 
regarded as authoritative. Its medico-liberal values 'fitted' within the dominant liberal 
ideology upon which the Bretton Woods system is based. It also had the 
organisational means to reproduce and disseminate its approach to HIV/AIDS 
effectively: an international administrative infrastructure and recognised authority in 
the area. This knowledge structure, however, was underpinned by its ability to 
generate income from the international community. Conversely the Zambian state's
198
dependence on donor community compromised its autonomy to directly reject the 
WHO's policy initiatives.
It is also apparent that shared ideas and values at the international level generate very 
different sets of policy solutions once transposed into different policy environments. 
The resource asymmetries in the contemporary global political economy make for a 
two-tier set of relations with international organisations. The Global AIDS Strategy 
was nominally just that, a ‘global’ strategy. In practice, neither the WHO nor 
organisations in industrialised countries regarded WHO’s assistance as necessary in 
developing HTV/AIDS policies in high-income states, except for very specific, 
technical advice. The ‘global’ strategy evolved into a mechanism for generating 
support, funding and expertise to launch a largely pre-determined set of initiatives in 
low-income countries.
B. The contribution of the research.
The contribution of this research is twofold. On an empirical level, it has gathered 
data on a complex set of relationships between the WHO and Britain and Zambia. It 
has then extended policy network theory to a discussion of the developing country 
policy environment and to international policy communities, both of which have been 
identified as a research priority. The research indicates that network theory can be a 
useful way of understanding and explaining policy outcomes in international policy 
interventions. In the first chapter, I discussed Lee and Walt’s (1995) study of the 
effect of decades of international agency pressure to promote family planning 
programmes in low-income countries. The authors assert that receptivity to these 
pressures was a function of a) improving relations with the Western community and b) 
economic crisis, which had given governments less room to resist international 
pressure. I argued that these two determinants were paradoxical. Either governments 
were ‘forced’ to adopt policies, or they chose to because they believed them to be 
convincing.
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By disaggregating the notion of a unitary ‘state’, policy network theory can explain 
this apparent contradiction. In Zambia, different state agencies adopted the terms of 
the Global AIDS Strategy for different reasons. Staff at the Ministry of Health were 
undoubtedly extremely concerned about HIV/AIDS and supportive of the WHO/GPA 
initiative. Regular international conferences and contact with WHO staff reinforced a 
liberal public health consensus about the disease. In contrast, a senior-subset of 
government led by the President strongly disapproved of the whole basis of the 
WHO/GPA’s initiative. Despite showing no apparent interest in stopping an inflow of 
funds from abroad, they were able to use political interventions to curtail its effective 
policy implementation.
It is however, on a second level that the research makes a more useful contribution. 
By comparing the relationship between WHO and two countries of such radically 
different political and economic stature, it has allowed for examination of two veiy 
different yet inter-related processes. The case study of Britain describes the process 
by which knowledge is constructed and disseminated by international collaboration 
between experts. The case study in Zambia looks at the way this knowledge is used 
and applied in developing countries. These two processes are inseparable, different 
sides of the same coin. Yet the academic tradition of treating them as separate — one 
the domain of international relations, one of development studies — means that many 
of the assumptions that underpin aid interventions are never fully explored.
During the course of this research some of the interviewees expressed surprise, even 
indignation at the apparent naivety of the comparison of the relationship between the 
WHO and Britain and Zambia. These respondents — without exception the 
consultants and staff of international aid agencies — expressed the view that ‘of 
course’ the WHO was not for industrialised countries, it was for developing ones. 
This is an interesting assumption. The UN system, including its specialised agencies 
like the WHO, was predicated on the principles of universality. Similarly, the Global 
AIDS Strategy was endorsed as just that, a global strategy. Yet clearly, there are very
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real differences between the member states and these differences radically affect the 
way they are perceived and the nature of their relationship to the international 
community more generally. These interviewees, caught up in the frustrating and 
upsetting complexities of implementing policies in developing countries were offended 
by the comparison because it seemed to ignore or downplay the real problems there. 
O f course agencies like the WHO have to focus their efforts in low-income regions 
like Africa. After all, African states are desperately impoverished and have no funds to 
launch extraordinary interventions. Unlike the industrialised countries, they have 
limited expertise and poor information on which to base policy. In the circumstances, 
it is only right that international agencies focus their efforts on advocacy and technical 
support in developing countries.
Such assumptions underpin many of the day-to-day activities of international agencies. 
These types of assumption, however, explain the way the programme developed. The 
research shows that in Britain and Zambia’s earliest responses to HTV/AIDS were 
relatively similar. In both countries, doctors and NGO workers collaborated with each 
other to put AIDS on to the government agenda. Both formed special committees to 
advise government on the issue and both launched a government-sponsored public 
education campaign in 1987. Yet after the initial period of consensus-building, 
WHO’s relationship with the two countries diverged dramatically, a difference 
underpinned by the assumptions I have outlined. If  developing countries lacked 
resources, then what was needed was a flow of funds from North to South. It lacked 
experts, and needed expatriate consultants. Its administration was inadequate to 
tackle the problem, so it needed a new office run by WHO administrators. Finally, its 
reluctant government needed to be taught that AIDS was a serious problem. 
Advocacy became an important part of the WHO/GPA’s intervention, organising and 
funding a series of seminars for civil servants.
This research indicates, however, that WHO/GPA’s interventions went on to under- 
perform for precisely the reasons it was launched in the first place. There were no
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resources to fund the day-to-day costs of interventions as they were conceived by the 
WHO/GPA. The ‘expertise’ from international organisations was often inappropriate 
for the circumstances. An approach based on individual responsibility for the 
prevention of AIDS proved relatively ineffective in circumstances where many people 
either perceived ‘risk’ differently from those in the West, or lacked autonomy to 
choose the extent to which they exposed themselves to it. The WHO/GPA created an 
administrative structure with which to tackle AIDS, but found that it was never able to 
integrate its activities with existing state organisations. Instead, it became embroiled 
in a lengthy process of on-going reorganisation. Finally and most importantly, senior 
members of government were deeply hostile to liberal AIDS interventions and could 
not be seen to actively condone them for fear of alienating an important part o f its 
constituency: fundamentalist Christians. The result was to create a bureaucratic 
response with a limited effect at controlling HTV/AIDS. In the process, the combined 
efforts of government and donors overlooked the resources that were available: 
religious and community groups, the existing government bureaucracy and the 
traditional leadership.
The strength of basing research on a comparison of the two countries is that it helps to 
expose some of the assumptions that underlie overseas development assistance. It 
explains how and why relationships differ and what effects these differences had on 
policy evolution. It is widely acknowledged that development interventions are 
frequently organised within a Western template (Caiden and Wildavsky, 1974). This 
research makes these comparisons explicit, laying bare the process of very different 
relationships. It brings the Third World onto the centre stage of the debate on trans­
national policy making.
The case studies in this research were chosen for their intrinsic interest. They are not, 
and were never intended to be ‘representative’ in the statistical sense. Despite this, I 
would argue that it is still possible to use evidence from these case studies to make 
theoretical generalisations. In this thesis I have identified a particular form of ‘donor-
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dependent’ policy network, consisting of a relatively large number of weakly 
accountable state agencies each of which has a limited but not decisive influence over 
policy outcomes. The effect of such networks on policy outcomes is to make 
interventions relatively bureaucratic and relatively top-down. I would argue that such 
networks operate in similar, low income, heavily indebted countries and that their 
presence may make a significant impact on the development of policies more generally. 
If this is the case then, rather than being a one-off ‘learning’ experience, the problems 
in operationalising the WHO/GPA’s Global AIDS Strategy look to be part of a more 
underlying problem of the complex and compromised political environment in which 
policies are made in low-income, donor-dependent states. In the 1970s, Caiden and 
Wildavsky (1974) put forward a compelling argument for why donor-sponsored 
attempts at central planning in low-income countries were persistently failing. The 
authors argued that economic plans were specifically designed to raise government 
revenue, develop infrastructure and develop skills. Paradoxically, however, in order to 
be operationalised effectively, these plans would require appropriate resources, an 
established infrastructure and a skilled public sector. The result was to create a 
profusion of administrative structures, and industrial plant that failed to achieve their 
objectives of economic and political development because the conditions that would be 
required to make them effective were not in place.
Nearly fifteen years later, the design of the Global AIDS Strategy reflected similar 
weaknesses as those described by Caiden and Wildavsky. Though the Strategy used 
the language of ‘co-ordination’ and governance rather than that of now discredited 
economic planning, it was still an essentially Western programme. The Strategy was 
based upon an ideal-type of administrative structures and policies from the West which 
were then used as a template for interventions in the South. It also assumed 
conditions that were not in place. What was left after a decade of donor interventions, 
is the administrative apparatus without the services. Viewed in this light, forty years 
of development interventions since independence have left an archaeology of 
abandoned, inappropriate administrative structures and projects. The failing lies not in
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the individual projects themselves, but in the policy environment in donor-dependent 
countries. Heavily indebted, resource-poor states are persistently failing to develop 
appropriate local responses to problems while donors continue to fund bureaucratic 
infrastructures. Until mechanisms are in place for ensuring policy-making is more 
sensitive to the needs and capabilities of individual countries, donor-funded 
interventions will continue to under-perform.
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Appendix one: Interview Schedule
Request whether I can use a tape recorder and whether the interviewee would like to 
remain anonymous
Obtain brief details of the interviewee’s current status and professional background. 
Give brief explanation of the Global AIDS Strategy (showing diagram of its structure 
if necessary) and explain the main objectives of my research.
1. I would like to ask you about your experience of the WHO/GPA’s Global 
AIDS Strategy
What, i f  anything, was its impact upon your organisation?
Was this association formalised (through joint-ventures, project approval etc) or 
more informal?
What, i f  anything, do you see as having been its overall contribution?
2. Have you, or your organisation, ever tried to influence WHO/GPA policies?
What happened?
3. To what extent do you feel that the WHO/GPA strategy was appropriate and 
effective in the circumstances?
4. To what extent do you think the objectives of the strategy were actually 
achieved?
Why do you think this was the case?
5. Are there any other individuals or organisations you think it would be useful 
for me to talk to?
Notes on questions
Question one was designed to be as non-directive as possible. I wanted to hear the 
respondents own account of the way the WHO/GPA impacted upon them without 
directing them as to whether any impact was formal, informal, financial or non­
existent. After allowing them to elaborate on this, I gave them a more specific prompt 
about particular forms such an impact might take to try to ensure all possible forms of 
involvement were discussed. The final prompt was designed to invite more general 
discussion about the strategy as a whole. While it may not have affected a particular 
organisation, they may have views about its impact more generally.
Question two was designed to explore issues about consensus. Were organisations 
broadly in agreement with the overall strategy or were there pockets of domestic 
resistance? To what extent and by what means were any differences resolved? I 
wished to explore networks of communication and the process of policy negotiation.
In many ways question three had the least direct relevance to my specific research 
objectives. I originally intended it to be a safety net to questions two and four, where 
people could talk about the ways in which conflict was managed. In practice, it 
turned out to be one of the most productive questions. Those people who been 
slightly guarded, as though they should be giving the ‘right’ answer discussed this, 
more general question much more animatedly. Indirectly, the question produced 
detailed information about the way interest groups actually manage and negotiate 
practical difficulties and ideological differences.
Question four was designed to elicit information about the implementation process 
and the way in which different groups perceived the overall success with which the 
strategy’s objectives had been achieved. Question five was designed to do a 
‘snowball sample’ of relevant organisations. I wanted to expand the original list of 
interviewees to include those organisations who may have been influential in the
development of HTV/AIDS policies in a way that was not envisaged in the Global 
AIDS Strategy.
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